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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
Judges of formal courts in Nigeria and South Africa do not easily have access to the contents of 
customary law they are required to apply in the course of adjudication and this has been a 
major challenge.  This thesis examines the processes that courts adopt in the ascertainment 
and application of living customary law in Nigeria and South Africa in order to discover factors 
that influence the ascertainment and application of customary law. This research is qualitative 
in nature and utilises both doctrinal and empirical methods to make its findings.  It examines 
the conceptualization of customary law in the context of the research against positivist and 
pluralist theories and analyses the doctrine of judicial discretion against relevant theories on 
how it impacts on the ascertainment and application process. The thesis also examines the 
current laws and procedures that regulate this exercise to discover how it contributes to what is 
ascertained by the court. For its primary sources, it utilised data obtained from the semi-
structured interviews conducted, and, records of proceedings of cases on customary law heard 
by the formal courts in Nigeria and South Africa within a fifteen-year period. The secondary and 
tertiary sources utilised include text books, journal articles, official reports and publications, 
and other literature. It identifies factors within the purview of institutional, substantive, 
procedural, socio-economic and political factors, as well as other factors that influence how 
judges exercise discretion in the ascertainment and application of living customary law. The 
thesis states that these factors contribute in varying degrees, to enhance or impede the 
ascertainment and application of living customary law by these formal courts.  It therefore 
proposes the consideration of these factors in the policies that seek to develop measures that 
would enhance the ascertainment and application of living customary law by the formal courts 
in Nigeria and South Africa.  
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Chapter One 
 
1 Background to the research 
This thesis conducts doctrinal and empirical research in order to identify factors that influence 
the process of ascertainment of customary law adopted by formal courts in Nigeria and South 
Africa. 
There is growing recognition of the need to affirm customary law in contemporary 
African societies, including Nigeria and South Africa.1 Nigeria’s and South Africa’s experience 
with implementing customary law span their pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. 
During these periods, formal and informal institutions (with the exception of formal institutions 
for the pre-colonial era) played crucial roles in ascertaining, interpreting and enforcing 
customary law, and in its sustenance and jurisprudential development or under development. 
The reception of English Common Law and other forms of law in Nigeria and South Africa, atop 
pre-existing systems of customary law, including Roman-Dutch law in South Africa, gave birth to 
pluralistic legal systems.2 The received systems co-existed with very diverse systems of 
customary law, with the former enjoying dominance.3  Customary law became subjected to 
limitations imposed by colonial laws, and subsequently by national constitutions, statutes and 
judicial pronouncements. 
 Some landmark decisions by the apex courts of both countries have received 
universal acclaim for their significant contributions to the development of customary 
law.4However, concomitant with the acclaim are serious concerns that in a number of cases, 
                                                          
1
Ntlama N ‘The application of section 8(3) of the Constitution in the development of customary law values in South 
Africa's new constitutional dispensation’ (2012) 15 PER 29. 
2
Legal pluralism describes legal systems that encompass more than one legal tradition. In itself, pluralism describes 
a ‘situation in which two or more legal systems coexist in the same social field’ Merry S E ‘Legal pluralism’ (1988) 
22 LSR 22 870. See also Allott A N ‘International development of customary law: The restatement of African law 
project and thereafter’ in Bennett T &Runger M (eds) The ascertainment of customary law and the methodological 
aspects of research into customary law: proceedings of workshop February/March 1995 LRDC Namibia, 31. 
3
Rautenbach C ‘South African Common and customary law of intestate succession: a question of harmonisation, 
integration or abolition’ (2008) 12 EJCL 2. 
4
 For e.g. see Hinz M O ‘Bhe v the Magistrate of Khayelitsha, or: African customary law before the Constitution’ in 
Hinz M O & Helgard K Patemann (eds) The shade of new leaves Governance in traditional authority: A Southern 
African perspective (2006) 267; Mmusinyane B ‘The role of traditional authorities in developing customary laws in 
accordance with the Constitution: Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa (2009) 12.3 PER.  See also Mojekwu & Ors v 
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the processes adopted by formal courts to ascertain customary law led them to apply versions 
of customary law that are different from those in usage by the particular communities.5  These 
concerns have long been acknowledged. In 1953, Allott used the phrase ‘colossal pyramid[s] of 
error’ to describe customary law versions that are products of judicial decisions, but are 
markedly different from the actual practices of the people.6 Would the description fit recent 
judicial pronouncements on customary law? Concerns about such errors are not misplaced; 
judicial versions of customary law may offer great advancements in the jurisprudence of the 
law, without expressing or developing actual living customary law.7 Yet such judicial versions 
become binding (as part of state law albeit their limitations to be effective socially), even 
though they annul an important principle that gives customary law its essence. Ordinarily, 
customary law derives validity not from judicial authority, but from the people’s acceptance to 
be bound by it.8 Ngcobo J. acknowledged this problem of distortion in Bhe & Others v 
Khayelitsha & Others:9 
 The evolving nature of indigenous law and the fact that it is unwritten 
have resulted in the difficulty of ascertaining the true indigenous law as 
practiced in the community. This law is sometimes referred to as living 
indigenous law. Statutes, textbooks and case law, as a result, may no 
longer reflect the living law. What is more, abuses of indigenous law 
are at times construed as a true reflection of indigenous law, and these 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ejikeme & Ors (2000) 5 NWLR 40; Mojekwu v Iwuchukwu (2004) NWLR (Pt. 883) 196; and Modjadji v Ngwenyama 
and Another (CCT 57/12) [2013] ZACC 14 (30 May 2013). And also Onuoha R A ‘Discriminatory property inheritance 
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abuses tend to distort the law and undermine its value. The difficulty is 
one of identifying the living indigenous law and separating it from its 
distorted version. 
There are other cases that raise concern on the ascertainment and application of living 
customary law.10 One identified reason for this concern is the process of ascertainment 
adopted by the court. In Motsoatsoa v Roro and Another11 for instance, the court had to 
determine whether a valid customary marriage that complied with the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act12 was concluded between the applicant and the late son of the first 
two respondents. The requirements prescribed by the Act are that both parties must have 
attained the age of 18, and consented to the marriage; and that ‘the marriage must’ [have 
been] ‘negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary law’.13 To 
determine whether the third condition was satisfied, it was necessary for the court to ascertain 
the procedural requirements for concluding a valid customary marriage, as stipulated by the 
customary law to which both parties were subject. The court accepted the respondents’ 
position that there was no valid customary law marriage because the applicant was never 
handed over to the deceased’s family. Whether the court’s choice of customary law 
represented the living customary law that applied to the parties is a subject of interest and it 
was a decision that was subject to the judge’s exercise of discretion. The judge’s exercise of 
discretion may have been influenced by factors which may have enhanced or impeded the 
ascertainment of the relevant living customary law since a number of considerations play out in 
the exercise of discretion. This research identifies factors that affect the process of ascertaining 
customary law by courts. The research will present ideas and options for a more effective 
process.  
How judges approach the ascertainment of customary law, or why their approach often 
results in what is called ‘colossal pyramid of errors’, may be explained through the 
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considerations they make in exercising judicial discretion in the ascertainment and application 
of customary law. The research therefore carries out a conceptual analysis of judicial discretion, 
a concept of the theory of positivism juxtaposed with legal formalism and realism against the 
background of legal pluralism. This thesis states that the exercise of judiciary discretion under 
positivism juxtaposed with realism and formalism fail to provide justification for judicial 
ascertainment of customary law which results in the application of distortions of living 
customary law.14 
In the process of ascertaining customary law, the court adopts two ways or approaches, 
namely by judicial notice and by leading evidence to establish customary law as fact.15 It is 
important to distinguish between these processes, approaches and methods of ascertainment 
for the purpose of clarity in this thesis. The process of ascertaining and applying customary law 
is part of the broader court process of adjudication. While the ways/approaches are utilised in 
the process of ascertainment (or establishment of customary law) by the court, in adopting 
either of the approaches, the court utilises the methods as aids. 
In this thesis, ‘methods’ refer to the various means in which customary law is 
ascertained within and outside the court. They include declarations by local authorities of the 
contents of customary law (which may be given the force of law as secondary legislation), 
judicial precedents,16 codification,17 restatement,18 opinion of experts regarding particular 
customary laws,19 texts,20 manuals,21 customary courts case book analysis,22 the use of 
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assessors,23 the opinion of native chiefs, academic records obtained through questionnaires,24 
and self-statement.25  These methods aid the ascertainment process adopted by the court.  
The broader process of ascertainment refers to the proof, that is ways in which 
customary law is ascertained or established in court and the course adopted by the judge to 
filter the evidence advanced, which usually includes the methods, to prove the applicable living 
customary law. It also includes evidential procedure under the law of evidence, and other 
(extraneous) factors that influence the judge’s choice of the applicable customary law whether 
directly or indirectly.  
In South Africa, ‘[a]ny court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state and of 
indigenous law in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty.’26 
The provision presupposes to some degree that the version of customary law of which the 
court takes judicial notice is the correct statement of the living customary law.  This may indeed 
be so, if the procedure adopted in ascertaining that version of customary law really did lead to 
a statement of the actual living customary law, or where the lived version has not moved away 
from the judicial version of which judicial notice is being taken. The critical question then is how 
would a court determine with certainty that the version of which it takes judicial notice, is the 
applicable living customary law? What factors influence the court in ascertaining living 
customary law? 
Again, if the judge chooses to require proof of customary law as fact, what process does 
s/he adopt to ascertain the applicable living customary law? How does the judge sift through 
the evidence placed before him/her, to arrive at the appropriate living customary law? 
According to Woodman, the process of proof is uncertain and is ‘a large area for intriguing 
research into the sources of judges’ opinion on these frequently uncertain matters in different 
jurisdictions.’27It is important that the process adopted by the court ascertains the living 
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customary law in order to achieve justice and not trample on the people’s notions and 
anticipations of justice.28 
The process is also crucial to the need to preserve customary law as ‘an original source 
of law’ that is at par with other sources of law, and which, like the common law, can be 
developed as the need arises.29 According to Ngcobo, J. in Bhe v Khayelitsha, customary law 
‘must be considered on its own terms and “not through the prism of common law.”30  Like all 
laws, indigenous law in South Africa now derives its force from the Constitution’.31  Pertinently, 
‘[i]ts validity must now be determined by reference not to common law but to the 
Constitution.’32 This thesis investigates the process adopted by formal courts for ascertaining 
customary law in Nigeria and South Africa with a view to determining the adequacy of these 
processes to secure the application and development of living customary law.  
Academics (including anthropologists) and even judges agree on the need to discover a 
well-defined process for formal courts to ascertain customary law.33 However, the factors that 
affect ascertainment must first be identified through a review of the current processes of 
ascertainment utilised by judges.34 Typically, judges apply the principles of evidence and courts’ 
rules of procedure, but other factors apparently affect their analyses. These could include the 
court’s desire for constitutional compliance, the science of judging, and such other factors that 
will be explored in the course of the study. This is buttressed by Woodman’s assertion that 
formal courts are incapable of ascertaining living customary law and that once traditional courts 
become formal courts, they too cease to apply living customary law.35 This is because the 
norms become institutionalized and assume a different form to fit into the formal courts based 
on ‘distortions as a result of misunderstanding and of the perceived need to make the 
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customary law applicable to state institutions’; Himonga has argued that other factors, such as the 
structure of the courts and their closeness to the people whose customary law is under consideration, 
may be relevant.36This debateraises much broader questions beyond the process of 
ascertainment and application of customary law which is the focus of this thesis. The analysis in 
this thesis is limited to its focus. 
This thesis is based on the hypothesis that where formal courts fail or succeed in 
applying living customary law, it is due to a combination of factors - some of which may be 
intrinsic and some extraneous to the court institution, rules and procedures - that impede or 
enhance their ability to properly ascertain customary law. The study seeks to determine what 
these factors are and how they affect the discretion of the judge in the ascertainment process. 
Therefore this research was conducted against the background of how the doctrine of 
discretion plays out in the ascertainment and application of customary law. 
 
2 Research objective 
The research pursues two primary aims: 
1. Theoretical aims: 
(a) Analyse the contextual application of the doctrine of judicial discretion under the theory 
of positivism against legal formalism and realism in ascertaining and applying living 
customary law under legal pluralism. 
2. Practical aims: 
(a)  Examine the processes and challenges of ascertaining customary law by formal courts in 
Nigeria and South Africa;  
(b) Identify the factors that influence the process utilised by formal courts to ascertain living 
customary law in cases. 
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3 Research question 
To achieve the above objectives, the thesis will seek answers to this overarching question: 
What factors inform the judge’s determination and application of living customary law?  In 
addressing this question, the thesis will also examine the following: 
1. Whether judicial versions of customary law are justified by the concept of judicial 
discretion under the theories of legal positivism, formalism and realism against the 
backdrop of legal pluralism; 
2. The processes formal courts adopt to ascertain and apply customary law and how these 
enable the ascertainment of living customary law. 
4 Categorisation of customary law 
The local law applicable to indigenous peoples in Africa is the focus of this research and has 
been referred to by different terms such as ‘indigenous law’, ‘native law’, ‘native law and 
custom’, ‘native customary law’, ‘African law’ and sometimes  simply ‘customary law’.37 
‘Customary law’ will be the term used in this thesis because it is commonly used to refer to this 
law and it is the term used in the Constitutions and some of the legislations discussed in this 
thesis.  
Generally, ‘[c]ustomary law derives from social practices that the community concerned 
accepts as obligatory’.38  Woodman however cautions that choosing the definition of customary 
law that is most suitable to a particular task is more important than making a universally 
acceptable definition.39 He also cautions that in seeking to define customary law, the judicial 
version of customary law should not be ignored.40 This is because this version compels 
enforceability over other versions. Woodman’s caution provides the reason for this research. 
Where the courts fail to ascertain the living version, the ‘judicial version’, which may be a 
distortion, becomes binding and enforceable in state institutions over the version practiced by 
                                                          
37
African Conference on Local Courts and Customary Law which held in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika 8
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the people, although in practice the living customary law continues to be practiced and 
enforced within the communities. 
Customary law is generally categorised into two versions. The first, the official version, is 
produced through the participation of the state,41 and reduced into writing by codification, 
restatement, and precedent (which may include academic writings that have been affirmed in 
court judgements). Stewart describes it as ‘the captured and formalised version that are 
recorded in the law reports, built upon and interpreted through an Anglo-Saxon Roman-Dutch 
law procedural and substantive law filter’.42 Woodman brands the official version as  the 
‘lawyer’s version’,  a mix of different sources that includes the adulterated version of the 
traditional chiefs, rules processed and developed in colonial courts and decisions that are 
products of such developments.43 This is what was handed over to ‘post independent Africa’ as 
the official customary law.44 It ceases to retain the attributes of customary law, and can be 
different from the actual living customary law.45 By nature, customary law evolves to 
incorporate changing norms in the society.  Courts that focus attention on the official version 
fail to properly ascertain the current version of customary law. They may however do so if they 
are conscious of the current social realities.  
The second version is called the ‘living version’ and it describes the current normative 
practice that is accepted by the generality of the community as binding.46 It has been referred 
to as ‘sociologists’ customary law’,47 ‘folk law’,48 and ‘unofficial law’.49 Given the right 
circumstances, it may be captured as official customary law but it will be subject to the 
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criticisms discussed in chapter four. This is the version that presents the challenge of 
ascertainment to the courts.50 
 
5. The problem with ascertaining customary law in formal courts in Nigeria and 
South Africa. 
Customary law requires ascertainment for purposes of adjudication and development in the 
formal courts. Since it is impracticable for the judge to embark on empirical research to 
ascertain customary law, it is expedient for the judge to have aids.  
The factors that affect the ascertainment of customary law are not peculiar to courts of 
general jurisdiction. Different factors may affect courts that are within the formal court 
structure differently. There are customary courts in the formal court structure presided over by 
qualified legal practitioners, while the others are led by lay judges who are presumed to be 
conversant with the actual customary practices of the people within their jurisdiction. However, 
the adoption of these courts as part of the formal court structure has created challenges on the 
knowledge of the applicable customary law. Additionally, in certain circumstances, lay judges 
still require the proof of some customary laws because the heterogeneous nature of 
communities made up of people with diverse cultures and customary laws necessitates this.51 
An example is the difficulty of resolving disputes between persons who, while belonging to the 
same community, are subject to different systems of customary law because they belong to 
different ‘villages, clans, lineages or households’ within that community.52 
 
6 Research justification 
Customary law still regulates the lives of an overwhelming majority of the populations of 
Nigeria and South Africa, in ways that affirm their distinct cultural worldviews and traditions.53  
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Nigeria’s estimated population of over 180 million people54 consists of more than 500 
languages55 and about 350 ethnic groups.56 Each ethnic group has its own distinct customary 
law systems which are also distinguished along lines of community, clan, and even family. The 
diversity of customary law systems in South Africa is not much different.  The country has a 
population of over 50 million57 people, distributed across 11 official languages and several 
ethnic groups that have distinctive customary law systems also along lines of community, clan, 
and even family.58 The diversity of these ethnic systems is a reality that cannot be ignored from 
a legal or anthropological point of view.59 
Constitutions, national legislation, and various international and regional instruments 
attest to the vital place of customary law in African societies.60 In South Africa, the Constitution 
provides for the recognition of the people’s right to practice their culture. It also provides for 
the development and application of customary law on an equal pedestal with other sources of 
law,61 as an ‘original source of law’ in its own right.62 The Nigerian Constitution creates 
customary courts and acknowledges that these and other courts of general jurisdiction may 
apply customary law.63 Integrating customary law into mainstream law in Nigeria and South 
Africa has entailed integrating customary courts into mainstream systems.  However, the 
affirmation of customary law as an original source of law would entail much more than a 
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fixation on integrating court structures. It should also entail, as a desirable and necessary 
object, the integration of customary law jurisprudence into mainstream jurisprudence.  
For the purpose of this research, the formal institutions of adjudication in Nigeria and 
South Africa are courts established by the constitutions and statutes of both countries as 
forming their court structures with jurisdiction over customary law disputes.  In South Africa, 
they are the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, the high courts, magistrate 
courts and the courts of chiefs and headsmen.64 In Nigeria, they are the Supreme Court, the 
Court of Appeal, the high court, magistrate courts and customary courts (known by different 
designations). They are successors to the former native courts that operated prior to and during 
colonial rule.65 Nigeria operates a specialised customary court of appeal, which is at par with 
the high court. The court hears appeals on customary law disputes from customary courts and 
is constituted by both legal practitioners and non-legal practitioners who are versed in 
customary law and who preside together over disputes. 
These courts in both countries have constitutional responsibility to subject customary 
law to constitutional standards, the bill of rights, and other statutes.66 They are therefore in a 
position to contribute to the development of customary law, that is, if they can successfully 
wade through the challenges of ascertaining what the laws are. 
Himonga asserts that ascertainment of customary law by courts is ‘an acknowledged 
problem’ and Hinz describes the methods of ascertainment applicable in the process of 
ascertainment as problematic.67 For instance, a witness’ testimony of a customary practice may 
be tainted by ‘ignorance, bias or corruption’.68 Also problematic is determining where it is 
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appropriate to utilise judicial notice,69 to use assessors, referees and referrals.70 Another 
dilemma arises when it is reduced into writing.71Unlike common law, the doctrines of equity 
and codified law, customary law consists of oral traditions that are impressed upon the hearts 
of those who know them,72 and are evolving73 and flexible74 and it therefore loses its essential 
qualities of flexibility and adaptability when reduced into writing. It becomes fixed and ceases 
to be a true reflection of the evolving practices of the people.75 There is also the risk that it was 
not accurately captured in writing. Therefore writing or codifying customary law stultifies its 
development in these respects. Hinz explained that codification will deprive customary law of 
Its openness to accommodate reconciliatory solutions to 
problems, instead of allowing the law to win over the parties. 
Customary law is particularly open to negotiations: not only 
those required to achieve solutions acceptable to all the parties 
to a case, but also those that navigate between the application 
of different laws.76 
 
Some of these methods of ascertainment may present factors that obscure the 
discovery of living customary law. 
South Africa is chosen as a case study because ascertainment of customary law as in any 
African country has been problematic. Added to this is the important position customary law 
now occupies and the potential for development it is open to.77 Nigeria is used as a case study 
also because ascertainment of customary law had been problematic and, for its distinctive 
customary court system from which additional factors may be identified. 
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The rationale for this thesis is hinged on the fact that customary law is not easily 
ascertained,78 and that flawed ascertainment processes conduce to flawed impositions that are 
anything but customary law, but are nevertheless passed off as such, to be observed as every 
judicial decision should be. These problems call for a resolution of the process of ascertaining 
customary law. This thesis proceeds on the premise that identifying the factors that stand in the 
way of effective ascertainment will greatly enhance the development of living customary law.  
7 Literature review 
This literature review is to simply highlight the works that influenced this study especially in 
identifying gaps that make this research necessary. It is nonetheless vital to state here that 
literature review undertaken in this study permeates the entire thesis. 
Attention was given to the need to ascertain customary law at the conference on ‘The 
Future of Law in Africa’ which was held in London in 1959/60.79 Since then, the need for 
customary law to achieve easier ascertainability and certainty has remained a concern.  In his 
analysis of the subject at the conference, Allott concluded that the different ‘machineries’ 
utilised by courts to prove customary law were not fool proof. That is, they do not adequately 
aid the court in ascertaining the living customary law.80 However, his work was generic in 
reference to Africa and not specifically, as in this case, to Nigeria and South Africa. Besides, the 
structure of the courts, as well as the socio-economic and political changes in both countries 
which give rise to new factors are expressed differently. While it discussed some of the 
methods of ascertaining customary law in court which supports the background of this 
research, his work was limited to mere examining (without investigating) how it works in 
practice and in particular, in customary courts.81 At any rate, he pointed out that how process 
of ascertainment works in practice continues to require research and is crucial to its 
development and effective application by judges.  
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At a 1963 ‘African Conference on Local Courts and Customary Law’, the subject was 
again raised.82 Discussions explored the possibility of improving the measure of certainty in the 
methods of recording customary laws. The ascertainment of customary law was also 
acknowledged as a predicament that must be addressed. Although the conference faulted the 
use of written records of customary law as aids for ascertaining customary law,83 it did not 
address the focus of this research. 
Most of the papers that have been written in this field focus on improving the methods 
of ascertainment of customary law, rather than on the process adopted by the courts. 
Chanock,84 Ubink, 85Hinz86 and Kwena87 in their respective writings assert the defects in the 
various methods of ascertaining customary law and tried to find solutions in one method or the 
other88 but hardly address factors that would aid the process of judicial ascertainment of 
customary law.  
Bekker and Van der Merwe89argue that despite the constitution’s elevation of the status 
of customary law, its evolving nature makes it necessary that it be ascertained through 
evidence led before the court and not only through judicial notice as is the case with Common 
law. In analysing the proof of customary law in court, with reference to particular cases, the 
authors acknowledged irregularities that called for further scrutiny of the approach to prove 
customary law in courts.90 They also acknowledged that the provision of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act did bestow discretion on the judges in the application of judicial notice.91 
 While ensuring compliance with constitutional principles when interpreting or 
ascertaining customary law may indeed be beneficial, it is also capable of unwanted 
consequences. Himonga and Manjoo92 have argued that subjecting customary law to 
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constitutional reform threatens its demise. They find evidence of this in pieces of legislation 
and pronouncements of the Constitutional Court that have replaced customary law with the 
principles of Roman-Dutch law and common law in the areas of succession and marriage,93 and 
point out that this will lead to the ossification of the customary law. To prevent ossification, the 
authors recommend limitations on legislative interventions, and reiterate the need for a more 
authentic process of ascertaining customary law on a case-by-case basis. They have also 
suggested the inclusion of customary law in the training curriculum of judges.94 However, they 
did not address the focus of this thesis.  In a separate paper, Himonga called for ways to 
strengthen the techniques currently used to ascertain living customary law.95 Strengthening 
these techniques requires a critical look at the factors that influence the court’s choice of 
customary law in cases before it so as to identify the weaknesses and strengths of the 
techniques currently utilised. 
Tonwe and Edu96 have discussed the process of proving customary law through judicial 
notice and evidence. Eri,97 and Keay and Richardson98 also discussed the need to engage 
assessors to enhance the ascertainment of customary law by the court. They however did not 
discuss the factors that influence judges in the formal court structures for effective 
ascertainment of the living customary law. These oversights are significant. According to 
Wieland Lehnert,99 lack of understanding of the nature of customary law and the drive for 
constitutional compliance are the reasons for the failure to ascertain the living customary law in 
some South African cases. Lehnert’s focus was however on the harmonization of ‘customary 
law with human rights’. It did not analyse cases with a view to discover the range of factors that 
affect ascertainment.  
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Elias has written extensively on the concept and nature of customary law which provides a 
good base for this research with respect to the nature and concept of customary law and an 
understanding of these is crucial for research of this nature.100 The same applies to the works of 
Allot,101 Woodman,102 Kerr,103 Chanock,104 Seymour,105 Bennett,106 Dlamini,107 Okany,108 Ndulo, 
Koyana, Himonga, Rautenbach,109 and, more recently, Mnisi-Weeks,110 Mwalimu,111 Tobin,112 
and by the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies113 which have contributed to giving this 
research a firm base. Bennett’s paper on ‘Re-Introducing African Customary Law to the South 
African Legal System’114 was insightful on the courts’ path in ascertaining customary law in 
South Africa.  
Woodman and Himonga115 agree on some factors that affect the judge’s ability to 
correctly ascertain the applicable living customary law. These include insecurity, convenience, 
personal experience and others. These present a good basis for this research even though they 
did not engage the depth of research undertaken for this thesis. Other relevant texts and 
writings are mentioned across the chapters and worthy of mention are the texts and papers on 
the relevant theories and doctrines discussed in chapter two. This research seeks to determine 
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the factors by examining the process leading to the court’s decision through case analysis, 
interviews and the relevant laws. 
 
8 Scope and limitations of the research 
The focus of this research is not to ascertain customary law, but to analyse the process of 
ascertaining and applying customary law for the purpose of identification of factors that 
influence how the judges arrive at what is ascertained.116 The study does not seek to indicate 
the proportionality of the factors but merely seeks to identify the factors that determine the 
ascertainment and application of customary law in both countries.   
The research commenced with a contextual analysis of customary law which permeates 
the chapters with respect to its ascertainment and application. It also carried out an analysis of 
the concept of judicial discretion under different theories as it relates to the ascertainment and 
application of living customary law. Apart from the brief history of the process of ascertainment 
by courts in Nigeria and South Africa, the discussion of each method of ascertainment in 
chapter four includes historical accounts of their utilisation. 
The doctrinal aspect of the research is restricted to the doctrinal sources listed under 
the methodology. While the materials utilised are majorly for Nigeria and South Africa, other 
materials on other countries in Africa and beyond are utilised for a broader analysis and 
appreciation of certain practices and other issues pertaining to the research subject.  
For the empirical aspect of the research, interviews were conducted with judges 
including chiefs and headmen, court registrars and clerks. The research is restricted to 
concluded cases alone. This is because the research analyses records of proceedings which 
includes judgements to identify factors in the context of the research. The thesis however does 
not claim to identify all factors intrinsic and extrinsic to the courts’ rules, procedures and 
evidential principles but those that appear glaring to the researcher. 
The adjudicatory institutions that form the object of this research are restricted to the 
formal courts. The research analyses civil cases in customary law because the private lives of 
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the indigenous people are mainly regulated by customary law. The research also did not restrict 
the civil cases used to a particular subject because there are not too many cases that are 
available for analysis and the same process of ascertainment and application of customary law 
apply to all categories of civil cases. For South Africa, decided cases from the superior courts of 
record, namely the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court, were 
analysed. The Constitutional Court is considered because it is the final arbiter with respect to 
matters of customary law related to constitutional provisions and the application of the Bill of 
Rights. The same applies to the Supreme Court of Appeal for non-constitutional matters. The 
High Court is considered for two reasons; first, cases that fit into the nature of analysis 
proposed in this study are few in the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
Secondly, the process of ascertainment is usually more thoroughly carried out at the High 
Court, being the original trial court amongst courts of superior jurisdiction.  For the lower 
courts, decisions by the magistrate court and the court of chiefs or headsman were analysed. 
Appeals from decisions of the court of chiefs and headsmen go to the magistrate court, where 
the process of ascertainment usually commences because the court of chiefs and headmen 
should be versed on the applicable customary law. 
For Nigeria, the similar reasons offered above apply with respect to the courts except 
that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter in all matters including constitutional matters. 
Decided cases from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court and the Customary 
Court of Appeal in Nigeria were analysed. The Customary Court of Appeal provides a unique 
perspective. For the lower courts, cases decided in customary courts are analysed. Since 
decisions of customary courts are usually not appealable to magistrate courts in Nigeria, 
magistrate courts are excluded from this research. The research also excluded sharia courts. 
Although Islamic law is regarded as customary law in Nigeria,117 it is a distinct legal system, with 
a different nature from customary law, primarily sourced from the Quran and hadith and not 
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indigenous to the people.118 In addition, the fact that it is recorded also gives it a nature that is 
quite different from customary law.119 
Finally, the scope of this research excludes the determination of practical norms.120  It 
acknowledges the limitations of the challenge faced by courts in determining the point at which 
a particular customary practice can be said to have generated into a binding norm that requires 
the force of law for enforcement.121In such instances, what may be presented to the court may 
best be described as practical norms but this is not considered in this thesis. Rather the 
research is limited to what will direct the judge towards ascertaining living customary law.  
The 2011 Court of Appeal Rules in Nigeria which were analysed in this research were 
repealed and replaced by the Court of Appeal Rules No. 17 2016 which came into effect on the 
6th of December, 2016 after the analysis of the data. It is important to note that this new law 
does not affect the substance of this research since the substance of the rules as it affects the 
court’s role in the ascertainment and application of customary law in the Court of Appeal 
remain the same. 
 
9 Research methodology  
It is important to commence by stating that while the main points of my methodology are 
stated here, other details with direct reference to the chapters will be related at the respective 
chapters for clarity. 
The methodology combines doctrinal and empirical research. The thesis analysed 
sources such as constitutions, legislation and decided cases with specific cases analysed using 
the records of proceedings obtained from the courts.122 Analysis was also carried out on 
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secondary and tertiary sources such as text books, journal articles, official reports and 
publications and other literature. The research is qualitative in nature and customary law civil 
cases at the various courts decided within the last fifteen years counting from 2015were 
utilised as primary data and analysed for its findings.123Consequently, the South African cases 
analyzed are those cases settled under the current Constitution. During this time, judges 
became responsible for ensuring the continued existence of customary law as a distinct source 
of law at par with the Common law and the Roman-Dutch law. The Nigerian cases analyzed are 
also those cases decided during the pendency of the current Constitution which subjects every 
source of law to the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution. Of necessity, records of 
proceedings of cases that went on appeal and the judgment of the final appellate court was 
given within the 15 year range were also utilised even if the judgments of the preceding courts 
were given earlier than the fifteen year range.  
The empirical aspect of the research involved interviews with judges and registrars of 
formal courts as a ‘primary method of field research’124 and the data were used as primary 
sources. For both countries, there were instances where sitting judges could not be accessed 
despite repeated efforts. So both sitting and retired judges who were presiding over or had 
presided over courts with jurisdiction to hear matters with customary law were interviewed.  
The first phase of my empirical research involved identifying and obtaining relevant 
cases to be used for case analysis. The second phase involved interviews. Records of 
proceedings were obtained for all court types within my scope. At the lower courts in North 
West Province, South Africa, some of the records obtained were written in vernacular and were 
translated by an experienced translator. 
The interviews conducted were no identifiers and were semi-structured. Open ended 
questions were utilised and many times further questions were asked for clarification. The 
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qualitative research method of conversational personal interview was used.125 Triangulation of 
methods was employed in analysing the data.126 
The findings are primarily based on data garnered from interviews conducted with 
judges and traditional leaders (where applicable) and triangulated with the records of 
proceedings of cases decided by the courts and analysed for the purpose of this thesis. Data 
were also garnered from court registrars, and these as well as the relevant laws were also 
utilised where necessary. The judges were interviewed to gain insights into how they exercise 
discretion as they ascertain and apply customary law to cases before them and what factors can 
influence this process. Chief registrars and other court registrars/clerks were interviewed to 
obtain information on how the administrative running of the courts can affect this process and 
what range of factors may emanate from them. The records of proceedings were utilised to 
scrutinize how the courts have so far, ascertained and applied customary law and, to identify 
what factors have featured in impacting this process. The relevant laws were analysed to 
determine the legal framework of this process, and identify the loopholes and strengths that 
impact on this process. All these specifically respond to the research question. 
In South Africa all the registrars interviewed besides one are qualified lawyers. In 
Nigeria, all the chief and deputy chief registrars interviewed are qualified legal practitioners 
with several years of experience in practice or at the lower bench before their appointment.  
Other court and general registrars interviewed comprise of both lawyers and non-lawyers. 
The research analysis utilised is both descriptive and explanatory. ‘Explanatory’ answers 
the ‘why’ questions while ‘descriptive’ answers the ‘what’ questions. The thesis utilises a 
contributory explanatory approach.127 That is, some of the factors identified will be correlated 
and may jointly contribute to the outcome of the version of the customary law ascertained.128 
For instance, a judge’s training and orientation may both contribute to the ascertainment of a 
particular version of customary law. The contributory approach simply means that the factors 
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identified could produce the consequence of ascertainment of a distorted or appropriate 
version. This approach may be ‘probabilistic’ or deterministic.129 It is ‘probabilistic’ where, for 
instance, despite the factors identified, it may not necessarily lead to the ascertainment of a 
distorted version of customary law. It is ‘deterministic’ where the factors identified invariably 
lead to the ascertainment of a distorted version by the courts.  The doctrine of judicial 
discretion is also utilised in the descriptive and explanatory research analysis.130 It is vital to 
state that the study does not seek to indicate the proportionality of the factors but merely 
seeks to identify the factors that determine the ascertainment and application of customary 
law.   
The method of sampling adopted is stratified and purposive and also based on 
availability. The subjects and participants were selected to represent the categories of courts in 
Nigeria and South Africa with jurisdiction to hear customary law matters. Their selection was 
also due to their relevance to the object of the research and the research question.131 The 
courts each have defined jurisdictions in the strata of the hierarchies of the court systems. The 
records of proceedings utilised were obtained from these courts and the judges interviewed 
were either serving in these courts or had served in them and had heard cases in which 
customary law was applied, some of which are analysed in this thesis. Sometimes the snow-
balling approach was utilised in the selection of the particular court and judge interviewed 
based on the recommendations of contacts. 
 The locations132 for the field work are where the formal courts are located. For Nigeria, 
research was carried out in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja for the simple reason that 
it has within its geographical borders the Supreme Court and all the court types that constitute 
the subject of this research which are the Court of Appeal, high court, customary court of 
appeal, and the customary courts. Research was conducted in four customary courts located in 
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three out of the six Area Councils within the FCT. Research was conducted in the customary 
courts in Garki (Abuja Municipal Area Council), Gwagwalada, Dutse (Bwari Area Council), and in 
Kubwa (Bwari Area Council) respectively located in urban (Garki) and semi-urban (Dutse, Kubwa 
and Gwagwalada) areas with Gwagwalada having a large population of its indigenous 
communities.Three judges sit in each of these courts and I interviewed only one judge from 
each of the courts.  
For South Africa, the research was carried out at the Constitutional Court in Gauteng 
Province and, Bloemfontein where the Supreme Court of Appeal is located. For the high court, 
magistrate court and courts of chiefs and headsmen, the research was carried out in the North 
West Province. This is for the sole reason that it was the only place I could locate courts of 
chiefs and headmen that keep records of proceedings and this was after months of making 
enquiries via email, phone calls, contacts and even travelling to meet contacts. The choice of 
the magistrate courts and high court in the same province was because appeals from the chiefs’ 
courts go the magistrate courts and thereafter to the high court.  
I was referred to the magistrate court in Mahikeng by a judge at the high court in 
Mafikeng on the understanding that I would find relevant information there.  I was equally 
referred to the magistrate court at Lehurutshe by a magistrate and a contact who had 
previously done some academic research there for the same reason.133 The choice of this court 
was also for the additional reason of its location (not too far from the chief’s courts) and the 
fact that it heard appeals on cases from the chiefs’ courts I researched. The choice of the chief 
magistrate court and regional magistrate court in Mafikeng, the capital of North West, is for the 
additional reason that it is an urban area which hints of cosmopolitanism and gives an insight 
into how the judges ascertain and apply customary law in heterogeneous settings with respect 
to customary laws foreign to them.  I was referred to the chief’s court in Gopane by an 
academic researcher because it kept records of its proceedings. I was also referred to the 
chiefs’ courts in Dinokana and Witklegat Moshana by the officer in charge of the Tribal 
Authority Office in Lehurutshe because they form part of the Bahurutshe Clan which is 
                                                          
133
For his honours and master’s degrees in sociology from the University of Witwatersrand. 
  26 
 
 
 
comprised of seven chiefs made up of Gopane, Moshana Bagalencoe Witklegat, Dinokana, 
Suting, Tshiete and Motswedi in no particular order in the North West Province. 
I conducted a pilot study at the Cape Town Regional Magistrate Courts at Cape Town 
City and Wynberg as well as at the Chief magistrate’s court also in the city of Cape Town. 
Through the pilot study, I noticed gaps in the information I obtained in relation to my research 
question. I framed further interview questions which I utilised in my field work. 
Prior to my field research, I had obtained ‘ethics clearance for research involving human 
participants’ from the Faculty’s Ethics Committee. Several communications via emails and 
several phone calls were made with the registrars of the courts where I obtained records of 
proceedings and conducted interviews in South Africa, and with my contact in Nigeria months 
before the proposed date of the interviews. I obtained letters of introduction from the 
university and permission to carry out research from heads of the courts where the research 
were carried out. Regardless of these, I still encountered a number of challenges. The letters 
were delayed due to the post office strikes that lasted for months, inadvertence of the 
administrative staff who forgot to convey these communications to the head of court in South 
Africa, the busy schedules of the judges and reluctance to grant interviews on the part of a high 
number of the judges and a few registrars.   
After the approval of my ethics application, I made a total of five trips to the various 
locations of my research to enable me obtain court records of proceedings on the cases 
selected for my research and to conduct interviews. I conducted a total of 50 interviews 
comprising of 21 in South Africa and 29 in Nigeria. Thirty-one judicial officers134 were 
interviewed which include traditional chiefs, a chief’s deputy, and a senior councilor who is the 
chief’s uncle and his ‘right hand man’.135 Sixteen were interviewed for South Africa and fifteen 
for Nigeria.  
The total number of records of proceedings utilised for this research covered 98 cases 
with 55 from South African courts and 43 from Nigeria. Records of proceedings were more 
easily accessible in South Africa. 
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Country      Total 
 Supreme 
Court 
Court of 
Appeal 
High Court Customary 
Court of 
Appeal 
Customary 
Courts 
 
Nigeria 9 9 8 7 10 43 
       
 Constitutional 
Court 
Supreme 
Court of 
Appeal 
High Court Magistrate 
Court 
Courts of 
Chiefs & 
Headmen 
 
South 
Africa 
7 8 14 11 15 55 
     Grand 
Total 
98 
Table depicting the number of records of proceedings analysed per court in both countries. 
 
The records of proceedings utilised in this research were obtained from the respective 
courts in person. With respect to the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
North West High Court, in South Africa, the cases were sighted online on the Saflii website 
using the search engine to locate all cases that had customary law content by searching with 
the word ‘custom’. A further scrutiny was made to determine whether and to what extent the 
cases related to the subject of this research. It is necessary to state that at these courts, a 
request was made for the latest judgments at the time of the research to confirm that no 
relevant case was left out and this was determined. At the magistrate courts, the records of 
proceedings of cases in which judgment was given within the 15 year range for the research 
were produced and were perused and those relevant to this research were selected. Most of 
the records of proceedings utilised for the chief’s courts were obtained from the records 
submitted to the chief magistrate courts Mafikeng and at Lehurutshe on appeals.  
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The process of selecting cases was more stringent for Nigeria. There were very few 
judgments posted on line and where there were, they were not in a manner such as that done 
by the Southern African Legal Information Institute (Saflii) for South Africa from which a search 
engine could assist in locating those with customary law issues. Some Supreme Court cases 
were identified on line and the judgments had to be read to determine whether or not they 
would cover areas relevant to the research. For the Court of Appeal, customary court of appeal 
and customary courts, however, a request was made for all the judgements of the courts’ 
division within the period of this research which were made available to the researcher. The 
judgements were perused to determine which ones were relevant to the subject of the thesis 
but some of the records could not be found despite several efforts to locate them.  
Records of proceedings of cases on appeal to the Supreme Court decided by other 
divisions of the Court of Appeal were utilised.  There is only one Court of Appeal for the entire 
Country with several divisions including the Abuja division and the judges are regularly 
circulated within short durations around the divisions. Therefore any of the judges could sit 
over such matters depending on what divisions they are at, at the particular point in time. 
Analyzing cases decided in other divisions (appealed to the Supreme Court) would generally 
represent the position in the Court of Appeal. After all the Abuja division was selected for this 
research solely because of its geographical proximity to the Supreme Court and other courts 
researched and not because of any peculiarity it possesses.  
The jurisdiction of the high court to hear chieftaincy matters was transferred to the 
Customary Court of Appeal so I could not identify any matter with customary law question 
decided in the high court in Abuja. There are however some narrow instances where the high 
court could hear matters with customary law questions. However, despite seething efforts, of 
speaking to the chief registrar, various registrars, heads of departments such as the probate 
department, and various legal officers136 to the various judges, and going through several 
judgements, and at an old archive,137no relevant customary law case could be located. 
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Extensive time was spent at the Judicial Research Centre138 located within the premises of the 
high court which has a database of the courts’ decisions from 2010 in soft copies.  
I did however obtain records of proceedings of cases decided by the high court of other 
states including those bordering Abuja that share similar jurisdiction with the high court in 
Abuja and appeals from their decisions go to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. These 
records were obtained from the records of proceedings at the Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court from the cases analysed. These high courts utilise similar civil procedure rules to that 
operative in Abuja, and their procedures are regulated by common federal legislations such as 
the Evidence Act. Their judges are also similarly qualified and trained under a uniform 
curriculum, and are similarly promoted to the Court of Appeal (which serves the entire Country) 
under the same criteria. The judges are all regulated by the same code of conduct and assessed 
by the Nigerian Judicial Council and all attend courses at the Nigerian Judicial Institute.  
The criterion utilised in selecting the cases in all courts is their relevance to the research 
i.e. within the subject of the research and the year bracket. Because there were not that many 
cases available, almost all cases that were found were selected. 
It is important to state here that this thesis is not explicitly comparative in essence, since 
its primary aim is to identify factors that influence how judicial discretion is utilised in the 
process of ascertaining and applying customary law by courts. Of necessity, comparison is used 
as a tool because the thesis engages case studies in two jurisdictions.139 However, it is simply 
employed here as merely a method of enquiry140 in the context of this thesis.141 After all, one of 
the types of studies described as falling under comparative law, according to Peter De Cruz, is 
one that ‘analyse[s] objectively and systematically solutions which various systems offer for a 
given legal problem’.142Comparison will be used as a tool in analysing the distinctive 
peculiarities that feature in the factors identified in the case studies of Nigeria and South Africa. 
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This is in line with Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz who define comparative law as ‘an 
intellectual activity with law as its object and comparison as its process’. 
The form of comparison utilised here is beyond the analysis of just the ‘black letter 
rules’ but includes how they address the process of ascertainment and application of customary 
law in a practical functional way within the context of the ‘procedural and institutional 
frameworks’ of both jurisdictions.143 This form also includes the social context surrounding the 
legal rules bearing in mind that it is done within a lawyer’s ‘context’ and would not include the 
epistemological engagements of an anthropologist to the extent of ‘epistemological scepticism 
of the postmodernists.'144 
Though comparative law has acquired various techniques and methods145 this thesis 
adopts a technique relevant to its legal and operational context146 which is mainly the 
functional approach but could include elements from any of the methods since the methods 
are interrelated and are known to include similar elements.147 Besides, scholars in comparative 
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law, including Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, acknowledge that there is no agreement on the 
methodologies to be followed.148 
Esin Orucu asserts that there is no standard methodology for comparative law and that 
comparison is only possible where data is available and obtainable.149 He also states that 
comparatists choose a variety of methods depending on the context.150  In essence, the thesis 
in its expositions and analysis reveals similarities and differences between the two jurisdictions 
studied within the scope of the subject of this research and the research question.151This is 
done in an attempt to enhance the process of ascertainment and application of customary law 
in the formal courts which is its primary focus.  
This thesis not only studies the applicable laws and rules, but includes how they function 
through their judicial institutions and actors ‒ judges ‒ within the two jurisdictions facing 
similar challenges with the ascertainment and application of customary law. This is to discover 
the factors that influence the judge’s discretion in this situation152in order to enhance the 
‘development of the domestic legal system[s]’.153It is vital to state here that the primary 
objective of this thesis is not to proffer solutions to the challenge of ascertainment and 
application of customary law but to discover factors that influence the judges’ role in this 
regard which should indicate how the solutions could be proffered. 
Of essence, customary norms are very central to the engagement with comparative law 
in Africa because it is one of its main sources of law.154 The thesis also utilises the technique of 
micro-comparison by focusing on just an aspect of the legal systems of both countries, i.e. the 
comparison is focused on the legal rules and practice that pertain to the focus of this research 
and not necessarily based on the legal systems.155 
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African legal systems have been excluded in major text on comparative law.156 Also 
noteworthy is that most of the texts and materials on comparative law and judicial discretion 
are with reference to western and positivist law and not on African customary law. Some of 
these writings are however applicable here because an essential part of the work is regulated 
by positivist and Eurocentric law except for the customary courts in Nigeria and courts of chiefs 
and headmen in South Africa where it is partly regulated by the applicable customary law. An 
attempt was also made to pitch customary law into these theories merely for the aspects that 
apply to it.  
It is vital to state that the presentation of the findings are my perceptions of the issues 
involved after careful consideration and that this thesis does not claim to have identified all 
factors present but merely identified factors that appear glaring to me. It is also important to 
state that since the interviews conducted are no identifiers, my presentation is done in a way 
that conceals the identity of the interviewees.157 
 
10 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into four parts. The first – Part A – which comprises chapters 1 and 2, is 
focused on the concepts, contexts, methodology and theories. The second – Part B – 
comprising chapters 3 and 4 is focused on the process adopted by formal courts in Nigeria and 
South Africa in the ascertainment and application of customary law. The third – Part C – which 
comprises of chapters 5, 6 and 7, is focused on the factors that influence the ascertainment and 
application of customary law in formal courts of both countries. The fourth – Part D – is the 
conclusion which draws on the themes covered in the preceding chapters is composed of 
chapter 8.  
Chapter one focuses on the background of the research which explains the concept and 
general applicability of customary law in Nigeria and South Africa. It states the research 
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question, its aim and justification, and has a brief literature review of scholarships on 
customary law in Nigeria and South Africa. It also articulates the problem statement which is 
the challenge in the process of the ascertainment and application of customary law. It explains 
the limitations of the research and the extent of its scope as well as the methodology adopted. 
 Chapter two commences by examining the concept of customary law in the context 
of this research, including its statutory and judicial definitions. It engages relevant theories of 
pluralism and positivism, the doctrine of judicial discretion and briefly the theories of formalism 
and realism in relation to customary law and the exercise of judicial discretion in its 
ascertainment and application. It also engages problems associated with this concept in the 
formal courts in Nigeria and South Africa. The chapter tries to position the ascertainment and 
application of customary law in debates on how judicial discretion should be exercised to find 
its own notch.  
 Chapter three examines the process of ascertaining customary law in both countries 
and analyses one of the ways through which customary law is ascertained and applied which is 
judicial notice. It explains the problems of ascertainment of customary law during colonial 
times, states the current court structures with jurisdiction to hear customary law matters, 
analyses how customary law is ascertained through judicial notice and discusses the challenges 
with this form of ascertainment in both countries.  
 Chapter four focuses on the second way customary law is ascertained and applied in 
the formal courts of both countries which is through proof as facts by evidence. It distinguishes 
how this is done in courts of general jurisdiction and courts specifically set up to hear 
customary law cases. This chapter discusses the various methods utilised under this approach 
and brings out the criticisms for each of the methods as a basis for the assertion that they do 
not adequately aid the ascertainment and application of customary law in the courts and 
specifically in the courts of Nigeria and South Africa. 
 Chapter five is a thematic presentation of the institutional and substantial factors 
identified from the empirical data and records of proceedings from courts of superior 
jurisdiction in both countries. This presentation pertains to how the factors concerned influence 
the ascertainment and application of customary law with respect to the discretion exercised by 
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judges in this context. It explains how these factors enhance or mar the ascertainment of living 
customary law.  
 Chapter six is a thematic presentation of the procedural and socio-economic and 
political factors also identified from the empirical data and records of proceedings from courts 
of superior jurisdiction in both countries. These factors influence the ascertainment and 
application of customary law specifically, with respect to the discretion exercised by judges in 
this context. Again, it also explains how these factors enhance or mar the ascertainment of 
living customary law.  
 Chapter seven is also a thematic presentation of the factors identified from the 
empirical data and records of proceedings but from courts of lower jurisdiction in both 
countries that influence the ascertainment and application of customary law. This presentation 
is also with respect to the discretion exercised by judges and chiefs in this context. It explains 
how these factors enhance or mar the ascertainment of living customary law.  
 Part D is comprised of chapter eight which is the conclusion. It summarises the main 
points of the chapters and broadly analyses the effect of the factors identified. It states that 
judges do indeed exercise discretion in the ascertainment and application of customary law and 
several factors do influence how this discretion is exercised. Some of these factors are directly 
derived from and are associated with the court institution, rules and procedures, and others are 
extrinsic to it. Sometimes the discretion exercised by judges is mild and sometimes wide and 
well outside the rules of court and the principles of law of evidence. The conclusion proposes a 
model process and states that the factors identified provide a platform upon which a process 
that enhances the ascertainment and application of living customary law can be nurtured. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Conceptual Nature of Customary Law, Theories and Doctrines 
 
2.1 Introduction 
For many decades in legal scholarship, African customary law was evaluated through the lenses 
of western legal concepts.1  This approach to studying African customary law ignored or 
diminished the value of indigenous African law. Fortunately however, the approach began to 
yield steadily to a new wave of scholarship that promotes and seeks to understand indigenous 
African law as a distinctive value system in its own right.2 The shift is indeed apposite, and has 
been motivated by the fact that how law is conceptualized has moved away from being fixated 
with state made and state enforced rules to include the participation of other institutions in the 
broader context of social relations3  that create legal obligations. However, the shift has had its 
challenges especially with regard to ascertaining customary law. The introduction of English 
legal principles, the conceptualisation of legal education in Africa according to western legal 
thought or theories has been a major setback in the manner that indigenous African law has 
been conceptualised in legal scholarship. This set back has also affected how customary law is 
interpreted and applied frequently by western-style courts. As a result, different views about 
African customary law have been developed by individuals, scholars and courts that have had 
dealings with it.  
The divergence in perceptions about customary law makes it imperative to explain the 
context in which customary law is used in this thesis and to state the basis for analysing its 
ascertainment and application by formal courts. It should be pointed out however, that it is 
inevitable that this analysis must be worked out in a pluralistic context. Societies in which a 
customary law system exists are typically pluralistic; customary law is made to co-exist with 
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other systems of law, and its relevance is asserted within that pluralistic context.  Although 
Nigeria and South Africa operate within the precepts of state centralism, they are nonetheless 
pluralistic legal systems.  
Centralism describes legal systems that recognize only laws that are made by the state 
which are ‘uniform’, ‘exclusive’ and administered by only state institutions.4 Such a statist 
approach denies the existence of other systems of law such as customary law, except to the 
extent that they have been enacted into law. The recognition of living customary law not 
enacted into law in South Africa adheres to centralist precepts because this recognition is made 
by constitutional provisions that were interpreted by the Constitutional Court.5   However, the 
existence of customary law as well as other state and non-state legal systems in both countries 
is evidence of the operation of a pluralist system and this thesis therefore adopts Griffith’s 
position that legal centralism is a myth.6 The existence of customary and other systems of law 
make the legal systems of both countries pluralist.   
In a pluralistic state, whether weak or strong, customary law as a normative system 
exists as law.7 In South Africa, which falls under both categories, customary law is regarded as 
state law at par with other sources of law but subject to the Constitution and other legislation. 
In Nigeria, which also falls under both categories, the recognition accorded to customary law by 
the Constitution is tacit. The Constitution does not expressly affirm customary law as a system 
of law, though it provides for a system of customary law adjudication, and subjugates it to the 
Constitution, English law and statutory law.  
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The regulatory framework that underpins the recognition, ascertainment and 
application of customary law tends to support and foster official versions of customary law 
rather than living customary law which describes the people’s daily practices or lived realities.  
The challenges of ascertaining the relevant living customary law make the use of judicial 
discretion inevitable in customary law disputes. The laws of evidence and procedure in Nigeria 
and South Africa allow significant latitude for the exercise of judicial discretion when applying 
customary law. The latitude may lead to the failure to apply living customary law even for the 
sake of achieving legal certainty.8 
This thesis argues that the exercise of judicial discretion cannot justify the failure to 
ascertain and apply living customary law by the courts. This study is partly undertaken on the 
basis that judicial discretion is a field that is yet to be adequately explored with respect to the 
application of customary law by courts in a pluralistic legal system.   This chapter examines the 
conceptual nature of customary law and the concept of living law, the implications of its 
statutory definition and its sources in both countries. The chapter also offers an analysis of 
judicial discretion, using relevant legal doctrines that help to explain the application of judicial 
discretion in the ascertainment and application of customary law by formal courts. 
 
2.2 The conceptualization of customary law 
This section broadly looks at the conceptualization of customary law as a basis for how it should 
be ascertained and applied by the courts. Hence it is used as the premise upon which the 
statutory definitions of customary law in both countries are considered in order to determine 
whether they point to what should be ascertained and applied in court. The section also 
discusses living customary law and explains relevant terms that feature in the thesis.   
The legal systems of Nigeria and South Africa operate along the line of positivism and 
illustrations of their underlying positivist leaning can be found in the jurisdiction of state courts 
to apply state laws.  The analysis of the process of the ascertainment and application of 
customary law is conducted on state institutions established and validated along positivist 
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practice. Thus, while in its essential nature, living customary law may not be regarded as state 
law or positivist law, its formal recognition by state courts and other state institutions creates 
official versions that may be regarded as part of state-made (positivist) law.9 Customary law is 
state law only when it is formally acknowledged as such. In the real sense however, it is not 
positivist law but encompasses social realities and practices that form the basis of its existence 
as norms operative in communities which are referred to as living customary law. Yet, by its 
very nature and operation, customary law cannot be described as positivist, or contained within 
the structures of positivist law.   
This thesis aligns its view in part with Van Nieberk’s that living customary law in the 
absence of state acknowledgement is law in its own right; but also agrees with Himonga et al 
that it is state law and may also be termed as positivist law due to its formal acknowledgement 
by the State.10 
Moore’s description of customary law supports this position.  Using the analogy of the 
‘semi-autonomous social field’, she wrote that a number of legal systems exist simultaneously 
and are interdependent of each other in every society, and described such legal systems as 
social fields that have ‘rule-making capacities, and the means to induce or coerce compliance’.11 
In her view, no society can exist without law. Pertinently, a society’s social institutions ‒ 
inclusive of indigenous institutions ‒ have legal features.12 To understand the entire legal 
system of a society therefore, it becomes necessary to understand the entirety of its people, 
institutions and operations.13 This makes customary law a necessary part of understanding a 
society’s legal culture.  
The imperative of such an approach cannot be overemphasized where the society has 
elements of legal pluralism.14 Therefore, customary law cannot be excluded from the status of 
law because it is not officially recognized by the state. This approach is in tune with the concept 
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of legal pluralism which states that more than one legal system exists in a state and are 
separately administered by state and non-state institutions.15 This also agrees with the 
conceptualization that law does exist outside state structures as expounded by Malinowski,16 
Schapera17 and Bohannan.18  Whether law is seen as mere ‘mutual obligations’ between 
individuals with ‘sanctions and incentives residing in ordinary social relations’ as promoted by 
Malinowski or as legal rules capable of being enforced by institutions such as the courts as 
espoused by Schapera, Pound, Hoebel and others,19 Moore argued that the conception of law 
has strayed from that promoted by Malinowski to include the participation of institutions and 
organisations in the ‘context of legal obligations’.20 
This thesis therefore attempts a convergence of the conceptualization of customary law 
on a social premise from a sociological and anthropological point of view with the judicial 
process in a positivist’ legal system as operates in Nigeria and South Africa. Commenting on 
Moore’s notion of interdependence existing among semi-autonomous societies, Himonga and 
Bosch state that this suggests that state courts may sometimes ‘apply norms of living 
customary law’21 and it is that law that ought to be ascertained and applied by formal courts 
endowed with jurisdiction to do so. According to Himonga and Bosch, the South African 
constitutional provision on the right to culture is an indication of weak positivism which ‘implies 
the recognition of theoretical frameworks of law that lie outside the legal positivist approach to 
law’, in this case, legal pluralism.22 
The legal systems of Nigeria and South Africa may be rightly described as positivist. 
Regardless of the wide disparities in their views, positivists generally have the same underlying 
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philosophy.  Legal positivism highlights the ‘conventional’ character of law:23 law is a social 
conception that is founded on norms that have been put forward in court decisions, legislation 
and even through practice.24 According to positivists, the legitimacy or authority of law derives 
from its source, the ability to execute it, and its efficacy, rather than on some moral or ethical 
grounds like the preservation of human rights.25 
 Legal positivism boasts of foremost philosophers like Jeremy Bentham,26 John Austin,27 
and Hart.28 In Austin’s theory of law, law is a command of the sovereign.29 That people obey the 
law which emanates from the sovereign30 because the sovereign enforces compliance through 
the threat of punishment. The sovereign however, is not bound by his own command (law) or 
subject to any other (external) command. The effect of Austin’s theory is that law derives its 
authority from its source (the sovereign) rather than the content.31 
Hart’s approach to defining law differed from Austin’s. His work, ‘The Concept of Law’32 
was devoted to answering the question ‘What is law?’33 Hart argued that there are internal and 
external dimensions to rule compliance. While external dimensions (or factors) are focused on 
the ‘observable regularities of behaviour’, the internal factors explain why people obey the law 
in effective legal systems.34 Internal factors illustrate why individuals ‘feel bound by the law’ 
and people develop a sense of ‘obligation to obey the law’ rather than feel ‘obliged to obey it’ 
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because they have internalised it, or as Hart described it, they have an ‘internal point of view’ 
about the law that engenders a sense of obligation to comply with it.35 
According to Hart, in order to answer the question ‒ ‘What is law’ ‒ several attempts 
have been made by eminent legal practitioners, jurists and academics. A few of these attempts 
are:  
 ‘“what officials do about disputes is … the law itself”’,36 
 ‘“the prophesies of what the courts would do”’,37 
 ‘“Statutes are ‘sources of law… not parts of the law itself”’.38 
These do not really reflect what law is but are simply a few features of law which do not 
cover all that it constitutes.39 
Holmes defined law as ‘prophesies of what the courts would do’.40 Arguably, this 
definition anticipated Woodman’s view that what courts declare to be the applicable customary 
law does in fact become law even when it differs from the lived normative practices of the 
people.41 This discrepancy results in the establishment of parallel normative systems as state 
and non-state law. The problem with this is that both systems – the actual customary practices 
and the official version of customary law ‒ become simultaneously binding, and potentially 
create a false impression of legal certainty with regards to official versions of customary law.42 
This anomaly accentuates the need for clarity about the meaning and nature of customary law, 
and how it can be identified. Notwithstanding these divergences in the views related above, 
they offer useful reflections regarding how rules of customary law emerge.43 Hence a brief look 
at the statutory definitions of customary law is necessary. 
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2.2.1  The dilemma of defining customary law 
Defining customary law requires delineating the sense in which the term has been used 
because anthropologists, lawyers, judges and others who take an interest in customary law 
provide different contextual understandings of the term.44 A clear understanding of what needs 
to be defined is also important because it goes to the heart of determining what 
medium/method ought to be applied when ascertaining customary law and whether the 
outcome of such processes of ascertainment reflects or captures the lived realities of the 
subjects over whom the customs hold sway.  
It is therefore important to consider statutory and judicial definitions of customary law 
in order to understand how courts view the normative practices that they are called upon to 
ascertain. Statutory definitions do not necessarily depict customary law accurately as the lived 
realities of the people to whom it applies.  Therefore, courts that rely on faulty definition to 
ascertain the applicable customary law in a dispute set off on a wrong premise, and end up 
ascertaining and applying something other than the customary law that the parties in the 
dispute actually recognise as normative.  
To buttress this point, King explained that a writer’s definition of law forms the ‘basic 
concept’ of his jurisprudence; in other words, his theoretical model of a legal system upon 
which he carries out his dissertation.45 In this context, for the legally trained lawyer/judge, 
ostensibly trained under a common or civil law legal system, it may simply be a set of ‘rules of 
law’ akin to what he is familiar with by virtue of his training.  The sociologist and anthropologist, 
are ‘more concerned with the interaction between law and the social and political system of a 
people, and in any case recognize that legal relationships are but a part of the total 
relationships between individuals in a society.’46 Even within the various courts actors like the 
judge adjudicating a case, the lawyer’s counsel to his client and even the ‘academic lawyer’ 
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embarking on a field research, customary law can be viewed differently.47 What is vital for this 
thesis however is what is eventually enforced by the court48 of which the court must get right.  
 
2.2.1.1  The implication of the definition of customary law under South African law 
The legislations that define customary law include the South African Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act49 and the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.50  The Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act uses the term ‘indigenous law’ and defines it as ‘the law or custom as applied 
by the Black tribes in the Republic’. Although the Act is silent on what would constitute ‘law or 
custom’, 51it can be inferred that ‘law and custom’ as used in the Act suggests a normativity 
that confers the status of law. This is the plausible sense to draw from the requirement in s 1 
(2) of the Act that either party may lead evidence with respect to the ‘substance of a legal 
rule’.52 Section 1 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act53 defines customary law to 
mean the ‘customs and usages traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of 
South Africa and which form part of the culture of those peoples.’ No definition is given in the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act54 of the terms ‘customary law’ and 
‘custom’ even though there are several references to the words  since part of the duties of the 
traditional leaders is the application of customary law in disputes before them.   
The 1996 Constitution does not define customary law.  It contains provisions that 
recognize and refer to customary law as a source of law, and acknowledges its existence in a 
number of ways. It gives recognition to traditional institutions and authorities that apply 
customary law55 and protects individuals from being discriminated against on the basis of their 
culture.56  It preserves the rights of individuals and of cultural, linguistic and religious 
                                                          
47
 The Editor op cit note 44 at 83. 
48
Ibid. 
49
No 45 of 1988. 
50
No 49 of 1996. 
51
Section 1 (1) & (4).Law of Evidence Amendment Act. 
52
Section 1 (2). 
53
120 of 1998  
54
41 of 2003. 
55
Section 211 & 212. 
56
Section 9 (3) of 1996 South African Constitution. 
44 
 
 
 
communities to speak a language or practice a culture or religion of their choice.57  The only 
limitation to enjoying these rights is that they must be exercised in a manner that is consistent 
with other provisions of the Constitution.58 
Provisions that make specific requirements regarding customary law can also be found 
in the Constitution. According to s 39 for instance, courts, tribunals and other fora must 
promote the ‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ when developing customary law,59 
and may not interpret the Bill of Rights to ‘deny the existence of rights or freedom that are 
conferred or recognised by … customary law in so far as the rights or freedom are consistent 
with the Bill’.60 In s 212(1) & (2) also, the Constitution acknowledges the existence of traditional 
institutions and authorities that are established and regulated by customary law.61 Subsection 
(3) of the provision states that customary law must be applied by the courts where applicable, 
subject however to the provisions of the Constitution and legislation.62 In s 315, the 
Constitution established ‘The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of 
Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities’ to ensure the continued existence of these 
cultures.63 It is vital to state at this early stage that customary rights exist and according to 
Nhlapo, some of them ‘coincide’ with the Western notion of human rights and some do not but 
they are not necessarily inimical to individuals and the society.64 
In sum, the implication of the definition of customary law under South African law is 
that it is broad enough to accommodate the distinctive features of customary law and it is also 
not restrictive to cut out practices that would be termed as customary law. 
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2.2.1.2   The implication of the definition of customary law under Nigerian law 
The Nigerian Constitution acknowledges the existence of customary law by establishing 
customary courts of appeal and vesting them with jurisdiction over customary law matters.65 It 
also requires that at least three of the justices of the Court of Appeal must be versed in 
customary law for the purpose of hearing appeals on customary law disputes.66 Based on the 
principle of constitutional supremacy, the application of customary law is subject to the 
provisions of the constitution.67 
The Evidence Act of Nigeria uses terms like ‘customary law or custom’,68 and, 
‘customary law and custom’.69 It defines ‘custom’ as ‘a rule which, in a particular district, has, 
from long usage, obtained the force of law’.70 It offers no definition for the term ‘customary 
law’. The obvious intent of this statutory provision is to confer the force of law on customs that 
have enjoyed long usage. Extrapolating semantically therefore, it may be suggested that under 
Nigerian Evidence Act, ‘customs’ and ‘customary law’ can be used interchangeably.  This 
definition is not broad enough to accommodate practices that would amount to customary law 
by the restriction of the phrase ‘long usage’. Of particular interest at this juncture, is the form of 
customary law that the courts enforce. To understand that form however, it is important to 
discuss the concept of living customary law. 
 
2.2.2  The concept of living customary law 
Eugen Erhlich, who is known for elucidating the concept of living law, explained that what 
constitutes law in a society must not exclude laws that exist in the people’s every day 
experience.71 In other words, law is not limited to legal rules that originate exclusively from the 
State.72 It extends to what lawyers consider as ‘non-legal social norms’ that do not fit into 
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conventional descriptions of hard law.73 Since Erhlich’s exposition, the concept of living law has 
been used by many scholars in diverse contexts such as Moore in her concept of ‘semi-
autonomous social field’ explained above. The concept formed the basis for the work of the 
American realist Roscoe Pound and a number of legal anthropologists.74 
In Pound’s view, law is ‘the body of authoritative grounds for decisions‘.75 Applied in the 
present context, Pound’s view explains the authoritative basis of a judicial decision that is 
grounded in customary law. Thus, even when the state does not officially recognise indigenous 
law, it would retain its essential character as living law. Calma also echoed the concept of living 
law when he described aboriginal customary law as organic. In his words, aboriginal customary 
law is ‘not frozen in the past, but a living, changing system that reflects its times, and will 
continue to grow and change, just as the common law continues to grow and change’.76 
Sociologist, lawyers and anthropologists reveal the following features of customary law.  
It is largely unwritten,77 and consists of rules that are binding on those who are subject to 
them.78 They are binding because a majority of the members of a particular ethnic community 
accepts them to be binding,79  or to regulate their behaviour, and to be enforced as such.80 
Typically where the customary law has been in usage for a long time and has not changed, then 
it remains binding. However, long usage is no longer an indispensable requirement.81   The 
important element in this regard, is that customary law evolves and is ‘flexible and pragmatic’.82 
Living customary law is never rigid, and this is what distinguishes it from official versions of 
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customary law. Some of what serves as official versions of customary law are ‘bounded by the 
rigidities of invented traditions’83 and, when applied by courts, have resulted in the application 
of distortions.84 
The concept of living customary law is enshrined as state law in South Africa through the 
constitutional provision that affirms it as ‘an original source of law at par’ with other sources of 
law.85 In the Mabena v Letsoalo,86  the high court of South Africa affirmed the concept when it 
held per Du Plessis J that ‘living law [denotes] law actually observed by African communities'87 
and that this, rather than official statements (or versions) of customary law is what courts have 
an obligation to ascertain and enforce in disputes involving customary law.  
The same concept of living customary law has also been affirmed in Nigeria since 1909. In 
the Nigerian case of Lewis v Bankole, where the court held that customary law ‘must be existing 
native law or custom and not the native law or custom of ancient times…’ (Emphasis added).88 
In KharieZaidan v Fatima Mohsen89 also, the Supreme Court defined customary law as ‘any 
system of law [that is neither common law nor statutory law], but which is enforceable and 
binding within Nigeria as between the parties subject to its sway’. In Oyewunmi & Anor v 
Ogunesan,90 the Supreme Court had this to say about customary law: 
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Customary law is the organic or living law of the indigenous people of 
Nigeria regulating their lives and transactions. It is organic in that it is 
not static, is regulatory in that it controls the lives and transactions of 
the community subject to it.  
This thesis will maintain that it is this organic version of customary law that ought to be 
ascertained and applied. 
2.2.3  Customary law terminologies 
As stated in the previous chapter, customary law goes by different labels that introduce some 
confusion regarding the content of customary law.   
 
2.2.3.1  Custom 
It is not unusual to see ‘custom’ and ‘customary law’ being used interchangeably. Schapera, 
writing on the Tswana customary law distinguished mere customary rules from legal rules that 
are capable of being enforced by the tribal courts.91 For Kerr, ‘law and custom’ refers to the 
‘system of law as a whole’.92 However, ‘custom’ also describes social habits or habitual 
practices that are observed out of some sense of social obligation, without being legally binding 
or enforceable.93 The ability of custom in this context to conform behaviour to certain social 
expectations is distinguishable from the ‘custom’ in Kerr’s ‘system of law as a whole’, which 
alludes to legally binding norms. In this thesis, it is used interchangeably with customary law 
unless indicated. 
 
2.2.3.2  Culture 
There are different definitions of the term culture.94 According to Kerr, ‘culture and law are not 
synonymous.’95 He argues that the makers and enactors of the South African Constitution 
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‘treated culture and law as different from each other’ and he therefore differs from the opinion 
of Himonga and Bosch that customary law is one of the constituents of culture and that culture 
as used in s. 30 of the Constitution demands ‘the application of the living customary law rather 
than the official customary law ...’96  This thesis’ position aligns with the view that customary 
law forms part of culture. In the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act,97 which Kerr referred 
to, customary law is defined as the ‘customs and usages traditionally observed among the 
indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of the culture of those peoples’.  
This definition suggests that a people’s culture includes legally binding customs. As far 
as customary marriages in South Africa are concerned, the Recognition of Customary Marriages 
Act subsumes customs and usages relating to marriage under culture. For the purpose of this 
thesis particularly, culture is taken to include the customary law applicable to the people. 
Myburg98 adopts this position and it is also buttressed by Ayinla’s views about African 
philosophy of law, that law is an essential portion of African culture and it cannot be separated 
from it since culture for the African encompasses the entirety of the different aspects of their 
lives.99 Similarly, in Du Plessis and Ors v De Klerk and Anor,100 the South African Constitutional 
Court 101 held that s 31 of the South African Constitution, 
[E]ven if interpreted narrowly as guarding only the individual’s freedom of cultural 
affiliation, would appear to require that customary law, which remains integral to the 
domestic culture of millions of South Africans, be accorded due respect. 
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The only reference to culture in the Nigerian Constitution is in the chapter on ‘the Fundamental 
Objectives and Directives Principles of State Policy’. According to s 20(a), the State shall 
‘protect, preserve and promote the Nigerian cultures which enhance human dignity and are 
consistent with the fundamental objectives as provided in this Chapter’.102 Even though this 
section is non-justiciable and cannot be enforced in a court of law in Nigeria, it remains a 
principle of State policy to guide relations between the State and its citizens. The protection of 
the right to culture in sections 30 and 31of the South African Constitution, and, section 20 (a) of 
the Nigerian Constitution includes customary law. 
 
2.2.4 Sources of customary law in Nigeria and South Africa 
The sources of customary law differ from community to community, depending on the pattern 
upon which the community is framed.103 Indigenous African political systems differ. Elias 
broadly categorises them into a centralised system of government with a paramount ruler and 
the decentralised (acephalous) where elders and respected members of the society are 
bestowed leadership roles. Therefore each political system may have different sources of 
customary law.104 According to Kerr, the sources of customary law include legislation, 
precedent, articles, custom, notes, commission reports, legal texts, and the records of 
anthropologists.     
The sources of customary law relied upon by courts in more recent times in the process 
of ascertainment and application based on the cases analysed and interviews conducted are 
more or less similar to these ones and include the communities themselves with the main 
distinction being the seeming underlying consciousness of the courts to view customary law in 
its own right as ‘an original source of law’.105  Kerr however omits the main source which is the 
community itself from which the customary law derives and which all other sources are subject 
to. 
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So far, this section explained that even though the positivist and state centralist systems 
practiced in Nigeria and South Africa through their laws and courts view customary law as law 
on the sole basis that it is so acknowledged by the state, customary law is actually law without 
such acknowledgement. The way it is defined by statute could cut out practices that constitute 
living customary law and that it must be viewed as beyond legal rules to include sociological 
and anthropological perspectives. It is only then that the court can know what to ascertain and 
apply to cases before it. Having discussed the conceptualization of customary law as utilised in 
this research, the discussion gives a purview of how judicial discretion can be exercised with 
respect to it.  
 
2.3 Judicial discretion: problematizing the ascertainment and application of customary 
law by formal courts 
This thesis analyzes the process of ascertainment and application of customary law based on 
the doctrine of judicial discretion under positivism. Hart’s extensive analysis of judicial 
discretion is relevant here due to the profound impact of his analysis in the theory of law and 
the doctrine of judicial discretion. Divergent views on judicial discretion based on other theories 
such as formalism and realism are also analysed and all these are done against the background 
of the concept and conceptualization of customary law under legal pluralism extensively 
discussed under 2.2 above. The reference to Hart’s postulations on judicial discretion is limited 
to how it impacts this thesis on the process of ascertaining and applying customary law in court 
 The analysis of the application of judicial discretion to the ascertainment and 
application of customary law is undertaken by first, applying the concept and conceptualization 
of customary law to Harts concept of law, to see whether or not and to what extent Hart’s 
hypothesis can be applied to it. This is also connected to the challenge that arises from the 
consideration of whether the utilization of judicial discretion in the process of ascertaining and 
applying customary law actually aid and justify what is ascertained by the courts. While the 
expositions of judicial discretion were made in relation to positivist laws, they find relevance 
and application in this thesis for the simple reason that the laws that regulate the 
ascertainment and application of customary law by the courts classify as positivist law. Both 
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legal systems are positivistic, and the judges of all the courts researched aside from the chiefs 
and headmen were trained under this ideology.  
  
2.3.1 Preface to judicial discretion 
It is important to first present the main points of Hart’s postulations. His views about judicial 
discretion are tied to his ‘concept of rules’. While Hart’s theory of law falls short of 
acknowledging a customary law legal system, his analysis of judicial discretion to an extent, 
reveals useful contribution to the process of ascertaining and applying customary law by courts. 
According to him, a legal system consists of primary and secondary rules that prescribe 
how things ought to be done.106 Primary rules prescribe dos and don’ts, while secondary rules 
regulate procedures for identifying, applying, modifying and interpreting primary rules. Both 
primary and secondary rules are social in nature, and comprise of social practices that have 
become normative.107 Primary and secondary rules exist in a complementary relationship in 
Hart’s ‘concept of law’. While primary rules establish standards, secondary rules provide an 
authoritative mechanism for identifying and enforcing compliance with those standards.108 
They ‘confer power, public or private ... or lay down rules governing the composition of powers 
of courts, legislatures and other official bodies.’109 In Hart’s words, 
[S]econdary rules specify the way in which the primary rules may be conclusively 
ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation 
conclusively determined. Secondary rules are chiefly procedural and remedial, 
and embrace not only the rules governing sanctions but also go far beyond 
them. Furthermore, these rules also extend to the rules of judicial procedure, 
evidence and the rules governing the procedure for new legislation.110 
Thus, secondary rules respond to issues about which public authority has responsibilities 
for making, amending and interpreting the law.111 Underpinning these rules is what Hart called 
the ‘rule of recognition’, the ultimate secondary rule to which all rules and the exercise of 
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public power must conform. 112 This rule eliminates uncertainty by prescribing how a public 
official can identify and accept a primary rule as applying to the particular community.113 It 
equally regulates the weight or level of priority that may be attached to a particular primary 
rule, depending on whether the primary rule is laid down by the constitution, legislation or case 
law, or whether it is a rule of requirement of customary practice.114 It reveals why a law is 
accepted by the people which is either because the constitution provides for it or because the 
legislature makes provision for it etc. and, which of its sources should have hegemony over the 
other.115 
It is important at this stage, to state the defects in Harts assertions concerning customary 
law in order to appropriately respond to some preliminary issues before engaging the doctrine 
of judicial discretion. First, while Hart acknowledges that law exists outside state law, he erred 
in classifying customary law as existing only in a pre-legal society because, according to him, 
customary law lacks an essential complement of secondary rules, which are necessary for 
determining what the primary rules are with certainty, and what their scope ought to be. 
Secondly, Hart inferably argued, using the concept of a secondary rule of change which 
regulates how laws change, that customary law lacks a legislative mechanism (Parliament) for 
abolishing, modifying or amending and replacing old primary rules with new ones.116 
Lastly, and having regard to resolving disputes, Hart also inferably argued that customary 
law offered no mechanisms.  As such, customary law must rely on social pressure alone to 
enforce compliance, which is grossly insufficient.  Put differently, Hart argued that customary 
law lacked a secondary rule for adjudicating disputes, which empowers certain individuals to 
ascertain and issue authoritative statements regarding whether a rule or the other has been 
violated, prescribe an adjudicatory procedure that must be followed, and define the various 
characters, functions and processes of the adjudicatory process.117 
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This thesis states here that the nature of customary law as law has long been established 
and contradicts Hart’s assertions. He described societies with only primary rules as lacking the 
necessary formal institutions for organising and regulating its social, legal and political affairs.118 
Such shortcomings of the pre-legal society may only be remedied by secondary 
rules.119However, the relationship between primary and secondary rules is not necessarily as 
Hart describes it for all indigenous societies in Nigeria and South Africa. Premised on paragraph 
2.2 above, African customary legal systems cannot be evaluated by Western construct about 
law and society, and to do this is problematic because such constructs fail to comprehend the 
very unique nature of African societies, the organization of their political and judicial systems, 
how normative practices evolve into rules that have binding effect, and their equally unique 
way of sanctioning deviation from those rules. In other words, enforcing the rules of customary 
law is not only driven by social pressure, and therefore arbitrary as Hart argued.  
Having regard to pre and post-colonial societies in Nigeria and South Africa, there have 
always been different levels of sophistication in how traditional institutions were organized.120 
While they may not show the levels of sophistication and formal organisation that Hart 
portrayed, they were no less effective than modern legal systems in maintaining social order.121 
Indeed, it may be argued that secondary rules do not necessarily have to take the particular 
form that Hart conceptualized.  
Despite this flaw in Hart’s analysis of customary law, his thesis on judicial discretion is still 
relevant because it applies to the courts operative in Nigeria and South Africa which have the 
responsibility of applying customary law to disputes before them. This is because these courts 
are established and legitimated by the state operating legal systems akin to Hart’s 
                                                          
118
Hart ibid at 91. 
119
 Singh op cit note 29 at 131. Hund claimed that small-scale societies like the Tswana lack institutions that can 
accommodate the operation of secondary rules. See Hund J ‘Customary law is what the people say it is" — H.L.A. 
Hart's contribution to legal anthropology’ (1998) 84:3 APLSP 432.  Hund based his assumptions on the evidence 
presented by Comaroff and Roberts. See p 433. 
120
 Bennett Application of Customary Law note 78 at 76. See also Okany The Role of Customary Courts in Nigeria 
(1984) 3. 
121
An example is the efficiency of traditional judicial institutions. See Allott A N, Epstein A L &Gluckman M 
‘Procedures: Proceedings and Evidence in African Customary Law’ in Gluckman (ed) Ideas and Procedures in 
African Customary Law Oxford University Press (1969) 22. 
55 
 
 
 
extrapolations and they exercise judicial discretion in the process of ascertaining and applying 
customary law.  
In Nigeria and South Africa, courts habitually resort to judicial discretion when dealing 
with customary law disputes. The question they grapple with in such disputes is what the 
primary rule (creating a duty or obligation) and its exact scope is. For theoretical purposes, 
subtle differences must be pointed out between judicial discretion when applying official 
customary law and judicial discretion when applying living customary law. Hart’s positivism 
explains the interactions between primary and secondary rules that are established and 
enforced by state institutions (i.e. state-law). It may accordingly be argued that customary law 
rules that have been officially recognized through codification, legislation and case law have 
become state law in Hart’s legal society. Under this circumstance, the courts apply customary 
law as positivist law because they exist within the state system, and possess secondary rules as 
extrapolated by Hart. Nonetheless, this thesis maintains that outside the state institutions, 
customary law does have secondary rules and when it is treated as positivist law, it alters its 
nature.   
With regards to living customary law however, a different maneuvering is required of the 
courts as they navigate through options before them to exercise judicial discretion to ascertain 
and apply them. This is because since living customary law is not certain, it creates a problem 
for Hart’s position and this is discussed below. This also applies where the living customary law 
has been captured in written form as state law because the certainty it projects extract from its 
flexibility.  
Another point is the fact that living customary law has its own secondary rules which is 
the basis upon which it should be applied. Where the process of ascertaining and applying it is 
regulated by the state, the state’s secondary rules must acknowledge the secondary rules of 
the living customary law in the utilization of its (the State’s) secondary rules. It is only then that 
the application of the state’s secondary rules is justifiable. Taken together, a theoretical 
approach to discussing judicial discretion in customary law adjudication reveals interactions 
between positivism and legal pluralism where customary law is forced to be dependent on 
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positivism. The interactions are like what Moore described as interdependence in semi-
autonomous societies.122 
The analysis of relevant legal doctrines by positivists applies to the process of 
ascertainment and application adopted by the courts in Nigeria and South Africa since this is 
regulated by positivist law. 
 
The meeting of Positivism and Pluralism in the process of ascertainment and application of 
customary law. 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2  Judicial discretion as a doctrine 
Having established that though Hart’s doctrine is positivistic, it finds application in the way 
customary law is ascertained and applied by formal courts. It is vital to explain what it is and 
how it is applied. To do this will also entail the examination of other theories. 
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Black’s law dictionary explains the exercise of judicial discretion as an act 
which is ‒ 
[B]ounded by the rules and principles of the law, and not arbitrary, 
capricious, or unrestrained. It is not the indulgence of a judicial whim, 
but the exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by 
law, or the equitable decision of what is just and proper under the 
circumstances.123 
This thesis argues that however noble these concepts are, how they apply to the 
ascertainment and application of customary law with particular reference to the nature of 
customary law124 will determine the justification of their utilization. 
Judicial discretion describes an area of judicial autonomy, free from the constraints of 
legal rules, where ‘the judge can exercise his or her judgment in relation to the particular 
circumstances of the case’.125The idea of judicial discretion can be traced to the time of 
Aristotle with respect to the role of the judge126 and it still applies today. A major contributor to 
the debate of how courts exercise judicial discretion in cases before them is Hart. He states that 
judges exercise discretion in determining what rules to apply in a case before them under a 
number of circumstances within prescribed parametres.127 This thesis argues that these 
circumstances also cover customary law disputes since they are regulated by state institutions. 
Ascertaining the content of the customary law to be applied to a given case can be 
herculean because courts are often confronted with more than one version of customary law, 
the credibility of which they must determine in order to arrive at the actual practices of the 
people. To determine the applicable custom, the court must exercise some degree of 
discretion, using certain parameters that point to the particular normative practice of the 
people to arrive at the right version of customary law.  
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Legislation, the rules of evidence, rules of court procedure, precedents and the inherent 
powers of a court all clothe the judge with the power to exercise discretion.128 It is therefore 
important to examine how the exercise of discretion aids the ascertainment and application of 
living customary law by answering questions of how discretion is exercised, and how the 
exercise of judicial discretion justifies the court’s choice of a version of customary law where 
they vary with living customary law. Judges have exercised this discretion either mildly, widely 
or somewhere in between and this is discussed below. 
Two other legal concepts, formalism (a positivist concept) and American realism also 
known as rule skepticism,129 take different views about judicial discretion. Formalism is a theory 
which states that legal rules are detached from social and political institutions.130  ‘According to 
this theory, once lawmakers produce rules, judges apply them to the facts of a case without 
regard to social interests and public policy.’131 Legal formalism believes that ‘there is always one 
“correct” answer to legal problems that can be reached using the internal tools of the subject 
primarily logic, precedent, and rules … {without any reference to} extra-legal policy 
considerations’.132 
Formalists, like Langdell Ronald Dworkin, Robert Bork and Justice Scalia133 argue that 
judges only apply the law as it is to the facts in a dispute through deductive reasoning, and may 
not be creative in their interpretations of it and therefore do not apply discretion and when 
they do, it is very mildly done.134 Legal formalism is founded on the premise that lawmaking 
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involves different socio-political factors that lawmakers are better equipped to take into 
consideration when making law, following the proper process. Judges, who according to 
formalists are not equipped to consider such factors, should restrict themselves to simply 
applying the law as it is to facts; and this would achieve ‘certainty, stability, and predictability to 
the law’.135 To do otherwise would be assuming responsibility for lawmaking and this would 
amount to usurping the legislature’s role in a democracy.136 However, the consequence of such 
a formalistic legal theory is rigidity, which may exclude developing the law in particular 
instances that are not specifically provided for by law,137 and,   stultify customary law. 
Legal realism on the other hand is a ‘theory that all law derives from prevailing social 
interests and public policy’.138  ‘According to this theory, judges consider not only abstract rules, 
but also social interests and public policy when deciding a case’139 and discretion is exercised 
widely. This position is held by legal realists such as Jerome Frank, Karl Llewelyn,140 Underhill 
Moore, Herman Oliphant, Wendel Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and Benjamin Cardozo.141 Consistent 
with this view, judges can make law.142 They assert that the court is the paramount source of 
law, and other sources of law are simply guides for the court to follow.143 However, a criticism 
of legal realism is that it engenders uncertainty regarding what legal rules apply in specific 
circumstances144 and may result in judicial dictatorship as exercising judicial discretion may 
result in choices of law clearly not intended by lawmakers.145 The implication of these doctrines 
to living customary law is explained here. 
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This thesis, like Hart’s, differs from the excesses of formalism and realism.146 While it 
agrees with Hart that the correct position lies between the two, it makes distinctions from 
Harts position. Hart argued that law exists only because ‘general rules, standards and principles’ 
of conduct can be adequately communicated as the focal tool of social control to a majority of 
people in a community. This is done through ‘authoritative verbal language’ (legislation) and by 
‘example’ (precedent) respectively. He states that both are open to uncertainties but this is 
more with precedents where uncertainty cannot be completely eliminated. He further 
explained that language is too limited to cover all situations that may occur under a rule. 
Therefore, the person (i.e., the judge) called upon to apply the legislation and/or precedent to a 
particular circumstance, is left with wide latitude in deciding to what extent the circumstance 
before him/her fits into the circumstance communicated. The person exercises wide discretion 
even when he or she makes a choice within the communicated rules. 
Judicial discretion is necessary because as Roland argued, ‘[w]hat guidance the law 
cannot provide is supposed to be provided by standard principles of justice and due process, 
reason, and the facts of each case.’147 Where guidance is missing in the law, the judge applies 
his/her mind to how the standard principles ought to apply to the facts to bring about a rational 
outcome that is the better option of any number of choices he/she must make, and which 
serves the interests of justice. Judicial discretion is a necessary part of this rational process.148 
The thesis also agrees with Hart’s questioning the practicalities of formalism on the 
ground that different factors in legal reasoning determine how legal rules are applied. As with 
Hart’s position, this thesis confirms that there are instances where how legislation applies to a 
specific circumstance is unclear and this is said to be open textured.149 The thesis confirms that 
legislation, however excellent its language may never envisage the entire range of situations or 
conduct that may come under its scope and this produces uncertainties150 and fosters the 
application of wide discretion. In addition, is that legislation introduces rigidity by providing for 
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specific circumstances while eliminating others, thereby falling short of conveying the real 
intention of the communication. One instance, is the South African Reform of Customary Law of 
Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act.151 It was enacted to provide for customary 
law intestate succession but excluded customary law testacy by the implication of its rigid 
provisions that confines the application of the Act to the absence of statutory testacy.152 
Even though Hart’s reference to legislation here is with respect to positivism, this thesis, 
for reasons earlier given, applies it to legislations of customary law and makes these points on 
the assumption that the legislations properly captured living customary law. Where it failed to 
properly capture living customary law, it hinders its ascertainment and application. This is on 
the ground that the premise upon which the discretion exercised by the judge already fails to 
represent the true content of the living customary law.  
It is important to note that a wide range of discretion is also exercised by the judge even 
if the legislation provides for the application of living customary law if such legislation does not 
state the customary rule but subjects the exercise of legal rights to the ‘the applicable 
customary law’. In such an instance, the applicable customary law would have to be ascertained 
outside the legislation which is silent on its content and a wide range of discretion is left for the 
judge to ascertain and apply same.153 Legislation is but one method out of several of 
ascertaining customary law and how these methods operate opens the judge to a wide range of 
discretion.154 
The thesis agrees with Hart that judicial precedents are also open textured.155 They 
involve ‘creative judicial activity’ that may create outcomes that differ from the intention of the 
legislature. Courts may limit or deviate from a rule or precedent by recognising exceptions from 
which they exclude the application of the rule of precedent. They may also expand the scope of 
a rule of precedent in order to make it apply to a situation that is not covered by a statute or 
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earlier precedent. Courts therefore have a vital role to play in developing the parameters of 
‘open textured’ rules on a case by case basis. They necessarily apply a wide scope of discretion 
in this process. Hence, vital and extensive areas are left to the exercise of judicial discretion in 
courts’ judgment whether it is within the ‘plain’ or ‘debatable’ borders of the rules. The courts’ 
rulings become binding until they are reversed by a subsequent legislation that the court also 
has the power to interpret.  
Thus, in his criticism of legal realism, Hart argued that courts merely set limits to the 
open texture of the law and may exercise discretion when doing so but may only operate within 
the borders of the written text of the law. This thesis agrees with Hart’s argument here only to 
the extent that it leads to the ascertainment and application of living customary law and will 
explain how this can be achieved. 
This thesis differs from Hart by first stating that his analogies of legislation and 
precedent, if applied to customary law, are restricted to official customary law and have some 
degree of certainty which detracts from the nature of customary law in which certainty is not a 
value.156 Granted that the law should be stated in clear and precise terms to avoid 
arbitrariness,157 this thesis faults the adoption of official customary law in a bid to achieve 
certainty rather than plod the murky waters of ascertaining the actual norm that currently 
applies to the community. Hart’s analysis did not contemplate living customary law, and the 
fact is that the content of living customary law is not readily available for application as in his 
scenario but must be determined by the court. Hart’s analysis becomes relevant at the point 
where living customary law has been determined. Prior to that, the court engages in a form of 
exercise of discretion as it considers evidence put before it to determine the content of the 
living customary law to a depth not envisaged by Hart. This is because here, the discretion that 
needs to be applied is first to ascertain the content of the applicable living customary law in the 
case, and then to determine how it will be applied to the case which includes whether it should 
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be developed to accommodate constitutional principles and be put through the so-called 
repugnancy and public policy tests or otherwise.   
Dworkin criticized Hart on the ground that he failed to recognize the distinction 
between rules which on one hand are specific and apply directly to particular issues, and, 
principles and policies on the other hand which give direction of a general nature. These 
principles permit the application of very minimal discretion in certain instances that may not 
precisely fall under the application of the rules.158 
Critics of Dworkin’s position include King who asserts that judges exercise a wide range 
of discretion where there are no applicable rules to be applied by the judge and where the 
judge sees the need to take a new position from his earlier decision in a new case.159Raz 
criticized Dworkin’s stance on mild discretion and states that there are matters where there are 
no single current answers even where the judges are ‘legally entitled to decide’ and in such 
instances, the judge can exercise ‘strong’ discretion.160Christie also states that what Dworkin 
calls principles more likely fit as rules and not all judges will decide a case in the same way161 
thus entailing the exercise of wide discretion. For various reasons, different judges may at the 
end of a case, decide the cases differently based on their respective personalities.162 
By rules, Dworkin means statutes and precedents which are positivistic. Regardless of 
the debate on the distinction between rules and principles, the question that arises is since 
more than one principle is usually utilised in a case, what happens when the judge has to 
choose which of the competing principles to apply or how much weight should be given to the 
applicable principles in a case?163 In such instances, discretion will still have to be exercised 
which will fit as wide. 
This thesis admits that there are circumstances where mild discretion is applied by the 
court in an aspect of its adjudication as stated by formalism. This is where the court simply 
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needs to apply official customary law that appropriately ascertained the content of the 
applicable living customary law albeit subject to the limitations associated with such form as 
discussed in chapter four of this thesis. However, there are several instances where wide 
discretion is applied. With respect to realism, this thesis confirms that the judges do generally 
exercises wide discretion in the ascertainment and application of customary law even to the 
extent envisaged by realism.  Extraneous factors other than the black letter law such as 
institutional, substantive, socio-economic and political, and, procedural factors as discussed in 
details in chapters five, six and seven have a bearing on how courts exercise discretion 
sometimes to the point of ignoring the black letter law.  
With respect to official customary law, while formalism will achieve rigidity, realism may 
go outside the purview of the customary rule applicable in the circumstance. With regard to 
living customary law which Hart’s analysis did not cover, since state law subjects it to the same 
process of ascertainment, it is exposed to similar risks as the official versions and more. Where 
the living norm conflicts with the official, according to formalism, the living will be sacrificed for 
the official. According to realism, even though there is more room for the living to be 
ascertained, developed where necessary and applied through the judge’s discretion, the living 
norm may be ignored based on the range of the judge’s discretion.  
With respect to customary law whether official or living, the challenge is threefold. The 
first challenge has to do with ascertaining the content of the applicable customay law in a given 
dispute. The second challenge involves situations where gaps exist in a customary law that has 
been judicially ascertained in a given case, or contained in written form such that it does not 
directly relate to the unique circumstances of a dispute. The pattern of customary law 
adjudication suggests that the more distant the facts of a dispute are from the circumstances 
contemplated by a rule of customary law, the more likely that the judge will develop or apply 
some other legal rule to fill the gap.164 The third challenge is where it is necessary to develop 
customary law and bring it to conformity with constitutional provisions.   
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To deal with gaps in the law as stated above, most positivists ‒ including Christie and 
Hart ‒ argue that the judge must exercise some legislative function in order to discharge his/her 
judicial function. In other words, he/she must exercise some discretion in making a choice of 
the applicable rule in order to decide the outcome of the case, based on his/her judgment.165 
This thesis asserts like Hart that discretion must be exercised within the limit of the applicable 
legal rules. 
That is there must be self-restraining mechanisms that ensure that judges do not 
overstep the boundaries of the law to develop rules or create rights and obligations that are 
altogether unknown to the law. This thesis however differs from him with regards to the 
circumstances where discretion can be applied. For instance, with respect to judicial notice, 
and, evidence of facts placed before the court both as means of proving customary law. That is 
where the court ascertains distortions rather than living customary law from the evidence 
placed before it and where the application of the judicially noticed customary norm conflict 
with the credible evidence of the applicable living customary law (which is benign).166 Here, the 
exercise of discretion by the judge where it leads away from the application of living customary 
law is not justiciable because it violates the Constitutional right to culture in those countries 
with this kind of provision in the constitution. This is especially so where it is stated in the 
legislation that the legislation was enacted to enhance the application of customary law.  
It is important to note that in customary law disputes, ascertaining and applying the 
applicable living customary law goes to the root of whether or not justice is achieved in the 
case. Isaacs has argued in support of the inevitability of the exercise of discretion, because the 
law, which consists of rules, principles and standards cannot be applied to factual situations 
without the use of discretion.167 However, he cautioned that the exercise of judicial discretion 
can affect both adjectival and substantive rights, even when the discretion was merely 
employed to resolve a question of the applicable procedure.168 This calls for limits and 
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conditions within which discretion may be exercised, in order not to produce arbitrary 
outcomes that frustrate the achievement of substantial justice.169 
 With respect to proving customary law as fact through evidence, the exercise of 
discretion by the judge is necessarily wide with respect to gaps, the need to develop 
customary law, and where there is uncertainty as to what version to accept especially given 
the nature of customary law which requires contextual application. This thesis argues that 
under these circumstances, the exercise of the judge’s discretion in the ascertainment and 
application of customary law is also only justifiable where it leads to the ascertainment of 
living customary law. These positions are buttressed by the fact that living customary law 
must be given the environment to thrive in light of the reality of pluralism in Nigeria and 
South Africa in the inevitable regulation of its application by positivist and pluralist laws. The 
application of positivist law in the ascertainment and application of living customary law must 
have as its primary aim, the survival and preservation of customary law which must be 
paramount albeit subject to the preservation of inalienable rights. Consequently, this thesis 
argues that where an official version contradicts the living version proved before the court, 
the judge must take advantage of every possible rule and principle within the valid confines of 
his/her power to reject the rigid positivist rules of procedure and decide in favour of the living 
version and where necessary, to develop same in line with the constitution where applicable. 
In ascertaining and applying living customary law, this thesis asserts that courts 
sometimes exercise wide discretion outside the confines of evidential and procedural rules 
and that this leads away from the ascertainment and application of living customary law. 
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Sometimes this wide discretion (in line with realist views) is as a result of the misapplication of 
the rules of evidence due to incompetence and lack of credibility. This thesis also asserts that 
courts also sometimes exercise mild or wide discretion within the confines of these rules and 
the degree to which this is done is contextual. The court may sometimes need to stretch 
further within the confines of these rules to confirm the contents of the applicable living 
customary law.  The thesis submits that there are factors internal and external to court rules, 
procedures and the judicial institution identified in the subsequent chapters that influence 
how the discretion of the judge is exercised. These may aid or hinder the ascertainment and 
application of living customary law and must be addressed to enhance the ascertainment and 
application of living customary law. It is vital to state at this stage that this thesis’ engagement 
with judicial discretion is limited to its utilisation by the courts in the ascertainment and 
application of customary law and what factors influence its exercise by judges.  
 
Meeting point of Judicial Discretion with Legal Formalism and Realism 
 
 
2.4        Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the context in which customary law is used in this thesis in its 
conceptualization based on the theory of legal pluralism which states that law can exist 
outside state institutions. This is despite the fact that the application of positivist law in the 
ascertainment and application of customary law in Nigeria and South Africa cannot be 
ignored. It also addressed the challenge of how customary law is defined in the statutes of 
both countries which for South Africa gives room for the concept of living customary law and 
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all its features. For Nigeria however, its definition would impede the concept of living 
customary law and its sources. The doctrine of judicial discretion was discussed as it relates to 
the ascertainment and application of customary law under legal positivism engaging Hart’s 
postulations as well as the broad positions of formalism and realism. The chapter asserts that 
Hart’s exclusion of customary law as law is faulty and explained the basis for this. The chapter 
contends that the exercise of discretion by the judges must ensure that the status of 
customary law as law is preserved.  It asserts that courts may sometimes need to within the 
confines of applicable rules stretch further to give consideration to the unique nature of 
customary law in order to confirm the contents of the applicable living customary law. It is 
only then that the exercise of judicial discretion in the ascertainment and application of 
customary law can be justified. The chapter also asserts that a number of factors determine 
how this discretion is exercised in the process of ascertainment170 which leads us to 
discussions on the process of ascertainment and application of customary law in Nigeria and 
South Africa in the next chapter.  
2.4  
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PART B 
 
The Process of Ascertainment of Customary Law. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Process of Ascertainment of Customary Law by Formal Courts – Judicial 
Notice 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The process of ascertainment and application of customary law in Nigerian and South African 
courts engages two statutorily prescribed approaches which are judicial notice and proof as 
facts through evidence. These approaches utilise the different methods of ascertainment 
discussed in chapter four.  Exploring these processes/approaches and methods in this section is 
an attempt to give a clear picture of what transpires in court. This chapter focuses on judicial 
notice. Proof as facts through evidence is discussed in chapter four.  
The chapter elucidates the rules that guide the judge as he/she exercises discretion in 
the process of ascertainment and application of customary law through judicial notice, as well 
as the challenges that affect this approach. The various courts with jurisdiction to ascertain and 
apply customary law matters are also discussed 
The chapter begins with a brief narration of the historical context of these challenges 
which began under the colonial administration of natives in Nigeria and South Africa. The 
history of the usage of the various methods of ascertainment is discussed in chapter four which 
deals with the methods. 
 
3.2 Brief historical context of the ascertainment and application of customary law 
How customary law is ascertained and applied in courts today is influenced by how the courts 
operated under colonial rule because it laid the foundation for the current practice. This 
influence is in the area of the conceptualization of customary law fostered by the nature and 
structure of the courts with jurisdiction to hear customary law matters. It also includes the 
knowledge of the judges in customary law. 
During colonial times, the ascertainment and application of customary law did not fare 
well under the system of indirect rule adopted by Lord Lugard to aid British administration of 
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Africa.1 The establishment of formal courts and commissions to exercise jurisdiction alongside 
traditional institutions born out of the need to retain colonial control created problems with 
respect to ascertainment and invariably, its application. The discussion on conceptualisation of 
customary law in the preceding chapter explains the challenge of Eurocentric interpretation of 
customary norms. This challenge was fostered by the colonial system under which formal 
institutions either directly heard cases of customary law, or exercised supervisory powers of 
review and/or appeal over decisions of the local adjudicators.2 The reviews were done on the 
basis of the principles of English law and this resulted in decisions that departed from 
indigenous customary law.3 
The challenges that also ensued during these times included the establishment of 
English-styled courts and pseudo-native courts to hear cases of customary law which were not 
necessarily manned by appropriate traditional leaders and custodians of the customs for 
Nigeria and South Africa.4 Traditional rulers were also excluded from the English styled 
customary courts.5 The personnel who applied customary law in these courts lacked formal 
training in customary law.6  These contributed to the undermining of customary norms that did 
not resonate with the Judge’s Eurocentric views.7 Customary law rules established by these 
courts through their decisions served as precedents. 
 Another challenge that affected the ascertainment and application of customary law 
during colonial times was the chronicle of events and legislative developments on the 
administration of civil and customary law.8 There were haphazard engagements with customary 
                                                          
1
Britain governed the colonies indirectly through their traditional institutions that maintained local traditions. See 
Bennett T W Application of Customary law in Southern Africa (1985) 39. See also Costa A  ‘Custom and common 
sense: The Zulu royal family succession dispute of the 1940s’ University of the Witwatersrand Institute for 
advanced Social Research Seminar paper in the Richard Ward Building seventh Floor 7003 on 6
th
 May, 1996 2. 
2
Bennett ibid. 
3
Ibid at 40. 
4
Keay E A& Richardson S ‘The Native and customary Courts of Nigeria (1966) 8 - 10. Native Courts Proclamation 
1900 No. 9 of 1900. The Chief Judge commented in his Amalgamation Memorandum that the native courts in 
southern Nigeria were not native courts. The judges were known to apply English law or their own views of English 
law in maters that required the application of customary law. See also Bennett op cit note 1 at 47 - 48.  
5
In Southern Nigeria. See Okany M The Role of Customary Courts in Nigeria (1984) 8. See also Keay& Richardson 
Ibid. See the Native Courts Proclamation 1900 No. 9 of 1900.  
6
Bennett op cit at note 1.Keay ibid. 
7
Bennett op cit note 1 at 40. 
8
Bekker J C Seymour’s Customary Law in Southern Africa (1989) 1. 
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law that ensued in the different colonies in Nigeria and South Africa.  This is because inroads 
into the colonies and protectorates occurred at different times and different laws regulating 
the recognition of customary law applied to these colonies. The consequence is that they did 
not foster a uniform experience within each country in which simultaneous challenges faced by 
the courts in the colonies would have enabled a garnering of progressive strides towards 
enhancing the ascertainment and application of customary law.   The nature of courts 
with jurisdiction to hear customary law cases determined how it was ascertained and applied. 
According to Bennett, The Native Administration Act enacted after the 1910 Union of South 
Africa eventually unified the various approaches that were adopted by Transvaal, Natal, Orange 
Free State and Bechuanaland. It prescribed uniformity across the country with respect to the 
‘recognition’ of customary law and the formation of separate courts for the adjudication of civil 
cases for Native Africans.9 
 In South Africa, even after the chiefs and headmen’s courts were established, they 
were manned by chiefs and headmen who had been acknowledged by the state and were 
authorised by the minister to hear civil cases regulated by customary law.10 They therefore 
owed allegiance to the colonial administration at the expense of applying customary law when 
necessary.11 The decisions of these chiefs and headmen’s courts were also still subject to the 
commissioner’s courts that were given discretion to also apply subsisting customary law subject 
to the latest modifications, natural justice or public policy.12 Further appeals went from the 
commissioner’s courts to the black appeals court and then to the appellate division of the 
Supreme Court only on grounds of law. These appellate courts were manned by officers or 
judges with Eurocentric views.  This arrangement subsisted until the abolition of the 
commissioner’s courts and the black’s appeal courts based on the recommendation of the 
Hoexter Commission in 1986.13 The courts of chiefs and headmen were incorporated into the 
formal court structure of South African legal system14 and currently continue to adjudicate on 
                                                          
9
Bennett Application of Customary Law op cit note 1 at 44-7. 
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Ibid at 48.. 
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Ibid. 
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Ibid. 
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Ibid. 
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Bennett ibid at 49. 
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customary law disputes with their decisions appealable to the magistrate courts up to the 
Constitutional Court.  
 The situation was similar in Nigeria. Decisions of the native courts established by the 
colonial masters were subject to other formal courts headed by non-traditional rulers which 
were established with jurisdiction to hear customary law matters.15 This arrangement 
continued even after the 1914 amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates of 
Nigeria.16 Despite the restructuring of the courts by succeeding heads of government, appeals 
from these native courts now called customary /area courts are still subject to hierarchies of 
formal courts who are mainly composed of Eurocentric trained judges. Some of these 
customary/area courts are headed by qualified legal practitioners.17 
It is important to note however that despite these challenges, in certain instances, there 
were extensive engagements with customary norms and its conceptions including its 
ascertainment and application which produced certain notable decisions on customary law 
such as the case of Lewis v Bankole.18 
In summary, how customary law was adjudicated during colonial times created the 
challenges with how it was ascertained and applied then and has contributed to the current 
challenge of its ascertainment and application. These challenges are in the conceptualization of 
customary law fostered by the structure and nature of the courts with jurisdiction to hear 
customary law matters, the knowledge of the judges, and the policy of the colonial government 
which did not favour a sincere development of the rules of customary law. 
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 See the Nigerian Protectorate Order in Council 22
nd
 November, 1913 reproduced in Fawehinmi, G. Court Systems 
in Nigeria, A Guide (1992) 2-11. Adewoye, O. The Judicial System in Southern Nigeria 1854 – 1954(1977) 137. See 
also Ogundere J D The Nigerian Judge and His Court (1994) 12-13. 
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Adewoye ibid at 137. 
17
In Abuja (FCT) all the judges of the customary courts are qualified legal practitioners. 
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(1908) INLR 81. 
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3.3 Courts with jurisdiction to hear customary court cases 
 
3.3.1.  South Africa 
South Africa has a dual system of courts comprising courts of chiefs and headmen as customary 
courts and other courts made up of courts of specialized and of general jurisdiction.19 The 
Constitutional Court affirmed in the case of Recertification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 199620 that the courts of chiefs and headmen fall under the categories of courts in 
the Constitution.21 
The courts of general jurisdiction entertain matters of customary law. The South African courts 
that have jurisdiction to hear customary law cases include the Constitutional Court, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, the high court, regional court, magistrate courts, as well as other 
courts established or recognized by an Act of Parliament. These other courts may be similar in 
status to the high court or magistrate court.  The Law of Evidence Amendment Act South Africa 
provides that any court may take judicial notice of customary law and this includes courts that 
fall under the last category mentioned here. According to Koyana et al, South Africa’s small 
claims court falls under this category22and can receive evidence of customary law in land 
disputes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
Berat expressed in her discussion on the transformation process of South Africa after the collapse of Apartheid 
that customary law being the basis of the dual system of law and courts in South Africa will not be overlooked. See 
Berat L ‘Customary law in a new South Africa: A proposal’ (1991) 15.1 ILJ 94. 
20
(CCT 23/96) [1996] ZACC 26. 
21
This case was instituted to affirm whether the proposals in the then proposed 1996 Constitution were in line with 
the constitutional policies. 
22
Koyana DS, Bekker JC  Mqeke RB ‘Traditional authority courts’ in Rautenbach C, Bekker JC & Goolam NMI 
Introduction to Legal Pluralism (2010) 174. 
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Courts with jurisdiction in customary law in South Africa23 
3.3.2.  Nigeria 
Nigeria operates forms of dual and multiple court systems. At both the federal and state levels, 
it has customary/area courts and courts of general jurisdiction also empowered to hear cases 
on customary law. Courts with jurisdiction to hear customary law cases are creations of statutes 
and the Constitution and are categorised into courts of superior and inferior jurisdictions.   
These courts include the Supreme Court of Nigeria, the Court of Appeal, the high courts 
of the States and the FCT, the customary courts of appeal of the states and the FCT and  
                                                          
23
Other specialised courts with jurisdiction in customary law such as Land Claims court are not included here 
because this thesis is restricted to the regular courts. 
Constitutional Court 
Supreme Court of Appeal 
High Court 
Magistrate Court Regional Court (magistrate) 
Courts of Chiefs and Headsmen 
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[S]uch other courts as may be authorised by law to exercise jurisdiction on 
matters with respect to which the National Assembly may make laws; and 
such other court as may be authorised by law to exercise jurisdiction at 
first instance or on appeal on matters with respect to which a House of 
Assembly may make laws.24 
Customary/area courts fall under the last two categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Courts with jurisdiction to hear customary law cases in Nigeria 
 
3.4 The process of ascertainment 
The Black’s Law dictionary broadly defines judicial process as including ‘all the acts of a court 
from the beginning to the end of its proceedings in a given cause’.25 The ascertainment of 
customary law forms part of the judicial process.  The process of ascertainment of a legal 
system entails ‘the determination of the conditions in which its rules can be identified and 
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Section 6 (5) 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
25
Black’s law Dictionary 6
th
 edition. 
Supreme Court 
Court of Appeal 
High Court Customary Court of Appeal 
Customary Courts 
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applied in legal proceedings’.26 Ascertaining customary law engages processes that contribute 
to how the court determines and applies customary law. Here, the power of the judge to 
exercise discretion is vital and is derived from the rules of evidence, court procedure rules and 
laws, and the inherent powers of the courts.  
 In Nigeria and South Africa, the ascertainment of customary law by formal courts is 
regulated by statute, and the processes are broadly similar, i.e. by judicial notice and proof as 
facts through evidence. Every court type in Nigeria and South Africa with jurisdiction to hear 
cases of customary law adopts a process of ascertainment. For customary courts manned by 
chiefs of the particular locality, the process may be more limited. For instance, where the 
customary law to be applied is that of the particular community, the chief may not need any 
external aid in the ascertainment and application. Relying on his/her knowledge is a process. So 
also is conferring with his/her council of elders on what may be areas of uncertainty with 
respect to the ascertainment of the content of the law to be applied to the sets of facts before 
the court. The processes for the different courts are discussed in this chapter and, in chapter 
four. 
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3.4.1  Nigeria 
In Nigeria, the process of ascertaining customary law is regulated by the Evidence Act, 
procedural rules of courts and the respective laws of particular courts.27 The Evidence Act28 is 
the main legislation that regulates the judicial ascertainment and application of customary law 
but it excludes the customary courts of appeal, customary and area courts in its application. 
This exclusion is however subject to an order by a constitutionally instituted authority allowing 
the application of all or certain provisions of the Evidence Act. Section 256 (1) (c) of the Act 
provides that: 
This Act shall apply to all judicial proceedings in or before any court 
established in the Federal Republic of Nigeria but it shall not apply … to 
judicial proceedings in any civil cause or matter in or before any … 
Customary Court of Appeal, Area Court or Customary Court unless any 
authority empowered to do so under the Constitution, by order published 
in the Gazette, confers upon any or all … Customary Courts of Appeal, Area 
Courts or Customary Courts in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja or a 
State, as the case may be, power to enforce any or all the provisions of this 
Act. 
In accordance with this provision, the Federal Capital Territory Customary Court Act29 
empowers both the customary court of appeal and the customary courts within the territory to 
apply certain provisions of the Evidence Act, including provisions that pertain to the 
ascertainment of customary law.  
The Evidence Act provides for two ways of proving customary law in court. According to 
section 16 (1) ‘[a] custom may be adopted as part of the law governing a particular set of 
admissible circumstances if it can be judicially noticed or can be proved to exist by evidence.’ 
Sub section (2) of the provision lays the burden of proving a custom on the person who alleges 
that the custom exists.  
                                                          
27
 The Evidence Act is within the purview of the exclusive legislative list of the National Assembly and therefore it 
applies to courts within the country. Other Laws and procedural rules are enacted by the respective state 
legislature. For the Federal Capital Territory however, its procedural rules and laws are enacted by the national 
assembly. 
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 2011. This Act replaced the Evidence Act cap E 14 laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
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 No 56 of 2007 (FCTCCCA). See section 65 which provides that ‘The Customary Court and Customary Court of 
Appeal FCT Abuja shall in Judicial Proceedings be bound by the provisions of sections 14, 15,59,76,77,78,92, 
93,135,136,155,177and 227 of the Evidence Act.’ 
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Clearly, the probable convergence of statutory law and customary law in the judicial 
resolution of disputes comes to the fore in section 16 (1), as the provision authorizes the court 
to also consider customary law among other sources of applicable law. But just as pertinent is 
the statutory recognition that customary law may apply in resolving a judicial matter if its 
existence can be proved according to the rules of evidence. It is, as it were, a convergence of 
positivist law and customary law.  Stating that customary law may apply ‘as part of the law’ 
means that customary law will apply as the substantive law.30 However, statutory and common 
law will regulate the procedure which includes the processes by which customary law will be 
ascertained.  
Thus, according to the Evidence Act, there are two ways of proving customary law in 
court. A judge adjudicating a matter in which a rule of customary law has been pleaded may 
ascertain the rule by judicial notice or by proof of evidence.  
In Orlu v Gogo-Abite31 the Supreme Court held that Ikwere native law and custom of 
inheritance which was the basis of the Plaintiff’s claim of ownership was not proved in the case 
and judicial notice of it could not be taken because it had not been notoriously decided.  There 
could well be situations where a court takes judicial notice of some parts of the customary law 
while requiring proof (facts) about other parts.  There is jurisprudential difference between the 
two methods of ascertainment. Until it is proved (ascertained), the court regards customary 
law32 as fact rather than as law. Impliedly, it becomes law when its existence has been 
established through evidence and applied by the court in its judgment. However, when 
customary law can be judicially noticed, it is viewed by the court as the law on the subject. The 
customary law proved through evidence is viewed as law only after it is ascertained and applied 
by the court in its judgment.33 This, as the legal pluralist may say, is a consequence of centralist 
views of legal theory. But what, precisely, is judicial notice and when may a court apply it as 
precedent on a question of customary law? 
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‘Substantive as use here is the sense of substantive as opposed to procedural. 
31
 (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt 1196) 307. 
32
Except official versions. 
33
Obilade A O The Nigerian Legal System (1979) 97.  
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3.4.1.1  Judicial notice 
Judicial notice is ‘[a] court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a 
party’s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact.’34  It pertains to the court’s power to 
accept such a fact as law’.35 The doctrine of judicial precedent is integral in the concept of 
judicial notice. According to the doctrine, the judgment of a superior court can be judicially 
noticed.36 
The basis for judicial notice of customary law was laid out in section 14 of the old 
Evidence Act, which provided as follows:  
A custom may be judicially noticed by the court if it has been acted upon 
by a court of superior or co-ordinate jurisdiction in the same area to an 
extent which justifies the court asked to apply it in assuming that the 
persons or the class of persons concerned in that area look upon the 
same as binding in relation to circumstances similar to those under 
consideration.37 
Section 17 of the current Evidence Act preserves the doctrine. But it simply states that 
‘A custom may be judicially noticed when it has been adjudicated upon once by a superior court 
of record.’38 As the provision before it, this provision allows courts to exercise judicial discretion 
in the matter of taking judicial notice about the existence of a custom. However, the provision 
seems to establish a single requirement for a custom to be judicially noticed.  All it requires is 
that a superior court has adjudicated on the custom before, and once.39 It would seem this 
provision dispenses with the old requirements that the custom of which judicial notice is sought 
to be taken, must have been adjudicated upon to an extent that the court could justify its 
bindingness in similar circumstances and in the same community. This would seem to suggest 
lessening of the standard for establishing precedent on an issue of customary law, or for 
justifying judicial notice thereof.    
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 Black’s Law Dictionary. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Section 5 (1)  9a) – (l) & 6 (3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution list the superior courts of records to include the 
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Section 17 Evidence Act 2011. 
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It is important to see how this new provision could constitute a problem. The repealed 
law gave courts the liberty to determine the extent to which a custom may be justifiably 
noticed judicially, guided by the stipulation that the custom must have been considered to an 
extent that justifies the court to presume it is settled law on the matter. The Privy Council’s 
position of this law in the case of Angu v Attah40 was that for a custom to be judicially noticed, 
it must have been repeatedly proven in a court of law.  This Ghanaian case decided by the Privy 
Council in 1916 formed the basis upon which customary law was proved in Anglophone Africa 
including South Africa.41 The decision offers a reliable standard, as it affirms the agency of a 
frequentative process that allows scrutiny, evaluation, and sifting until the actual binding rule 
of custom is determined, and errors are eliminated.    
This position was adopted in several Nigerian cases.42 In Olagbemiro v Ajagungbade& 
Anor,43 there were a number of decisions by the high court and the Court of Appeal supporting 
the appellant/plaint’s claim on ownership of land in Ogbomoso. There was another case on the 
same subject in which the Supreme Court seemingly deferred from the decisions at both the 
high court and the Court of Appeal. The judge at the high court considered the evidence led 
during trial independently from earlier judgements at the high court, Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court and differed from the position of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court on 
appeal confirmed the decision of the high court which took judicial notice of the decisions of 
the earlier high court and Court of Appeal and elaborated that the position expressed in its 
judgement (at the Supreme Court) was obiter dictum of which a judicial notice could not be 
taken and the ratio decidendi was on a different subject and did not apply to the case.  It should 
however be noted that these cases were adjudicated during the pendency of the Evidence Act 
which required proof to an extent. 
There are of course cases where frequent application of a custom does not necessarily 
confirm its authenticity.  In such cases, it may not be justified to take judicial notice of the 
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P C (1874-1928) p 43. 
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Bennett T W Application of Customary law in Southern Africa (1985) 19. 
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 See Giwa v Erinmilokun (1961) 1 ALL N.L.R. P. 294 and Olabanji v Omokewu (1992) NWLR (Pt. 250)671. See also 
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custom.44  However, where a court is satisfied that the process employed by another court to 
ascertain the authenticity and accuracy of a custom now being contested before it was 
painstaking and left no stone unturned, the mere fact that the custom had been judicially 
deliberated upon only once should not prevent the court from taking judicial notice of it.  
Thus, in Cole v Akinjele, 45decided prior to the enactment of the current Evidence Act, 
the court was called upon to take judicial notice of a Yoruba customary law that entitled 
children that were born outside wedlock to inherit alongside children born within wedlock. This 
was on the premise that the father acknowledged paternity while alive. The custom had only 
been proved in one case ‒ Alake v Pratt.46 The court (in Cole) found that the custom had been 
satisfactorily proved based on the weight of evidence put before the court in Alake v Pratt and 
took judicial notice of the custom.  
The provision of the current Evidence Act requiring that once a custom has been 
adjudicated upon once by a superior court, it ‘may be judicially noticed’, does not require that it 
must also justify its application by the judge in the particular case.  While it is reasonably 
expected that a judge would take that into consideration before judicially taking notice of a 
custom, omitting that in the provision of the statute is amiss. It should be noted that the 
provision preserves for the courts a considerable berth of discretion on the matter which may 
be erroneously exercised. 
Under the previous Evidence Act, a court may take judicial notice of a custom from a 
court of co-ordinate jurisdiction as well as from a court of superior jurisdiction meaning that 
judicial notice can be taken of a judgement of a customary court by another customary court. 
The current evidence Act limits judicial notice to be taken from only superior courts of record. 
The implication of this is that the wealth of customary norms ascertained and applied by 
customary courts may not be utilised through judicial notice even though some of these 
customary courts outside the FCT are manned by local chiefs who are versed in the customary 
norms and their decisions may be devoid of Eurocentrism and tend more towards living 
customary law.  
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(1960) 5 FSC 84. See also Olagbemiro v Ajagungbade III (1990) NWLR (PT. 136) 37. 
46
(1955) 15 WACA 20. 
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A court is not necessarily bound to take judicial notice on a customary norm that has 
been established in a prior judicial process – even if the process was before a court of superior 
jurisdiction where credible evidence led before the later court with respect to the same 
circumstances contradicts the finding of the earlier court. The operative word ‘may’ in section 
17 of the new Act give the later court the discretion to refrain from taking judicial notice of a 
customary law even if that law was ascertained by a court with superior jurisdiction. The 
credible contradictory evidence of the applicable customary law should constitute a justifiable 
reason to not take judicial notice of a customary law that has been determined by a superior 
court.  
Ordinarily, the principle of judicial precedent compels compliance with the decision of a 
superior court of record.47 However, ‘judicially noticed facts may be rebuttable’.48 This would 
happen where a court with superior jurisdiction erred when ascertaining a customary rule.   For 
example, a court may not judicially notice a customary rule if the facts or issues in the case it 
which it was previously ascertained are distinguishable from the case at hand. Arguably, where 
the judicially noticed customary law is made without due regard to actual normative practice 
and the facts of the particular case, a court should be at liberty to refrain from accepting such in 
view of fresh credible evidence to the contrary.  
When a court fails to appropriately ascertain customary law, it violates the 
constitutional rights of the people whose rights it is to have their lives regulated by the 
customary law in question, and to have their disputes resolved according to that custom. It is 
therefore particularly crucial for courts to ascertain customary law properly as their decisions 
invariably become precedents or can be judicially noticed.  
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By requiring that ‘[a] custom may be judicially noticed when it has been adjudicated 
upon once by a superior court of record’, section 17 dispenses with the need for parties to 
prove the facts constituting the customary norm in question.  Indeed, according to section 
122(1) ‘[n]o fact of which the court shall take judicial notice under this section needs to be 
proved’. However, sub-section 122 (2) (l) of the provision seems to introduce ambiguity over 
what a court shall do with a custom that has been judicially ascertained. The section provides as 
follows: 
The court shall take judicial notice of … all general customs, rules and 
principles which have been held to have the force of law in any court 
established by or under the Constitution and all customs which have 
been duly certified to and recorded in any such court.  
 According to subsections (3) and (4) of the provision,49  a court may resort to books, 
documents or references as aids for the purpose of taking judicial notice, and may decline to  
do so until the party alleging the fact (custom) produces  such books or document.   
Apparently, subsections (3) and (4) recognise the fact that courts may rely on 
documentary proof, in addition to the judicial precedent itself, for the purpose of taking judicial 
notice.  It is another layer of evidence intended to ensure that the decision to take judicial 
notice is rightfully made. Scholarly or other works that document facts or authoritative 
statements about customary law, especially where those facts have been judicially ascertained 
and subjected to further anthropological studies, provides more certainty about the 
authenticity of the alleged custom.  
However, as noted above, section 122 is not without problems, especially for living 
customary law. Subsection (2) employs mandatory language ‒ ‘the court shall take judicial 
notice of… all general customs … held to have the force of law in any court’. The language may 
appear to take away the discretionary dimension of taking judicial notice as provided for in 
section 17. The best probable way to reconcile the apparent contradiction between these 
provisions is to consider section 122 as only requiring that courts take notice of judicial 
pronouncements on customary law, and to apply them only when they have ascertained that 
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those pronouncements remain the law on the subject matter. In other words, in so far as 
sections 17 and 122 go, and as is typically expected of courts when considering precedent, a 
court in a customary law matter must not only acknowledge precedent, it must determine 
whether it remains law and is applicable in the instant case. Hence, the provision that courts 
also consult books, documents and references.  
It is this interpretation that preserves the discretion of the court, as, according to 
section 17, it may take judicial notice, but it is not bound to do so.  Courts ordinarily ought to 
take any judicially noticed fact or custom as the settled ‘law’ on the issue, but it may be 
suggested that the Evidence Act takes a unique approach to judicial notice.  By inference, 
subsections (3) and (4) of section 122 bequeath the court with the leeway to consider facts that 
may suggest that the custom has evolved from what was ascertained in a previous case only if 
they have books or documents to support this. This, it is argued, will greatly hinder the 
ascertainment of living customary law and has the potential of promoting official customary law 
because the living norm may not have been captured in writing and official versions are often 
contained in written form.  Therefore, where a party has reason to dispute the content of a 
customary law that has been judicially noticed, he should be given the chance to present 
evidence to the contrary.  
The provision of section 1 (2) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act in South Africa 
already addresses this by stating that ‘the provisions of subsection (1) shall not preclude any 
party from adducing evidence of the substance of a legal rule contemplated in that subsection 
which is in issue at the proceedings concerned.’ A similar provision to this in Nigeria is section 
16 (1) of the Evidence Act which provides that ‘A custom may be adopted as part of the law 
governing a particular set of admissible circumstances if it can be judicially noticed or can be 
proved to exist by evidence.’50 
In summary, this section discussed the current provision of the evidence Act and argues 
that it is broad and gives room for wide discretion by the judge in ascertaining and applying 
customary law to cases before it by not providing standards and the circumstances to which the 
court may take judicial notice of customary law. The implication of this is that it provides a wide 
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field which can be explored by the judge against ascertaining and applying customary law. 
However, considering the wording of the provisions discussed, the thesis argues that though 
the courts are bound to adopt judicially noticed facts, they can exercise liberty to deviate from 
it where credible evidence is proved before it to the contrary. This will enable the courts to 
utilise this additional evidence to ascertain and apply living customary law.  
 
3.4.2 South Africa 
The main legislation regulating the ascertainment and application of customary law by courts in 
South Africa is the Law of Evidence Amendment Act.51 This Act does not restrict its application 
to specific courts but provides that it applies to any court which by implication could include 
the courts of chiefs and headmen. This is different from the situation in Nigeria. The Act 
provides two ways in which customary law can be ascertained by the courts. As in Nigeria, they 
are by judicial notice and by adducing evidence. 
3.4.2.1  Judicial notice 
By virtue of section 1 (1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, ‘[a]ny court may take judicial 
notice of the law of a foreign state and of indigenous law in so far as such law can be 
ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty…’  This provision gives the courts discretion 
with respect to how judicial notice should be applied because it does not state the detailed 
circumstances of how it must be done.52 Bekker van Der Merwe states that the provision of the 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act did give the court the discretion to apply judicial notice in 
ascertaining customary law and this has been done based on the ‘whims and fancies of the 
whole spectrum of justices’.53 
There are divergent positions regarding whether the Act compels courts to take judicial 
notice of indigenous laws in its process of ascertainment and application with respect to the 
choice of law rules that relate to the application of customary law and Common law. In Thibela 
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v Minister van Wet enOrde54 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that section 1 (1) gave courts no 
discretion in applying customary law where necessary and is mandatorily required to do so 
when it is applicable with respect to the choice of law rules between applying either customary 
law or Common law. Academics like Kerr55 and Bennett56have argued that section 1 (1) makes 
the utilization of judicial notice mandatory while the application of customary law is not 
mandatorily required.57 In other words, while the court may not be compelled to apply 
customary law, it was mandated to adopt judicially noticed norms of customary law where they 
are available when applying customary law.  
According to Himonga et al,58 neither the application of customary law nor the 
utilization of judicial notice is mandated, as the wording of the said provision clearly gives room 
for the exercise of discretion on the application of customary law and the adoption of judicial 
notice. However, the court must apply customary law ‘where it is applicable’.59 
The Constitution provides in section 211(3) that ‘courts must apply customary law when 
that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with 
customary law’. This section has been explained in the scope of choice of law rules.60 That is, 
where it is determined that customary law is applicable and not statutory or Common law, then 
it must be applied to the case.61 Bennett explains that the choice of law rules extend to making 
a choice ‘between different systems of customary laws ‘Therefore, based on section 1 (1) of the 
Law of Evidence Amendment) Act, the courts may utilise judicial notice as an aid to ascertain 
the content of the applicable customary law where available. Based on the principles of judicial 
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1995 (3) SA 147 (SCA). In this case, issues on customary law were to be determined by the court. The widow 
claimed that the deceased who was her husband had adopted her son under customary law during his lifetime.  
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Kerr A J ‘The choice of and the application of customary law’ South African Law Journal (1996) 113 at 409. 
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 Bennett T W ‘The conflict of laws’ in Bekker, Rautenbach & Goolam (eds) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South 
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58
Ibid. 
59
Ibid at 58 - 60. 
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 See Bennett T W ‘Re-Introducing African Customary Law to the South African Legal System’ (2009) 57 AJCL 7 & 8. 
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 Due to the uncertainties in this the Report on Conflicts of Law South African Law Commission Project 90 The 
Harmonisation of the Common Law and the Indigenous Law recommended that parties should be given the right 
to make this choice and, in the absence of any choice, it should be left to the discretion of the court available at 
http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/reports/r_prj90_conflict_1999sep.pdf (accessed on 23/03/2017) p xvi. 
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notice and judicial precedent, a judge cannot exercise discretion to refrain from taking judicial 
notice where the circumstances require that he/she does. 
The Law of Evidence Amendment Act is however silent on whether a rule of customary 
law may only be judicially noticed when it has been ascertained by superior courts. A glimpse 
into the incidence prior to the enactment of the relevant provision of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act gives more light here. According to Bennett, there was a persistent dilemma 
with respect to the discretion of the magistrate’s court to apply customary law and in what 
circumstances they could do so under section 54 A (1) of the Magistrate’s Courts Act62which 
was not definite and had a lacuna.63 This provision was consequently repealed in 1988 and 
replaced by section 1 (1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act seemingly as a solution to the 
uncertainty.64 Seen from this light, it can be deduced that judicial notice is not restricted to the 
decisions of superior courts.  
The use of the phrase ’Any court may’ in Section 1 (1) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act may be interpreted to mean that the provision of the Act is applicable to the 
courts of chiefs and headmen. However, another inference that can also be made from the 
circumstances surrounding its enactment is that the provision may have been made without 
ever intending that it should apply to courts of chiefs and headmen (i.e. the provision 
empowering courts to take judicial notice) since it merely sought to address a dilemma faced by 
the magistrate courts.65 
Another legislation that regulates judicial notice is the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act66 
which can also be said to apply to all laws of which customary law is one since it does not 
specifically exclude it. Section 5(1) of the Act provides that ‘Judicial notice shall be taken of any 
law or government notice or of any other matter which has been published in the Gazette’.67 It 
appears from the use of the disjunctive word ‘or’ gives the court a choice between official and 
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 No. 32 of 1944. 
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Bennett Sourcebook of African Law (1991)18 & 119. 
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 It may be necessary that this provision is amended to state clearly the exclusion of the courts of chiefs and 
headmen from its application. 
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No. 25 of 1965. 
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 Section 5 (2) provides that ‘A copy of the Gazette, or a copy of such law, notice or other matter purporting to be 
printed under the superintendence or authority of the Government printer, shall, on its mere production, be 
evidence of the contents of such law, notice or other matter, as the case may be’. 
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living customary law where they differ without giving priority to the official.  However, it may 
be argued that the Constitutional subjection of customary law to legislation states otherwise.  
Citing the cases of Ex parte Minister of Native Affairs: In Ex Parte Minister of Native Affairs 
in re Yako v Beyi
68 and Morake v Dubedube69 which were decided prior to the enactment of the 
current amendment to the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, O’Dowd explained that chiefs’ and 
headmen’s courts can take judicial notice of native law and custom.70 However, should superior 
courts take judicial notice of customary laws that have been recognized by the courts of chiefs 
and headmen? Would the superior courts be justified to take judicial notice of decisions of the 
courts of chiefs and headmen on the ground that the latter are regarded as more versed in 
customary norms, even though they are subordinate to the superior courts? Further, should 
courts of chiefs and headmen be bound to take judicial notice of legislated customary laws?  
Neither section 1 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act nor section 5 (1) of the Civil 
Proceedings Evidence Act (the latter applying to superior courts only) differentiate between a 
superior and inferior court on the matter of which court may take judicial notice of a decision of 
another on a question of customary law. This would suggest that other courts may take judicial 
notice of customary law ascertained by courts of chiefs and headmen. This may indeed be 
beneficial to the development of customary law. Other courts would have the benefit of taking 
judicial notice of customary norms that are more likely to have undergone a more accurate 
process of ascertainment by persons who are custodians of the norms or to whom customary 
law is a lived reality. This however is subject to the limitations of how the flexibility of 
customary law is applied contextually. And since what the Constitution recognises is living 
customary law, 71 to require courts of chiefs and headmen to apply legislated customary law 
would stymie the evolving nature of the law, and affect legitimacy of the court. 
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 1948 AD 388. In this case, with respect to the commissioner’s court is ‘bound by earlier judgments of the Native 
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The Law of Evidence Amendment Act provides that judicial notice of customary law can 
be taken ‘in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with sufficient certainty’. Though 
‘customary law’ as used here should refer to living customary law, official versions appear to be 
included as well, having regards to section 5 (1) of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act. A number 
of points ensue from this. First, legislated customary law would be judicially noticed because it 
can be readily made available such as the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and 
Regulation of Related Matters Act.72 The challenge here is that the content of such customary 
law, where it has been reduced to written form (be they texts, judicial precedent, legislation 
and other documentary sources like reports of commission, anthropological recordings etc.) 
may differ from the actual normative practice of the community. The differences may occur 
because the recordings were made in error or the customary law, though correctly captured at 
the time it was recorded, may have evolved over time.  
Secondly, having regard to section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, courts 
may rely on other evidence besides judicial pronouncements for the purpose of taking judicial 
notice of a customary law, as long as that evidence ‘readily’ establishes the customary law and 
‘with sufficient certainty’. This may not necessarily be documentary proof, but may include oral 
evidence73 which gives the courts the potential of ascertaining and applying living customary 
law despite the tendency to rely on written materials. Zeffertt et al explained that indigenous 
law is ‘capable of being readily ascertained with sufficient certainty’ only if the ‘courts have 
access to authoritative sources’.74 He made reference to a few cases which included 
Harnischfeger Corporation & Another v Appletory & Another75 where the Supreme Court held 
that materials on a particular foreign law were ‘neither readily accessible nor ascertainable with 
such certainty’  because the court’s library as well as the library of a nearby university were 
deficient on them.76 Even though his reference is with respect to foreign law, the same 
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provision applies to customary law. In Hlophe v Mahlalela & Anor77the court could not ascertain 
the Swazi law and custom pertaining to custody of minor children after the death of the mother 
whose lobola was yet to be fully paid even after checking five books.  
The courts may augment scarce authorities with facts presented in evidence. In Mabena 
v Letsoalo78also decided in the same year, the court lamented a dearth of authorities on the 
customary rule put before it that the plaintiff and the mother of the bride can negotiate lobola. 
It, however relied on facts put before it under section 1 (2) of the Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act which confirmed the few documents presented to it.  
Relying on judicial notice dispenses with the need to lead evidence to prove customary 
law.79 This is because the courts would regard the customary law as an established fact.80 
However, relying on such recorded law will foreclose the ascertainment and application of 
living customary law by courts. This thesis argues that an approach that is more amenable to 
living customary law would be for courts to utilise credible evidence of a customary law to 
buttress what the court has judicially noticed, or to disprove the credibility of what may have 
been judicially noticed. 
According to Zefferttet al, the practice of judicial notice in South Africa lacks a clear-cut 
distinction between ‘a judicially noticed fact (which at common law has the effect of being 
conclusively proved) and a fact that has been rebuttably presumed (that is which has been 
sufficiently proved)’.81 The situation is similar for Nigeria. This thesis argues that different 
evidentiary value should attach to each.  Where parties to a suit do not dispute the contents of 
the applicable customary law for which they must lead credible evidence to show that it does 
not represent the norms of the community, there should be a rebuttable presumption that that 
customary law is definitive on the matter. This is because no evidence was lead to conclusively 
prove the norm. Parties in subsequent cases should be given the opportunity to rebut the norm 
by presenting contrary evidence.  
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It should however be noted that where a customary norm has been conclusively proved, 
it is different from admitted facts which need not be proved under the evidence act. In a 
situation where parties in a subsequent case are not in dispute with a customary norm that had 
been conclusively proved in an earlier judgement, the judgement in the subsequent case 
affirming the conclusively proved customary norm should not be treated as a situation of 
admitted facts. The implication for such admitted facts is that they are not binding on 
subsequent cases on similar subject matter involving other parties who dispute their veracity 
and therefore should not qualify as judicially noticed facts.  
The rule of stare decisis creates occasions where lower courts are compelled to apply 
wrongly ascertained customary law.82 The common law position on judicial notice is that if 
judicial notice is taken of a fact as an outcome of an inquiry, no issues will be raised again 
concerning the fact.83 However, it is a difficult proposition to apply stare decisis to customary 
law. Where judicial notice is utilised to preclude the presentation of further evidence to 
disprove a customary law that has been judicially noticed, it may hinder the ascertainment and 
application of living customary law by the courts especially giving its flexible nature and 
contextual application. Judicial notice may have its advantages, offering a less cumbersome 
means of proof, but it need not be sacrosanct when it comes to customary law. A rigid 
application results in a less credible process for ascertaining living customary law by the courts.  
Therefore, where a party has reason to dispute the content of a customary law that has 
been judicially noticed, he should be given the chance to present evidence to the contrary. The 
provision of section 1 (2) of the Law of Evidence  Amendment Act already addresses this by 
stating that ‘the provisions of subsection (1) shall not preclude any party from adducing 
evidence of the substance of a legal rule contemplated in that subsection which is in issue at 
the proceedings concerned.’ The disjunctive word ‘or’ used in section 1 (a) of the Evidence Act 
notwithstanding, also covers this if the party who puts forth the evidence contends that judicial 
notice cannot be applied for reasons that it does not correspond with the customary norms of 
the particular community. 
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The entire process of ascertainment encompasses a convergence of statutory and 
customary laws and the two ways it can be done as prescribed by statute engages with 
ideologies of positivism and pluralism.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The challenges that affect the ascertainment and application of customary law by the courts 
began in the way and manner customary law was recognised, regulated and adjudicated in 
colonial times. Currently, this is regulated by the respective laws of evidence, civil procedure 
rules and court laws in both countries. The Law of Evidence Amendment Act in South Africa and 
the Evidence Act in Nigeria provide for the utilization of judicial notice as a means of proving 
customary law but this must not be done at the expense of ascertaining and applying living 
customary law since the utilization of judicial notice may impede this in certain circumstances.  
The inclusion of the chiefs and headmen’s court in the application of judicial notice, i.e. 
to be used as a source, can provide rich jurisprudence and source of living norms applicable in 
the respective communities beneficial to other formal courts. The broad provision on the 
application of judicial notice under Nigerian law leaves a lot to be desired as it leaves wide 
room for the exercise of discretion which can impede the ascertainment and application of 
living customary law. The law in South Africa is more concise but the provisions of section 5 (1) 
of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act and section 1 (1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
also create a challenge with respect to judicial notice of legislated customary law over living 
customary law.  
This thesis argues that an approach that is more amenable to living customary law 
would be for courts  to utilise credible evidence of a customary rule to confirm what the court 
has judicially noticed,  or to disprove the credibility of what may have been judicially noticed. It 
also argues that there should be a clear cut distinction between judicially noticed facts that are 
sufficiently proved and those reputably presumed. While for the latter, credible evidence can 
be led by the parties on the applicable living customary law to rebut the presumption, such 
credible evidence should also not be foreclosed for the former where necessary. 
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Judicial notice is but one approach through which the courts can ascertain customary 
law. The other approach which is by proof as facts through evidence is extensively discussed in 
chapter four. 
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Chapter Four 
 
The Process of Ascertainment of customary law by formal courts – 
Proof as facts by Evidence 
 
4.1  Introduction 
The process of ascertaining and applying customary law in court is part of the procedures of the 
court in the adjudication of cases and this process utilises two approaches. While the previous 
chapter dealt with ascertainment of customary law through judicial notice, this chapter 
explores the ascertainment of customary law by proof as facts through evidence based on data, 
primary and secondary sources utilised in the research. The chapter discusses how this is done 
in courts that are primarily for the adjudication of customary law and other regular courts that 
also hear customary law cases. When ascertaining customary law through this approach, judges 
utilise one or more of the methods of ascertainment that are discussed below in 4.3.2.1.1.  The 
chapter also discusses the challenges associated with utilising these methods and how they 
impede the ascertainment and application of living customary law. It is vital to note here that 
when courts utilise these methods, there is a wide scope available for the exercise of discretion 
in the process of ascertaining and applying customary law.  
 
4.2  Proof of customary law as fact through evidence - Nigeria 
Apart from judicial notice, another approach in which the existence and practice of customary 
law can be ascertained by the court under the Evidence Act is through proof as a fact. Indeed 
section 18(1) of the Evidence Act provides that a custom that cannot be judicially noticed must 
‘be proved as a fact.’ This is usually done by the party alleging it. Customary law is law, but it is 
treated as fact for the purpose of its ascertainment. Nigerian courts, ‘have long maintained that 
[i]t is as a well-established principle of law that native law and custom is a matter of evidence to 
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be decided on the facts presented before the court in each particular case…’1 Statutes, such as 
the Evidence Act, also provide that evidence of a custom’s content must be proved before the 
court and in this instance, it is treated as fact. Proof of customary law is done in both customary 
courts and non-customary courts. 
 
4.2.1  Proof of customary law in customary courts 
 Generally, customary courts are excluded from the application of the Evidence Act and 
this may be for the reason that customary law procedures should apply to its 
proceedings.2Though the FCT Customary Court Rules, 2007 does not specifically require proof 
of the customary law where the court is situated, customary courts’ judges have required 
proof. Perhaps this omission is based on the assumption that the judges are versed in the 
customary law within the location of the court but this is not so since the judges are hardly 
indigenous to the communities where their courts are located. Even if they were, consideration 
must be given to variations and nuances that are distinct to clans and families within the 
community. The heterogeneity of cultural systems now prevalent in urban and rural settings in 
Nigeria makes it impossible for any single judge or panel of judges to be knowledgeable in all 
the customary law systems within the court’s jurisdiction. This therefore makes proof of 
customary law a necessity. Currently, a number of customary courts in Abuja are presided by 
judges who are from different communities outside the location of the courts and are qualified 
legal practitioners who have been trained in the principles of evidence. 
Obilade’s view that customary courts must be governed by customary law in the 
absence of statutory provisions requiring the proof of customary law in customary courts is not 
applicable in Nigeria’s Federal Capital Territory (FCT).  Statutory provisions now require the 
proof of customary law in the customary courts and the Customary Court of Appeal Abuja.  The 
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Giwa v Erinmilokun (1961) 1 All NLR 294. Here, the Federal Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the lower 
court which took judicial notice of the content of the customary law of Lagos that absolute grant of land even to 
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Customary Court Act 2007 permits the application of certain provisions of the Evidence Act.3 
The Customary Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007 requires parties to prove their case before 
the court where no liability is admitted.4 This invariably covers proving the content of 
customary law being put forward before the court. 
There are more specific provisions that require proof of customary law before the court. 
According to section 19 of the FCT Customary Court Act, ‘Evidence of a customary law shall be 
adduced in a customary court in all such cases as may be provided in the rules made under this 
Act’. Order 12 rule 7 of the Customary Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007 specifically requires 
proof where the alleged customary law applies in an area outside the jurisdiction of the court. 
However, in line with Obilade’s view, the evidence, and the means by which it is given and 
recorded by a court must accord with the native law and custom applicable to the matter at 
hand. 
Customary courts are required to ascertain customary law in accordance with the 
applicable native law and custom in the case before the court.5 Invariably, the court may only 
receive evidence from those customarily authorized to state what the content of the customary 
law of the community is of necessity, the judge must first determine how this must be done 
under the applicable customary law.  In essence, when exercising discretion, the judge must 
place more reliance on the evidence of those authorized by customary law over other sources 
he may consider to be more credible and authoritative. He/she cannot rely on other methods 
outside the traditional practice to ascertain the customary law to be applied in the case. 
In the cases analysed in the customary courts and the FCT Customary Court of Appeal, 
the records of proceedings do not reveal that any ascertainment of the method of proving 
customary law under the applicable custom was done. The court simply embarked on the 
determination of the content of the applicable customary law to apply in the case before it. No 
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Section 65 provides that ‘The Customary Court and Customary Court of Appeal FCT Abuja shall in judicial 
proceedings be bound by the provisions of sections 14, 15,59,76,77,78,92, 93,135,136,155,177and 227 of the 
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jurisdiction and he refers to Ehigie v Ehigie (1964) 1 All NLR 842. See Akrofi A ‘Judicial recognition and adoption of 
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5
 Order 12 Rule 5. 
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ground of appeal in the cases analysed in the appellate court relates to the failure of the court a 
quo to first ascertain the method of ascertainment under customary law. Perhaps how 
customary law was ascertained in the court a quo was in line with what is required under the 
applicable customary laws.  
Order 12 rule 7 requires the ascertainment of customary law for only cases that require 
the application of customary law of communities located outside the jurisdiction of the court. 
The cases analysed in the customary courts however revealed that the courts adopted similar 
procedure of ascertainment for cases involving the application of customary law of 
communities located within and outside the jurisdiction of the court regardless of the lacuna in 
the rules of court.  
Where a party is dissatisfied with the decision of the customary court with respect to 
what was ascertained as the applicable customary law, on appeal, he may apply to the 
Customary Court of Appeal for ‘leave to adduce evidence’ of the customary law.6 Presentation 
of evidence at the court may be at the instance of the parties or the court. Where a party with 
the leave of court presents evidence before the Customary Court of Appeal, the opponents 
would also be given the opportunity to do likewise.7 The court may also order parties to provide 
additional evidence as it deems necessary or direct the court below to take fresh evidence and 
‘report specific findings of fact’ back to it.8 The court below is also expected to ‘express its 
opinion on the demeanour of the witnesses and of the value of their evidence and may also, if 
it is the same court against whose decision the appeal has been made, state whether or not it 
would have come to a different decision had the additional evidence been brought forward at 
the trial.’9 
The Customary Court of Appeal basically has appellate functions.  However, by virtue of 
the Customary Court of Appeal of the FCT Abuja (Jurisdiction of Chieftaincy Matters) Act, 
2011,10 it now has original jurisdiction to exclusively ‘hear and determine dispute on or relating 
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to Chieftaincy matters’.11 There is a wide range of discretion exercised by the judges who 
themselves are qualified legal practitioners in  ascertaining and applying living customary law 
and this is determined by a number of factors discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
 
4.3  Proof of customary law as fact through evidence – South Africa 
Just as the situation with judicial notice, the Law of Evidence Amendment Act provides that 
customary law can be ascertained in court by proving it as facts through evidence brought 
before the court. How this is done in the courts of chiefs and headmen depends on the 
procedure adopted by the particular chief.  
 
4.3.1  Proof of customary law in courts of chiefs and headmen 
The procedure followed in the courts of chiefs and headmen was prescribed in the repealed 
Black Administration Act.12 Currently, this is regulated by the Chiefs’ and Headmen’s Civil Court 
Rules.13 Rule 1 provides that in civil cases, the procedures adopted by the court will be 
regulated by ‘the recognized customs and laws of the tribe’. Therefore, the procedure utilised 
by the court to resolve disputes is the procedure applicable under the particular customary law. 
This procedure is broadly accepted as being ‘simple, informal and flexible’.14 Dlamini asserts 
that the procedure applicable in the courts of chiefs and headmen is inquisitorial15 and 
therefore the chief/headman and his counsellors would play an active role where there is a 
need to ascertain the content of customary law. 
Ascertainment is necessary where the chief is uncertain about specific contents and 
would consult with his counsellors. Sometimes, the customary law of a different community not 
known to the particular court would need to be ascertained. The chiefs and headmen’s courts 
are not bound by certain restrictions such as the parties’ prayers and the rules of pleadings but 
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28 of 1927. This is by virtue of rule 12 of the BAA. Currently, only three sections of the BAA survived and these 
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13
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Dlamini C R M ‘The Role of Chiefs in the Administration of Justice in Kwazulu’ A thesis submitted in partial 
fulfillment of the degree of Doctor Legum in the Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria 1988 187, 190 – 191. 
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are at liberty to rule in ways that they consider would bring justice to the case.16 Therefore, in 
the exercise of discretion with respect to ascertaining and applying customary law in cases 
before them, they would paddle through some degree of likely solutions which in any way is 
line with the flexible nature of customary law. At the centre of their consideration is the desire 
to achieve justice and reconciliation albeit subject to customary norms.17  The procedure 
adopted for the ascertainment and application of customary law where necessary is 
determined by the particular court and not the provisions of the law of Evidence Amendment 
Act. 
 
4.3.2 Proof of customary law as fact through evidence in regular courts other than courts 
with mainly customary law jurisdiction in Nigeria and South Africa 
 
Proof as facts through evidence in Nigeria and South Africa is discussed together because the 
processes are largely similar for regular courts in both countries. Here, the outcome of the 
various methods of ascertainment are utilised. The analysis of these methods is done generally. 
It should however be noted that some of the methods discussed here are also adopted under 
judicial notice. 
Section 16 (1) of the Nigerian Evidence Act provides that ‘A custom may be adopted as 
part of the law governing a particular set of admissible circumstances if it … can be proved to 
exist by evidence.’ Subsection (2) of section 1 of the South African Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act provides that even though customary law may be ascertained through judicial notice, it 
‘shall not preclude any part from adducing evidence of the substance of a legal rule 
contemplated in that subsection which is in issue at the proceedings concerned’. How then is 
evidence led to prove the substance of the applicable legal rule? 
The case of Angu v Attah18  holds that customary law is proved ‒ 
In the first instance by calling witnesses acquainted with the native 
customs until the particular customs have by frequent proof in the 
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Ibid at 192 – 193. Order 13 rule 1. It should be noted however that this does not extend to monetary orders in 
civil claims. 
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Dlamini op cit note 15 at 190. 
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Supra. 
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courts, become so notorious that the courts will take judicial notice of 
them.  
 
The danger Bennett identified in the approach of regarding customary law as facts,  relates to 
the point that once customary law is regarded as fact, then it resultantly must be pleaded in 
every case with fresh evidence presented to prove its existence since facts are ‘peculiar to the 
particular case and, in principle, judicial notice cannot be taken of them’.19 This thesis’ position 
however is that with regard to determining the content of the applicable customary norm, 
where it is proved conclusively as fact, it need not be pleaded in every case with fresh evidence 
unless it can be established that the normative practice has evolved. This position is however 
subject to the criticisms and limitations of customary norms passed through an institutional 
process and reduced in written form even though proved as facts as discussed under 4.3.2.1 
below. The facts of a dispute are peculiar to each dispute but this is not necessarily so for facts 
of a normative practice. 
It is important to note here that Zeffertt et al aver that the judge’s personal knowledge 
of facts cannot on their own qualify as facts that can be ‘ascertained readily and with sufficient 
certainty’.20While agreeing with Zeffert et al, this thesis asserts that a judge’s knowledge may 
play a role in the process of ascertainment he adopts. This is because he may be sceptical about 
readily accepting the notoriety of a set of facts as sufficient proof based on his earlier 
knowledge so he may indulge the presentations of further evidence and may also use assessors 
to confirm the facts.21 
As already intimated, the methods of ascertainment utilised in the process of 
ascertainment in Nigeria and South Africa are similar and will therefore be discussed 
hereunder.  
                                                          
19
 Ibid. 
20
Zeffert D T, Paizes A P & Skeen A St Q The South African Law of Evidence (2003) 717. 
21
 Although the case of van Breda v Jacobs 1921 AD 334 (Though not on African customary law) states that judicial 
notice can be taken of a custom which is old and has been in long usage. This definition in application to African 
customary law will not suffice based on its flexible and evolving nature.    
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4.3.2.1  Methods of ascertainment 
When a customary law dispute comes before a court, the party who alleges that a particular 
practice is the applicable customary law would ask the court to take judicial notice of the 
practice as having been proven, or may seek to proffer evidence of facts to prove the existence 
of the customary law. Where customary law has to be proved as a fact before Nigerian and 
South African courts, any or a mixture of various methods of ascertainment is utilsed.22 These 
methods include the recounting of lived experiences by witnesses,23 the opinion of experts 
regarding particular customary laws, texts, manuals, customary courts case book analysis, 
assessors, the opinion of native chiefs, academic records obtained through questionnaires, 
commissions of inquiry, legislation, judicial precedents, codification, and restatement. Yet 
another method, which was recently developed, is self-statement. A party who alleges a 
customary law may employ any of these methods. These methods are discussed below. This 
section concisely explains what they are and criticisms related to the challenges of utilising 
them. This is done on the basis of the weight they carry with respect to how they apply to the 
process of ascertainment in answering the overarching question of this thesis which is ‘What 
factors determine the ascertainment and application of customary law by the courts?’ It should 
be noted that precedent is excluded here because it had been discussed in chapter three. 
 
4.3.2.1.1  Ascertainment through assessors 
Courts in Nigeria and South Africa used assessors to ascertain customary law. While this still 
subsists in South Africa, assessors are no longer used in Nigeria. Such assessors are usually 
Africans who are versed or presumed to be conversant in the particular customary law sought 
to be ascertained. The assessors are either chiefs, traditional leaders or persons who by virtue 
of their position had first-hand experience or were versed in customary law. They were 
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 Bennett T W & Runger M (eds). The Ascertainment of customary Law and the Methodological Aspects of 
research into customary Law: Proceedings of Workshop, February/March 1995 Windhoek: Law Reform & 
Development Commission.  
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appointed to sit with and assist the judge(s) in resolving disputes based on their knowledge of 
the applicable customary law. In colonial times, they were selected by the colonial officers.24 
In South Africa, assessors were either ‘subpoenaed or summoned’ to court to provide 
assistance.25In Nigeria, customary courts used assessors26 and selected them from an approved 
list of assessors27 as is currently done in South Africa. Their role was solely advisory.  However 
they were known to alter their positions a number of times in the course of a case,28 which put 
their reliability in question. The practice in both countries then was that they had no vote in the 
final decision of the court even though their opinions were habitually accepted,29 though hardly 
ever chosen over precedents.30 
In the past, the role of assessors was akin to that of an expert witness,31  though 
distinguishable in the sense that it is the court – rather than the parties‒ that summoned them 
to render expert evidence. Their assertions were not subject to cross examination. Also, their 
opinions were sometimes given in private when sought by the presiding magistrate. Bennett 
and Park have criticised this. Writing about the practice in South Africa, Bennett argued that it 
undermines the value of expert testimony when it is not subjected to rigours of cross-
examination. Park recommended that expert opinion by court-summoned assessors be subject 
to cross examination.32 
Currently in South Africa, assessors sit with the judge but their views are still not subject 
to cross examination and are given in the judge’s chambers. Park’s recommendation is 
therefore pertinent in order to test the credibility of the assessor’s testimony and to give the 
other party a chance to respond to their testimonies. This will better aid the court to have a 
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 Ibhawoh B ‘Historical globalization and colonial legal culture: African assessors, customary law, and criminal 
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level ground in exercising discretion to go for the more cogent and credible version of 
customary law. Although assessors may present a picture of neutrality because they are 
summoned by the court, they are not immune from deliberate or inadvertent error either as a 
result of bias due to direct or indirect interest in the subject matter of the dispute, or because 
their genuinely held opinion are distorted or outdated versions of customary law. The process 
of selecting assessors may also be flawed, where for instance the selection criteria fails to 
produce the most knowledgeable persons with regard to the applicable customary law. In 
South Africa, it is done by the office of the Premier.33 
Currently courts in Nigeria where necessary, summon experts or persons versed in the 
particular customary law to testify in court on the content of the applicable customary law and 
their testimony is subject to cross examination by the parties. These persons/experts are 
recommended by the chief of the community who is requested by the court to recommend 
someone well versed in the content of the customary law sought to be ascertained and applied. 
This method seems more cogent for the ascertainment of living customary law than the views 
of assessors which cannot be challenged by the parties. 
 
4.3.2.1.2  Ascertainment through witnesses  
According to the Black’s Law Dictionary34 a “witness” is a person who testifies in a cause before 
a court. In its broader meaning, it includes all persons from whom testimony is extracted for a 
judicial proceeding on issues that are within their knowledge. The recounting of lived 
experiences by witnesses (whether orally and (or) in writing) as a method of ascertaining 
customary law is clearly covered by the Evidence Act of Nigeria and the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act South Africa.  
According to section 18 (2) of the Nigerian Evidence Act – 
Where the existence or the nature of a custom applicable to a given 
case is in issue, there may be given in evidence the opinions of 
persons who would be likely to know of its existence in accordance 
with section 73.  
 
                                                          
33
See the case of Modiakgtla v Noko & Anor (2014)Unreported North West High Court Mahikeng MG CIVLI APP 
13/12. See also Bophuthatswana Traditional Courts Act No. 29 of 1979 & Proclamation No. 110 of June, 1994. 
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Section 73 (1) provides that the court may admit the opinions of persons who are likely to know 
of the existence of a general custom or right in order (for the court) to form an opinion about 
the existence of the said custom or right. These provisions do not restrict such opinions to 
expert witnesses. Similarly, section 1(2) of South Africa’s Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
permits the presentation of evidence to prove the ‘substance of a legal rule’. The provision 
recognizes that a person who is not an expert, may testify about the content of a custom if he 
or she is ‘likely to know of its existence’.  
Litigants have utilised these provisions to bring witnesses who are ordinary members of 
the community – rather than experts‒ to present testimonies with respect to their lived 
experiences of customary law or what was related to them through legitimate customary 
means such as oral history from their fathers.35 The challenge with this method of 
ascertainment however is tied to the credibility of the witnesses and how the judges may 
interpret their narration of the customary rules they relate. For example, and as observed by 
Burman, in an era of urbanization in which people migrate from their rural roots where 
adherence to traditional values are strong, in preference for urban areas and cosmopolitan 
lifestyles, their views or testimonies regarding customary law may be misleading to a court in 
some cases.36 
An obvious misnomer, for instance, would be where the court approaches the 
ascertainment of customary law using a legalistic approach to problem solving, as opposed to 
the customary law preference for a commonsensical approach.37A good instance is the scenario 
related by von Benda-Beckman’s testimonies of witnesses related to the litigant which he states 
are usually treated with suspicion and sometimes are rejected by judges on that basis whereas 
in customary law parlance, it ‘is considered normal and desirable’ to have relatives testify on 
behalf of litigants.38 
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Both Nigeria and South Africa regard witnesses’ testimonies as relevant to 
ascertainment. In Nigeria, the courts would deem as relevant any fact which ‘tends to show 
how in particular instances a matter alleged to be a custom was understood and acted upon by 
persons then interested’.39 Similarly, section 2 of South Africa’s Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 
deems as admissible any relevant and material evidence of ‘fact, matter or thing’ which may 
‘prove or disprove any point or fact in issue…’ Where such witnesses are credible, their 
accounts of the customary norms aid the court in its exercise of discretion towards the 
ascertainment of living customary law. 
 
4.3.2.1.3 Texts & other written materials 
These refer to books, manuals, handbooks, Commission Reports, and other informal sources, 
such as journals of missionaries and travellers to the particular African communities.40 These 
informal sources are sometimes mere records of the untested impressions of their authors and 
devoid of anthropological standards.41 Although these have been utilised in earlier and recent 
times to ascertain customary law,42 they may not be credible sources for the reasons given 
above. 
Courts would prefer that such written materials presented to them as proof of 
customary practices are affirmed by the communities to which they apply as held in the West 
African Court of Appeal which overturned the decision of the lower court in the case of Adedibu 
v. Adewoyin.43 In this particular case, the court a quo ignored the contradictory evidence of the 
parties on the content of customary law made to the family head and relied instead on the 
version in a text44 which was different from the averments of the parties. This text did not form 
part of the evidence of the parties and none of the counsel referred to it.  The appellate court 
held that where the court relied on a text, it must have been part of the evidence put before 
the court, and it must also be proved that either the book or its manuscript has been accepted 
by the community as a ‘legal authority’.  
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A South African example is Maclean’s Compendium of 185645 which magistrates used as 
a guide on the content of customary law before the Report of the Native law and Customs 
Commission 1883.46 Prinsloo however criticized the report as offering a version of customary 
law that was collated by ‘officers and missionaries who had not made a proper study of the 
relevant customary law’.47In Nigeria, an attempt to collate customary law is being undertaken 
by the Law Reform Commission of Abia State.48 
Considerable research efforts have been put into this exercise, but it is not likely that 
the objective of publishing a manual of all the customary laws of the communities in the State 
will be completed in the near future.49 For the exercise to be a credible documentation of the 
customary norms, it must meet the necessary sociological and anthropological standards for 
such exercise.  
In South Africa, Seymour’s Native Law and Custom, published in 1911, was regarded as a 
major reference material by courts, even though it was initially restricted to the Cape and 
Transkei.50 Later editions of the text incorporated research data that were gathered through 
anthropological research, court precedents and commission reports.51 However, Bennett 
criticized the text for representing customary law through a Eurocentric view.52 Later customary 
law texts include the South African Native Law by Whitefield,53 Schapera’s book on Tswana 
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 It was compiled and edited by Col Maclean who was a chief Commissioner of British Kaffraria. See Standford W E 
M The reminiscences of Sir Walter Stanford Macquarrie J W (ed) (1958) 35. 
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Law54 – essentially a restatement of customary law. There have been a number of other texts in 
more recent times.55 
Examples of Nigerian texts include Elias’ numerous texts, such as Nigerian Land Law and 
Custom amongst others,56 and Bohannan’s text on the Tivs in Nigeria.57 ‘The Traditional Concept 
of Justice among the Ibo of South-Eastern Nigeria’58 is another text, and some others.59 Another 
resource is a book titled ‘Towards a Restatement of Nigerian Customary Law’ published by 
Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Justice. There are also manuals on customary laws such as 
‘[t]he customary law manual: a manual of customary laws obtained in the Anambra and Imo 
States of Nigeria’,60 and other more current ones.61 The main challenge here is that there is a 
dearth of texts especially recent ones to aid the court as lamented by Woodman. 62 Apart from 
the fact that texts may not have credibly captured the customary laws of communities, these 
customary laws where properly captured may have evolved and would therefore not aid the 
court in exercising discretion towards ascertaining and applying living customary law. 
Commission reports are products of commissions of inquiry which, by virtue of their 
respective terms of reference, purportedly ascertained the contents of customary law at their 
hearings.63 In South Africa, there have been the Natal Native Commission of 1852, the Cape 
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Native Laws and Customs Commission of 1883, the South African Native Affairs Commission of 
1903-1905 and the South African Law Reform Commission Reports.64 The contents of these 
reports were prominently used by courts to ascertain customary law.65 As helpful as these 
methods may seem to be to the courts, some have been criticized for not utilizing scientific 
methods in the observations recorded, and for being clouded by the Eurocentric views of the 
authors.66 Those that were compiled by lawyers have been criticized as being rule based and 
failing to present the normative realities of the customary laws they claimed to present67. The 
more recent are the Project 90 Customary Law Report on Traditional Courts and the Judicial 
Function of Traditional Leaders on customary law and practices which have been utilised in the 
process of ascertainment and application of customary law in the courts in recent times.68 
These have been more useful when development of the customary norm is contemplated 
which presents the current view of what the community wants. This is because if the customary 
laws are credibly sourced, they present before the courts the tools with which to aid them in 
exercising discretion towards the ascertainment and application of living customary law. 
Colonel CB Maclean’s compendium of the customary laws of British Kaffraria is an 
example of a source of customary law. However, these sources may be described as indicative 
of the contextual framework of what Kerr refers to as customary law and may be distinct from 
living customary law. Indeed, Kerr did acknowledge that the records are older than what the 
natives would state as their customary law at the time of his writing.69 According to Kerr, the 
records were partly statements of eminent tribesmen and of ‘settlers, colonial administrators 
and missionaries, who came into contact with local tribesmen, and were able to observe how 
the laws were administered by the chiefs’.70 Some of these statements were given as witness 
testimonies in court. In one particular case, the court relied on evidence provided by the Hon. 
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Charles Brownlee, whose testimonies regarding customary law was held in high esteem and 
relied upon by courts. Courts have also relied on the findings of native law commissions, such 
as the 1883 Commission.71 
 In Matyesi v Dulo,72it was noted that courts have arrived at many decisions with the aid 
of the evidence on the native law and custom of the indigenous Africans in the Cape Colony. 
These were presented before native commissions, and such evidence were complemented by 
the ‘valuable assistance of Assessors’.73 In Kerr’s view, these sources should not be fleetingly 
dismissed because the processes adopted by the commissions and assessors to adduce 
evidence of customary law were thorough and conscientious.74 Nevertheless, however 
thorough and conscientious those processes may have been, it must be pointed out that there 
are issues that question the credibility of these sources of customary law with respect to, for 
instance, the protection of colonial interest discussed in the previous chapter. Besides, the 
authenticity of these records may be challenged on certain grounds such as the Eurocentric 
conceptions of their authors. 
 
4.3.2.1.4  Ascertaining through restatement 
Where the courts exercise discretion in adopting restated customary law, whether or not living 
customary law is ascertained and applied depends on the authenticity of the restatement.  Two 
of the main purposes of restatement are to promote certainty regarding the content of 
customary law and to limit judicial discretion in its ascertainment.75 Prinsloo describes 
restatement as entailing ‘an authoritative and systematic recording of customary law or a 
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branch thereof for juridical purposes’.76 While restatement achieves a semi-codification of 
customary law, it may not be compared to codification which results in legislated law.  
Restated customary laws merely serve as guide for courts and other practitioners and 
do not override court decisions.77  This may diminish the weight that courts attach to 
restatements. Nonetheless, they should provide courts some reasonable assistance because 
they are presented as legal rules in a form that courts are familiar with.78 
Hence, restatements have been utilised by courts during ascertainment in order to 
address the unreliability of witnesses’ testimonies and deficiencies in information in texts 
especially where judges find such accounts to be ‘unsatisfactory’.79 Restatements are essentially 
done by researchers rather than by courts. The outcomes of such research are presented to 
courts as restatements of customary law.  Since courts utilise restatements when exercising 
discretion, it is vital to discuss its reliability as a method of ascertainment and briefly recount 
how it has been done on the continent.  
In Africa, Allott prosecuted an ambitious project of restatement in which Eugene Cotran 
and Hans Cory, an anthropologist, were involved at different stages, in order to provide a 
‘strong prima facie evidence of customary law on a given topic’.80 The project was meant to 
cover 16 English speaking African countries, including Nigeria.81 In the end, the project 
produced only six volumes of restatements of the customary laws regarding marriage and 
divorce, succession and family law in just a few countries.82 
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The outcome of the project was meant to aid the courts in ascertaining customary law.83  
A presentation of the rigorous process of restatement embarked upon in the above project is 
worthwhile. The project  lasted about seven years84 and entailed the discovery of a long  
bibliography of published and unpublished materials, ranging from official documentations of 
customary law to private scribbling, monographs, reports, etc. that were: 
[P]repared by anthropologists, sociologist, administrative officers, 
judges, commissions of enquiry, declarations, by-laws, or statements 
of customary law by indigenous customary and local authorities; and 
judicial decisions, if any, of higher and inferior courts.85 
 
Thereafter, law panels were established in collaboration with the government and 
consultations were had with different ‘interest-groups’. There were also field studies, analysis 
and further consultations before the reports were edited and published.86 
Although this process produced Kenyan’s first restatement, the outcome was criticized 
because of the probable influence that Cotran’s legal education had on his perception of 
customary law.87 Cotran also excluded certain details that he considered vague, or with respect 
to which there were variations or disagreements.88 His investigative and analytical methods 
were also described as failing anthropological standards.  Indeed, Cotran may have been 
motivated to produce ‘ideal rules and principles’ of customary law rather than a restatement.89 
His omission of the records of customary courts was flawed because, as Roberts observed, ‘the 
chance remark of a witness before the court’ could have inspired a better understanding of the 
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law than could have been obtained from discussions with informants’ through interviews.90 
Another criticism suggest that Cotran’s work had a fossilizing effect on customary law.91 
Allott, responding to the latter criticism, stated that due to the evolving nature of 
customary law, restatement requires periodic reviews to keep it up to date.92 This however 
does not resolve the criticisms raised above.  
Considerable concern has been expressed over the representativeness of consultations 
in a restatement exercise, particularly with respect to whether people subject to the customary 
law that is sought to be ascertained were adequately consulted.93Ubink has argued that 
concerns about the representativeness of consultations ought not to be fatal to Allot and 
Cotran’s work since they assert that the project was done to aid judges in adjudication and not 
necessarily for the restated laws to be accepted by the people.94 This argument defeats the aim 
of ascertainment, as it fails to acknowledge that the purpose of ascertainment is to determine 
the living customary law and that a restatement, to be useful to the courts, must record the 
actual practices of the people.  
There have been notable works of restatement in Southern Africa.  Schapera’s ‘A 
Handbook on Tswana Law and Custom’ covered the Bechuanaland Protectorate.95 Though the 
Batswana of South Africa are not part of Bechuanaland Protectorate, Prinsloo states that they 
also use Schapera’s handbook.96 
Schapera claimed to have personally collected a vast portion of the Tswana law that he 
published from attending the tribal court sessions and from tribal informants who were viewed 
as authorities.97 He also conducted ethnographic studies, examined official records and 
forwarded his compilation for comments from various district officials and academics.98 Though 
a highly commended work, it remains subject to short falls of ascertainment mentioned earlier. 
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There is also the limitation that it may not have captured variations in other communities that 
do not fall under the particular community studied despite the fact that the same language is 
spoken.99 
More recent works of restatement in South Africa include those carried out by the 
Centre for Indigenous Law, Faculty of Law University of South Africa, covering customary laws 
of Bophuthatswana, indigenous public law, Kwa Ndebele and Amaswazi.100 The methodologies 
adopted in these projects entailed the compilation of a memorandum for field research and the 
collation of materials on the subject for empirical verification.101 The memorandum was flexible 
and adjustable to realities on the field.102 However, this project was criticized for being rule 
based and for being unduly reliant on interviews conducted on panels.103 This is in addition to 
earlier criticism of restatement some of which also apply here. Prinsloo cautioned against the 
use of ‘conceptualising law in abstract terms’ which may not be well comprehended by 
informants.104 
The effect of all the identified short comings of restatement limits the authenticity of 
what is ascertained which will in turn affect the veracity of customary law versions ascertained 
and applied by the court. Adding to that is the fact that so far a high number of customary laws 
in South Africa are yet to be restated. Where restatements are available, the courts should 
receive evidence to confirm the restated practice. 
In Nigeria, there are very few works on the restatement of customary law. In 1990, an 
attempt at restatement was made.105 More recently, the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal 
studies did a restatement of various customary laws across Nigeria, focusing on chieftaincy and 
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traditional institutions, inheritance, succession, land, and marriage’.106 The exercise took four 
years. The aim was to establish the ‘common law of Nigeria’ by identifying commonalities in 
customary practices’ and jurisprudence and noting exceptions.107 
The methodology included: 
[D]esk review; field  research;  collation  and  analysis  of  field 
research findings; testing of field research findings in a stakeholders 
consultative conference; further desk review to fill in gaps in the 
literature; and the core restatement work by a select committee of 
Reporters.108 
 
The work was published in 2013 and no work that analyses this effort for veracity was sighted 
during this research. However, the work could be subjected to similar challenges that 
restatements have been subjected to109 and it still leaves the court with quite some discretion 
in the ascertainment and application of living customary law.  
Restatement is usually done with the aim of unification. Achieving unification can be 
quite overwhelming since all customary laws must first be identified and ascertained, then 
variations identified and discarded.110 This cannot be done without first having a proper 
appreciation of the values of the cultures (whose laws are sought to be ascertained) as well as 
their respective legal systems. Otherwise the result will be a distortion of the customary laws. 
One advantage restatement can be said to have over codification is that if it varies from lived 
practices, the courts may disregard it for more credible evidence put before it since it is merely 
a guide to the courts. It however can influence the court in exercising discretion towards living 
customary law. 
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4.3.2.1.5 Ascertaining through codification 
Codification is distinguished from restatement in that it is legislated customary law and is 
described as a ‘comprehensive and exhaustive statement of the applicable customary law on a 
given topic or area’.111 It purports to be an exhaustive restatement of customary law inclusive of 
case law and statutory provisions on an issue.112  The accuracy of describing codification as an 
‘exhaustive statement’ of customary norms is doubtful since law makers cannot fully anticipate 
the entire circumstances to which a law will apply. This was explained by Hart when he 
buttressed why it is needful for courts to exercise discretion.113 
Since legislated customary law becomes binding on courts and may only be amended or 
repealed by legislation, courts are not at liberty to disregard its provisions, especially so in 
South Africa and Nigeria where customary law is subject to legislation. This, in essence, would 
mean that living customary law will be subject to legislated customary law thereby impeding 
the judge’s discretion towards applying the living customary law ascertained during the trial. 
Though the codes serve ‘as a certain and convenient source of reference for the courts’, their 
short comings cripple their benefits.114 
There are examples of codifications in South Africa. Courts have relied on the Transkei 
Penal Code of 1886, the Natal Code of Zulu Law of 1878 and the Natal Code of Native Law 1891 
and amendments of 1932, 1967, 1981, 1985 and 1987.115 But they have all been criticized as 
distortions of Zulu law and their normative practices.116 Their compilation was devoid of in-
depth research on Zulu law. There was a great deal of reliance on questionnaires filled by 
magistrates.117 It was stated that the Codes are “a model of how not to do it”.118 Yet, courts 
have relied on these official versions of customary law in South Africa.119 
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Customary law in Nigeria is not codified120 except with certain parts of the respective 
chiefs’ laws of the various states of the federation. This is largely due to the seemingly daunting 
task it would require to adequately research, ascertain and record these laws and their 
numerous variations.121With respect to chieftaincy matters, some works of codification have 
been carried out in some communities. The codes are subject to some of the criticisms 
discussed below. 
One of the criticisms of codification is that it imposes customary law into positivist or 
centralist conceptual framework in which customary law is law because it is legislated by the 
state. This conflicts with the pluralist status of customary law as a heterogeneous system of 
normative values and practices.122 Flowing from this criticism is the fact that codified customary 
norms remain static and not flexible, are unable to evolve with current practices that have 
normative value. This ultimately impedes the development of customary law even by the 
courts.  Where codifications fail to reflect the actual customary law of the communities, what is 
codified becomes a departure from the actual normative practice and an imposition altogether.  
Consistent with this criticism, some attempts by colonial administrators to codify 
customary law have been described as inventions motivated by the interests of the colonial 
government.123 The process of codification can also be manipulated. In Kenya, native elders 
were known to have provided versions of customary law to be recorded that served their 
interests over and above other members of the communities such as women and younger 
men.124 This has also been the case in South Africa.125 
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The fact that numerous versions of customary law could subsist within the same geo-
cultural space, often among people of the same linguistic stock, also make codification very 
difficult. It is severely cumbersome to identify, harmonise   and record the various shades of 
differences in the same cultural system.126 Harmonization is in fact unadvisable, as it may result 
in the omission of nuances that make up the content of customary law.127 This could severely 
impede the credibility and acceptability of the codified norms by the people who would be 
bound by them.128 Sometimes, concerns about the credibility of the codification process revolve 
around the expertise of the experts that were used to ascertain the norms.129 
Amending to update codified customary law may not necessarily be a solution because 
of cumbersome processes and delays that bog legislative amendments.130  Due to the evolving 
nature of customary law, there is no guarantee that the codified law is a statement of the 
normative practice at the time of codification.  This has prompted some debate regarding the 
timing of codification since the law may be at the brink of evolving.   Shadle, Odje and Pogucki 
as well as Azinge have argued that this ought not to preclude codification and it may be best to 
go ahead with codification and let the law evolve in its own stride.131 Their position however 
supports two versions of customary law – the codified version and the living version since 
untimely codification can result in diversions between the code and actual practice.132 
 
4.3.2.1.6 Ascertaining through self-statement 
Currently, there is no identified self –stated customary law in Nigeria and South Africa 
therefore, the courts are not known to have utilised this method in their process of 
ascertainment and application. It is however discussed in this thesis because it is one of the 
methods of ascertainment and may find adoption in both countries in future.  
‘Self-stating’, a term coined by Hinz,133 refers to:  
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A process of ascertaining customary law by the owners of the law 
to be ascertained, namely the people – or, rather, the community 
to which the people belong – and the traditional leaders as the 
custodians of customary law.134 
The methodology adopted in self-stating customary law differs from community to 
community135 but the common premise is that the ‘end product’ is derived from the 
community.136 In other words, it is the community which decides what is written down as their 
law since once written, the customary laws become binding on the communities they derive 
from.137 
The pioneer self-stating experiment was conducted among the Ovambo, Kavango and 
Caprivi communities in Namibia and was coordinated by the Human Rights and Documentation 
Centre of the University of Namibia’s Faculty of Law.138 Prior to this, certain traditional 
communities, on their own, began this experiment before Namibia gained its independence. 
Eventually, the Council of Traditional Leaders took on the venture and appealed to other 
traditional authorities to participate, and thereafter, it became a national project.139 Self-stating 
is towards achieving certainty.140 It is different from codification because it is the community 
that decides what their law is and what aspect of it should be self-stated, reduced in writing, 
141or amended.142 According to Hinz, self-statement accommodates the evolving nature of 
customary law because it can be amended periodically to accommodate new changes. He 
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explained further that living customary law is not subject to the self-stated law,143 and it 
accommodates unification, amendments and developments of customary law by the 
communities. 
According to Ubink, based on her research on the Uukwambi Traditional Authority144 in 
Namibia, self-statement enhances certainty by reducing judicial discretion in the application of 
customary law. She noted that villagers and the traditional leaders see this as a benefit.145This is 
no doubt commendable. However, Ubink admits that self-statement, even as a community 
driven exercise, cannot anticipate all the circumstances to which the law would be made to 
apply. Thus, self-statement is not exhaustive.146 The achievement of certainty in the customary 
law of the Uukwambi should also be treated with caution due to the flexible nature of 
customary law and the effect of such certainty on it.147 This is more so because despite Hinz’s 
efforts to preserve the ‘nuance, flexibility and negotiability’ of the customary law in South 
Sudan, Leonardi et al wrote that it was  doubtful that the project preserved these three 
elements.148 
Hinz had engaged a high number of assistants to help him with the ascertainment 
exercise, but Leonardi et al questioned whether they could maintain the ‘level of sensitivity and 
understanding required to assist the recording of laws without influencing the process’.149 The 
authors also questioned the usefulness of self-statement, pointing out that once they were 
recorded, chiefs are wont to treat them as codes and therefore give it precedent over other 
versions of customary law.150 Lastly, they observed that negotiations and adjustments of 
customary law, which occur in courts, are often influenced by gerontological and hierarchical 
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contestations that cannot be captured by legislation or any form of ‘written ascertainment’ of 
customary law.151 
Thus, as painstaking and inclusive as self-statement may be, it is not without challenges. 
The processes involved in self-stating, and the participation or representation of the 
community, are subject to self-serving interests, distortions, and the likelihood of alteration at 
the point of writing to reflect the writer’s perception.152 The issue may then be raised, having 
regard to the processes involved in self-statement and the criticisms they attract, whether self-
statement is law? If it is, then it is codification with a difference with regard to the fact that it is 
people rather than state driven. Secondly, since it is subject to credible contradictory evidence 
of living customary law, it may only be regarded as a prima facie evidence of normative 
practices. Therefore, every self-statement presented in evidence in the process of 
ascertainment must be analysed in order to determine whether or not it should be admissible 
as representing the people’s customary law.  
 
4.3.2.1.7 Ascertaining through legislation 
Under South Africa’s Law of Evidence Amendment Act and Nigeria’s Evidence Act, legislation is 
one of the categories of that which courts can take judicial notice of. Where customary law has 
been legislated, proving it would be less cumbersome and straight forward. Examples of such 
legislation in South Africa are the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of 
Related Matters Act.153 In Nigeria, the chieftaincy laws enacted during colonial times and 
thereafter for regulating the appointment and deposition of traditional chiefs 154 and Nigeria’s 
Land Use Act of 1978 which unified the regulation of land interest including customary land 
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ownership are examples.155 There have been ‘legislations by traditional authorities’ whereby 
local government councils adopt bye-laws that emanate from traditional chiefs as representing 
the customary law of their particular community on a particular subject.156 
Legislation on customary law is often a product of law reform commissions in Nigeria 
and South Africa. The National and Provincial legislature in South Africa are empowered to 
make such laws.157 In Nigeria, federal and state legislatures can make laws regarding customary 
law.  However, as pointed out earlier, legislation may not be the most efficient method of 
ascertaining customary law. The outcome will be subject to the criticisms already discussed. 
Legislation has been used to supposedly achieve the harmonization and unification of 
customary law. Although the case for legislating customary law mostly hinges on achieving 
certainty, certain factors defeat this. First, as discussed earlier, it would crystallise customary 
law. Secondly a flawed process of investigating customary rules would result in legislating 
distortions.158  Thirdly, even if the customary rules were correctly ascertained, it would not 
accommodate all variations; and it would certainly also not envisage all possible circumstances 
that could arise in the application of the customary law. Under these circumstances, the courts 
would still need to exercise discretion in the ascertainment and application of the law in cases 
before them.  
In the rare instances where customary law is correctly ascertained and legislated, 
normative practices within the communities may yet evolve, and an amendment to the 
legislation may not be a practical solution because legislative amendments involve 
cumbersome, complicated and protracted processes. However, where the legislation does not 
                                                          
155
 Allott A N ‘Nigeria Land Use Decree 1978’ 1978) JAL 22.02 136. The Supreme Court had initially held that the Act 
abolished customary law interest.’ See Akinloye v Ogungbe (1979) 2NLR 282. See also in Agbosu L K ‘Extinction of 
customary tenancy in Nigeria by the Land Use Act: Akinloye v Ogungbe’ (1983) 27.0 JAL 188. See also Nwokocha v 
Governor of Anambra State (1984) 6 SC362 in Nwauche E S ‘Constitutional challenge of the integration and 
interaction of customary law and the received English law in Nigeria and Ghana’ (2010) 25 TSLR 51. However, the 
Supreme Court eventually reversed its position by stating that the status of customary law interest in land was 
preserved by the Land Use Act. See Abioye v Yakubu (2001) FWLR (part 83) 2212.  
156
Verhelst op cit note 78 at 32. For instance see the Native Authority Ordinance of Western Nigeria in ‘Ajayi ‘The 
Integration of English Law with customary Law in western Nigeria: Journal of African Law 98 105 (1960)’ in Verhelst 
ibid. See also the Western region Local Government Law cap 68 (1962).   
157
 See the preamble to the Superior Court Act 10 of 2013 of South Africa. 
158
Molokome A ‘Legislating in matters of customary Law: Issues of theory and method’ in Bennett & Runger (eds) 
op cit note 22 at 64. 
123 
 
 
 
represent the normative practices of the community, it does not necessarily aid ascertainment 
process by the courts.159 Nonetheless courts are compelled to enforce them.  
 
4.3. 3 Summary 
No doubt, while all the methods discussed above aid the courts in its process of ascertainment 
and application of customary law, they are not without impediment based on the criticisms also 
discussed. This is with respect to the process employed in each method to ascertain customary 
law whether they meet anthropological standards to ensure that what is ascertained represents 
the normative practices of the communities. Other impediments are tied to the challenge of 
capturing all nuances, negotiability and variations within communities and capturing customary 
norms through Eurocentric lens. This will result in distortions and rigidity, would impede its 
evolvement and flexibility and create gaps in the captured laws. 
 Courts are compelled to utilise the outcome of some of these methods such as 
codification and legislation as against credible evidence of living customary law. The degree of 
discretion the judge can exercise in such circumstances will be restricted to filling up gaps not 
covered. While self-statement and restatement are subject to similar impediments mentioned 
above, they are still subject to credible evidence of living customary law and would thus not on 
their own impede the court’s discretion towards ascertaining and applying living customary law. 
Witnesses and experts are subject to their own challenges which are reliability of their 
testimonies for whatever reason, but stand the chance of presenting credible evidence of living 
customary law upon which the judge must exercise discretion to ascertain. While the use of 
assessors is beneficial to the court, their opinion should be available to the open court and be 
subject to cross examination by the parties for verification. Texts, manuals and other written 
works are persuasive but, in most cases, are not available and are outdated. However, they are 
also subject to verification by the communities and would also on their own, not impede the 
application of living customary law.  
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4.4  Conclusion 
The provisions of both laws on evidence regarding the ascertainment of customary law are 
required to apply to the regular courts. However, the lower courts are statutorily required to 
apply the applicable customary laws in ascertaining and applying it and it is in doubt whether 
the customary courts in Abuja actually adhere to this.  
Despite the statutory prescription of proof of customary law as facts through evidence, 
reliance on the various methods of ascertainment by courts as aids in the process of 
ascertaining and applying customary norms to cases cannot be avoided. They are usually 
adopted in the process of ascertaining customary law. These methods where they guarantee 
certainty, also, violate certain salient features of customary law in the area of flexibility and 
evolution. Whilst these methods assist the courts, their shortcomings leave room for judges to 
exercise different degrees of discretion. How this discretion is exercised could enhance or mar 
what is ascertained as customary law.  
It has been shown in chapters three and four in Part B that the legal framework and 
approaches of ascertainment utilised by the courts determine at least to an extent how the 
judges exercise discretion towards ascertaining and applying living customary law. In Part C, 
factors that influence how this discretion is exercised will be identified.  
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PART C 
 
Factors that influence the ascertainment and application of customary 
law in courts – Nigeria and South Africa 
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Chapter Five 
 
Common factors that influence the ascertainment and application of customary 
law in courts of superior jurisdiction in Nigeria and South Africa 
 
5.1 Introduction 
It is important to state that ‘Part C’ comprises chapters five, six and seven, all of which identify 
factors that influence the ascertainment and application of customary law in Nigeria and South 
Africa’s courts of superior and lower jurisdiction. While chapters five and six are on the superior 
courts, chapter seven is on the courts of lower jurisdiction. It is vital to reiterate here that this 
thesis is not explicitly comparative in essence, since its primary aim is to identify factors that 
influence how judicial discretion is utilised in the process of ascertaining and applying living 
customary law by courts. However, since the research utilises case studies from two 
jurisdictions, comparison, of necessity, is used as a tool. 
The scope of this research is in line with what John Reitz writes is necessary in conducting a 
research in comparative law. Even though he referred to foreign law, his point resonates with 
the research of this nature which is on the utilization of a law the judges are not too conversant 
with but must apply. He explained that a proper grasp of the ‘foreign law’ must involve the 
description of the ‘normal conceptual world of the lawyers’ seeking the knowledge of another 
legal system.1 This includes the sources of law, the gap between the law and the practice, and 
the deficiency between what is known about the law and what actually does occur in practice.2  
Hence the analysis of the applicable laws, the investigations of the courts’ record of 
proceedings and the empirical data were all gathered to address these inquiries. By 
complimenting the rules with records of proceedings which include judgements, and, 
interviews, the thesis brings to the fore the practical realities which most times present a 
different picture from the law.3 
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The interviews conducted revealed glimpses and insights of the judges ‘philosophy, 
sociology and social culture’ that impact on how they ascertain and apply customary law in 
cases before them. ‘Black-letter law of statute’4 were also utilised, and they reveal their own 
range of factors. 
Part C relates the accounts garnered from the interviews under different themes covered in 
the study.  
This chapter therefore, identifies some of the factors that influence the ascertainment and 
application of living customary law by the superior courts in Nigeria and South Africa. The 
various factors identified are within the range of intrinsic and extrinsic dynamics to court 
processes and are based on the presentation of the data, and centred on the premise of the 
conceptualization, context and theories extensively discussed in chapter two. This appears to 
be more in line with the realists’ point of view where the application of legal rules cannot be 
divorced from social and other factors related to it. This is opposed to that of legal formalists 
where legal rules ought to be simply applied by judges without any consideration to extraneous 
factors.  
The factors are broadly categorized as Institutional, Substantive, Procedural, and, Socio-
economic and Political factors.  These factors fall under two broad categories of Common 
factors and Supplementary factors. Institutional and Substantive factors will be discussed under 
Common factors in this chapter, Procedural and Socio-economic and Political factors will be 
discussed under Supplementary factors in chapter six. The categories and classifications are 
based on my own creation based on common features and, to simplify the discussions on 
factors. It should be noted that the level or type of court of superior jurisdiction is not a 
relevant variable for the factors identified because the factors generally apply across the courts. 
However where there are factors distinct to a particular court type, it will be stated. It is 
essential to state here that this thesis does not claim to have identified all factors possibly 
present but merely identified factors that appear glaring to the researcher. 
This thesis asserts that the exercise of discretion by judges in the ascertainment and 
application of customary law in cases before the court are influenced by these factors and they 
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may either enhance, or impede the ascertainment and application of living customary law in 
courts. These factors are discussed below.  
 
5.2 Common factors identified 
These factors are discussed under the broad categories of Institutional factors and Substantive 
factors. 
5.2.1  Institutional factors 
The factors that fall under this category are connected by a common feature which is that their 
occurrence is determined by institutional arrangements directly or indirectly. These cover a 
range of factors from the judges’ exposure to customary law under different circumstances to 
statutory requirements and are discussed here. 
5.2.1.1  Exposure to customary law under different circumstances 
This is particularly with respect to the judges’ appreciation of customary law concepts through 
their exposure. This segment is focused on the judges’ exposure to customary law under 
different circumstances which impact on their knowledge of its concepts and nature. Their 
exposure contributes to how they exercise discretion in ascertaining and applying customary 
law to cases before them in Nigeria and South Africa. The circumstances are taken one after the 
other. 
5.2.1.1.1 Training and minimum requirements for appointment 
The degree to which customary law is taught during the training of the judges determines, to an 
extent, how equipped they will be in handling customary law cases in their judicial capacity 
which also entails how they ascertain and apply it. Judges in both countries qualify first as 
lawyers and have no special training for the bench except for South Africa where the 
opportunity to occupy an acting position as a judge might give the prospective judge a form of 
experience. Unlike the situation in Nigeria, the legal profession is split between the attorney 
and the advocate in South Africa. However at the undergraduate level, the training is uniform 
for both attorneys and advocates and is mainly composed of substantive law and judges are 
appointed from either side.  
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There are uniform curriculum requirements for law faculties in Nigerian universities5 
and customary law is not taught as a module. It is rather taught as a sub-topic under sources of 
Nigerian law which is a topic under Nigerian legal system.6 In South Africa, there is no national 
body that prescribes a general curriculum with respect to subjects that should be offered.7 This 
is determined by the respective universities even though the subjects offered across the 
faculties are generally similar. The implication of this is that the judges are not trained on a 
uniformed curriculum and each law faculty determines the curriculum of its law degree. 
Invariably, whether and to what extent customary law will be taught and the judges 
interviewed, except for two who were from a particular university, most indicated that 
customary law was a very small part of their curriculum. 
For both countries, after the LL.B qualification, the second tier vocational training8 (for 
Nigeria) and the training for advocates9  and attorneys10 (for South Africa),   is almost devoid of 
customary law. The result is that the judges have very little and limited knowledge of the 
subject.  Central to both academic institutions is the emphasis on positivism and centralism in 
the theories, substantive and procedural law taught which produces students versed in 
Eurocentric conceptions and principles, and, a system that promotes state law hegemony. This 
relegates customary law to a position of very little prominence and invariably affects the 
                                                          
5
The Council of Legal Education and the National Universities Commission regulate legal training and prescribe 
minimum course contents. National Universities Commission Benchmark Minimum Academic Standards for 
Undergraduate Programmes in Nigerian Universities Law April, 2007 ‘Decree (Act) No. 16 of 1985 contained in the 
National Universities Commission amended Decree (Act) No. 48 of 1988’ 25. 
6
 There are also fleeting reference to it in family law and constitutional law. It may however be taken as an elective 
subject. 
7
 The Council of Higher Education in South Africa has mandated that LL.B curriculum must reflect cultural rights 
based on the Constitution and transformation agenda. Council of Higher Education, Higher Education 
Qualifications Sub-Framework Qualification Standard for Bachelor of Laws (LLB) (2015) available at 
http://www.che.ac.za/sites/default/files/Draft%20Standards%20for%20LLB%20v8final_Ready%20for%20Public%2
0Comment_20150807.pdf (accessed on 04/02/2017) 8. See also Penelope Andrews ‘Law faculties must embrace 
difference to produce great graduates’ (2016) available at https://theconversation.com/law-faculties-must-
embrace-difference-to-produce-great-graduates-59927(accessed on 04/02/2017). 
8
At the Nigerian Law School. 
9
Admission of Advocates Act, 74 of 1964.The courses taken at the bar exams include’ legal writing, motion court 
practice and procedure, ethics, criminal procedure and evidence and preparation for and conduct of civil trials’. 
See http://www.sabar.co.za/law-journals/2014/april/2014-april-vol027-no1-pp08-11.pdf 8 (accessed on 
30/06/2016). 
10
Attorneys Act, no 53 of 1979. See also section 14 of the Act. The courses taken include practice and procedure in 
the High Court and magistrates’ courts, practical bookkeeping, practice, functions and duties of an attorney, the 
practice, functions and duties of a notary, law, practice and procedure of conveyancing. How about succession?  
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perceptions of the graduates. Of all the judges interviewed in both Countries, only two, i.e. one 
in each country, did not offer customary law at all at the undergraduate level. For the judge in 
South Africa, his first exposure was as a high court judge while for the Nigerian judge, it was in 
practice prior to his judicial appointment. 
The rule based legal education received by the judges hardly accommodates customary 
law which is more than rules. A proper understanding of its system would require the 
engagement of other disciplines to properly capture its essence, context and the scope of its 
application even from a jurisprudential level.11 This situation confirms earlier scholarships that 
the content of legal education relegates customary law.12 Therefore, the content of legal 
education received by the judges do not prepare them to efficiently adjudicate on customary 
law matters. 
The minimum requirement for the appointment of judges of higher courts in both 
Countries is prescribed by their respective Constitutions.13 For South Africa, the Judicial Service 
Commission, and for Nigeria, the Extant Revised NJC Guidelines and Procedural Rules for the 
Appointment of Judicial Officers of All Superior Courts of Record in Nigeria 2014 provide for 
additional requirements.14 While knowledge in customary law is expressly required for Nigeria, 
it is not so for South Africa. The South African requirements however appear broad and can be 
interpreted to include knowledge of customary law since they include appropriate qualification, 
a broad reflection of the demographics of the Country,15 a good grasps of the values of the 
Constitution, competence, experience16 and legitimacy.17  Therefore, aside from the academic 
                                                          
11
 See ‘teaching living customary law in  decolonising (African) contexts with special reference to South Africa’ 
faculty seminar presented by Prof Chuma Himonga, Chair, DST/NRF Chair in Customary law, Indigenous Values and 
Human Rights, University of Cape Town held on 8 June, 2016 at Level four, Kramer Building. 
12
Himonga C ‘Goals and Objectives of Law Schools in Their Primary Role of Educating Students: South Africa The 
University of Cape Town School of Law Experience’ (2010) 29.1 PSILR 56. See also Oba AA ‘The Future of customary 
law in Africa’ in Jeanmarie Fenrich, Paolo Galizzi& Tracy E Higgins (eds) The Future of African Customary Law (2011) 
67. 
13
See sections 231 (3) (b), 237 (2) (a), 256 (3) & 266 (3) (a) 1999 Nigerian Constitution. See also Section 174 (1) & 
(2) of the 1996 South African Constitution. 
14
Which includes sound knowledge of the law and work experience. Rule 4 (i). 
15
Section 174 (1) & (2) of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa. 
16
Republic of South Africa Judicial Service Commission ‘Summary of the Criteria Used by the Judicial Service 
Commission when Considering Candidates for Judicial Appointments’ (2010) 
Http://Www.Capelawsoc.Law.Za/Docs/Judicial%20appointments%20-%20criteria.Pdf (Accessed On 23/03/2015). 
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qualification,18 knowledge and experience in the diverse normative systems of the South African 
peoples19 can adequately fall under ‘competence, experience and legitimacy’. Since the courts apply 
customary law, knowledge of customary law could be a measure of the suitability of judicial candidates 
even though the training received by the judges did not cater for this.  
 In Nigeria, ‘considerable knowledge of and experience in the practice of [c]ustomary 
law’20 is required for a certain number of judges appointed to all the superior courts with 
jurisdiction to hear customary law cases except for the High Court.  
 The particular measure of what constitutes ‘considerable knowledge in customary law’ 
is uncertain. In considering whether a judge is versed in customary law, the Judicial Service 
Commission would look at the LL.B syllabus of the judge’s training to see if customary law 
featured in the subjects taken.21 Incidentally, the justices of the Court of Appeal in Abuja are all 
presumed to be versed in customary law by virtue of the content of their training. Therefore, 
where there is an appeal to the Court of Appeal concerning the customary law of any 
community, if one of the judges is from that community, he would be presumed to be versed in 
the particular customary law and would be made part of the panel to hear the case.22 
 Two categories of judges are appointed into the customary court of appeal. While some 
are legal practitioners, others are not but all are required to be versed in customary law.23 
Currently, all judges at the FCT Customary Court of Appeal, are qualified legal practitioners. A 
retired judge of the customary court of appeal appointed under the category of a non-legal 
practitioner incidentally, had an LL.B before his appointment even though he did not proceed 
to the vocational school for license to practice. He was appointed on the basis of his being 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17
R E Badejogbin ‘The application of different normative systems in the adjudication of cases in Nigerian and South 
African courts: Are the Judges Adequately Equipped for this?’ in Diallo F & Anamzoya A (eds), Legal Pluralism in 
African Courts: Actors, Institutions and Governance (Leiden-Boston: Brill, Forthcoming, 2017). 
18
DGRU ‘Judicial selection in South Africa’ (2010) 
http://www.dgru.uct.ac.za/usr/dgru/downloads/Judicial%20SelectionOct2010.pdf (accessed on 30/06/2016) 21-
25. The Democratic & Governance Rights Unit (DGRU) is an applied research unit within the Public Law 
Department at the University of Cape Town. 
19
DGRU ibid 19. The other values are independent minded, fair, impartial, judicial integrity, judicial temperament 
and ‘commitment to constitutional values’ 34 – 36, 40. 
20
While some may not be legal practitioners, some must be legal practitioners of ten years standing. Sections 237 
(2) & 266 (3) (a) & (b) 1999 Constitution. In section 288 (1) (b), knowledge of customary law is required for some 
appointment to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. 
21
 From interview conducted. 
22
 From interview conducted. 
23
Section 265 (3) (a) (b). 
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originally from the community where the court is based and thus was exposed to the customary 
norms of that community. If his appointment was meant to provide an unadulterated 
perception on customary law, his LL.B may have tainted it. 
 
Nigeria 
 
South Africa 
Judges of higher courts expressly required by statutes to have knowledge in customary law in the lighter colour 
Supreme 
 Court 
Court of Appeal 
Customary Court of Appeal 
Constitutional Court 
Supreme Court of Appeal 
High Courts 
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 Both indigenous and non-indigenous judges in both countries benefitted however little 
from the paltry reference to customary law in the curricula and derived a basic understanding 
of its concepts at least to an extent. This applies to its methodological and sociological 
distinctions as well as its basic principles at varying and minimal levels.24 There was also an 
assumption that by virtue of this exposure, they can now be regarded as versed in it. As one 
judge responded when asked if being taught customary law during the LL.B broadened her 
understanding: ‘Of course it did because I wasn’t exposed to all this at all. It did. I now know the 
various customs from one tribe to the other, yes.’ This is apparently an overrated assessment 
since not much can be garnered from a subtopic in a semester’s course. It also poses some 
dangers to think that one has learned so much when there is still so much more to 
comprehend. Two judges however, one from each of the countries, had the benefit of being 
taught by some individual lecturers whose interest in customary law drove them to more in-
depth research from which they profoundly impacted their students and stirred them to further 
anthropological texts and courses. Judges who were students of such academics displayed a 
profound understanding and appreciation of the concept of customary law and its 
jurisprudence regardless of their race. Both went on to obtain their Ph.D. in related fields to 
customary law, and have published in this.25 
5.2.1.1.2 Exposure to customary law in legal career 
A judge’s exposure to customary law is not guaranteed merely because the judge spent some 
time in law practice prior to the judicial appointment.  It is common for both countries that 
while some judges did not engage with customary law at all in their legal career, most, aside 
from their limited exposure to customary law in their studies, further engaged with customary 
law cases in their legal practice. Some in academia, taught and researched customary law, and 
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By admission of the participants. 
25
 For the Nigerian judges, customary law was a major part of his LL.B curriculum in the subject Property Law and 
constituted about half of the subject Introduction to Nigerian Law and it was taught for about half a semester in 
Land law. It was also taught in Jurisprudence and in ‘Family Law’ as well as at LL.M in a comparative analysis of the 
philosophical foundation of law. He engaged extensively with customary law in his research right up to his Ph.D. He 
extensively engaged with customary law in his academic career up to the rank of an associate professor and while 
in private legal practice and had a number of publications in the field. He convened the LL.M programme on 
International Human Rights which extensively engaged with customary law jurisprudence. 
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in South Africa, some also directly worked with communities and attended traditional court 
proceedings as observers. For another still in academia, the engagement with customary law 
came in the work at the legal aid clinics where cases involving customary law such as family law 
and labour related cases were handled. This entailed much time spent in rural communities.  
 One of the judges who worked as a maintenance officer in the magistrate court in South 
Africa acquired extensive knowledge and exposure in her role as a maintenance officer in the 
villages in the areas of the application of family law with regards to women, men, children, and 
the role of traditional leaders. This gave her a good grasp of the concept and nature of 
customary law.  The degree of experience in customary law cases while in legal practice and 
other professional endeavours, such as academics prior to their appointments, range from 
none, little to extensive. The determining factor is tied to interest, opportunity and location.  
Judges interviewed at the Constitutional Court had their first engagement with 
customary law in their judicial capacity at the Constitutional Court. Incidentally, this was in the 
novel cases that created precedent. This is because they were not career judges but were 
appointed directly from the academia. Some had extensive engagement with customary law 
before their appointment. There was no such category in Nigeria because judges are not 
appointed directly into the Supreme Court.26 However, a judge appointed from academia to the 
high court who rose through to the Supreme Court had extensive engagement in customary 
law. Some judges in both countries had their first engagement with customary law as judges, at 
the High Court.  
Judges’ exposure to customary law is also determined by the jurisdiction and location of 
the courts where they served. While other judges had very little engagement with customary 
law at the high court due to the urban setting of where the court is located,27  their experience 
in practice or academia prior to their elevation to the bench aided them at the higher appellate 
courts.  All these engagements enhanced their understanding of customary law concepts and 
its application. 
 While some judges had substantial experience in customary law prior to their 
appointment to the higher bench, some did not irrespective of whether they were in legal 
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This is however changing with calls for nomination of Supreme Court justice from the academia and law practice. 
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practice or served in the lower bench. In Nigeria, those who served as magistrates seldom 
adjudicated on customary law matters. One of them had indeed served for over ten years as a 
magistrate and as an inspector of area courts but did not handle any matter on customary 
law.28 At the higher bench, judges who served in courts which had no jurisdiction in customary 
law29 before their elevation to the Court of Appeal due to the jurisdictions of these courts, had 
their main exposure to customary law matters at the Court of Appeal. One of them stated:  
From my experience, I never tried any of their matters, or adjudicated 
or received complain in respect to any customary law indigenous to 
those areas. I never had the opportunity of seeing how they prove 
their own customary law, what it looks like.  
From this category, a judge handled substantive number of cases in customary law at 
the Court of Appeal.  
Another dimension to exposure is at the background of the judges even though it is 
outside institutional influence. Here, the level of the judges’ exposure is not necessarily 
determined by race even though the race of the judges might be indications to be confirmed by 
further probing whether they were exposed under other circumstances. A judge of indigenous 
African descent is not by that fact alone necessarily exposed to customary law. Some were 
raised in urban settings outside their community of origin and in townships where indigenous 
norms did not feature at a practical level in the towns and in their families. Still under this 
category in Nigeria are those who regularly visited their community of origin where they were 
exposed to their customary practices. Others however who grew up in their local communities 
had observed and experienced the application of customary law at a practical level and have a 
greater appreciation of its concept, depending on the extent to which the particular family had 
imbibed western culture. Yet under this category are those whose communities of origin have 
become cosmopolitan urban settings and who were instead exposed to the ‘westernized 
version’ of customary law which might qualify as living customary law or as merely practical 
norms.30Others under this category in Nigeria were not exposed to their customary laws 
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 This is due to the location where he served which inhabits mainly adherents of Islam and matters taken to the 
areas courts were in that regard. Only one judge interviewed in South Africa had been a magistrate and he hardly 
ever handled customary law cases. 
29
 Such as the federal high court and the sharia court of appeal 
30
 This was explained in chapter under scope and limitations of research. 
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because their religious practice of Islam as a way of life replaced the customary norms. Judges 
of non-indigenous African descent did not have or observe the application of customary law in 
their backgrounds and had their first encounter during their undergraduate studies. 
It is important to note that none of these factors stood on their own in determining the 
judges’ knowledge and understanding of customary law. For instance, those who had no 
exposure from their background one way or the other encountered customary law in their 
studies, research and/or in practice and acquired a basic knowledge of its concept and nature 
albeit with Eurocentric flavours except for a few who further extensively engaged with 
customary law. In all, these were not without the influence of other factors discussed in the 
chapters under Part C. Quite worrisome however is the category of those who neither 
encountered customary law in their background, studies or during their career in law but had to 
adjudicate on customary law issues for the first time at the high court and appellate court. 
 
5.2.1.2  Grasps of the concept of customary law and its development 
A proper grasp of the concept of customary law is a factor that determines how customary law 
is ascertained and applied by the courts in both countries, and would impact positively on the 
exercise of discretion in its ascertainment and application. The discussion below is reflective of 
the situation in both countries. There appears to be a general appreciation of customary law by 
most of the judges who view it as a distinct source of law which is operational on its own 
principles, fact sensitive, contextual, local in its nature and designed for harmonious living in 
the community. Of all the judges interviewed, only two judges one each from Nigeria and South 
Africa, mentioned the necessity of exploiting anthropological factors in the ascertainment and 
application of customary law which, according to them, should come from the elders 
conversant with the application of the customs. This knowledge and understanding varies 
among the judges some of whom admit to having Eurocentric views that no doubt influence 
their perceptions of its concepts and principles. This is due to their law education which was 
heavily tilted towards Eurocentric conception of law and their background.  
There was a dearth of understanding of its concepts by some judges. Some allude to the 
idea of written customary law for easier ascertainment without appreciating how the very idea 
137 
 
 
 
of having customary law in written form could alter its very nature and veracity. A judge 
explained that English law was codified and did not suffer the challenge of evolution so the 
same should apply to customary law. A judge at the customary court of appeal sees no 
difference between Common law and customary law concepts except that one is codified while 
the other is not and states that the concept of both is to do justice. This is particularly worrying 
since the customary court of appeal is primarily established for adjudication on customary law.  
A few judges did not know what it means to develop customary law.31 Another denies that 
there are uncertainties in customary law.32 
 
5.2.1.3  Statutory requirements 
The provisions of the law that regulate the ascertainment of customary law also 
influence how it is ascertained. On one hand, the Nigerian Evidence Act defines custom as ‘a 
rule which, in a particular district, has, from long usage, obtained the force of law’ and then it 
requires that judicial notice can be taken of customary law if it had been adjudicated upon only 
once. It differs from the provision of the repealed Evidence Act which required that judicial 
notice of such can be taken only if the issue has been notoriously addressed by the courts. 
Under the old Evidence Act, the judge is restrained from taking judicial notice of a customary 
norm, unless he/she is satisfied that it had been notoriously tackled in adjudication. The case of 
Orlu v Gogo-Adebite33 clearly illustrates this. Here, the plaintiff sued the defendant for a piece 
of property which he claimed he inherited from his father under Ikwerre native law and custom. 
Even though he had title documents as evidence of his ownership, he had lost them during the 
war. The court held that aside from his evidence, no further evidence was led on the content of 
Ikwerrenative law and custom on inheritance upon which he based his claim. The court 
therefore could not take judicial notice of the custom not having been notoriously dealt with by 
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Though there is as yet no clear definition of development, it appears to refer to the process of bringing it in 
conformity with constitutional provisions while retaining its essential character. According to Lehnert, this is akin 
to development in common law context where development of the rule means the ‘formulation of new rules 
either by creating them or reformulating old ones’. This is done passively where the court adopts development 
made by the community or actively where the court itself develops the rules. See Lehnert W "The role of the 
courts in the conflict between African customary law and human rights’ (2005) 251. 
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Ibid at 252. 
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PHC/171/86. 
138 
 
 
 
the courts. At the time this case was heard in court, the Evidence Act required notoriety. This 
decision was upheld by both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.  
Since notoriety is no longer a requirement, it should not impede the application of 
judicial notice where necessary. But would the less stringent requirement actually aid the 
exercise of discretion towards living customary law. The judges interviewed emphasised current 
norms as what ought to be ascertained and applied. However,  the definition of custom pins it 
to that which has been in ‘long usage’ and will  point more towards ascertaining old rather than 
the current normative practice of the people.  
On the other hand, for South Africa, the key requirements for taking judicial notice 
according to section 1 (1) of its Law of Evidence Amendment Act is ‘readily’ ascertainable with 
‘sufficient certainty’. As discussed under 3.4.2.1 in chapter three, ‘readily ascertainable’ has 
been associated with the written form of the rule of customary law sought to be ascertained 
and applied. The courts have a wide range of discretion in determining if a customary law has 
been proved with ‘sufficient certainty’. The implications for these is that reliance on written 
forms would impede the ascertainment and application of living customary law as discussed 
under 4.3.2.1 in chapter four.  However, ‘sufficient certainty’ gives opportunity for living 
customary law to be ascertained and applied by the court as was done in Mayelane v 
Ngwenyama and Anor.34 Here the Judges at the Constitutional Court took further steps to be 
sufficiently convinced of the applicable customary norm on whether or not the consent of the 
first wife is required for a valid subsequent polygamous marriage by the husband. In such an 
instance, the Constitutional Court could have restricted itself to the issues before it and rule 
that the living customary law was proved. However, the Constitutional Court thought it 
essential to sufficiently confirm the customary rule beyond ‘mere assertion’ by the person 
relying on it and her witness since the outcome would invariably apply to members of the 
broader community.35 
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5.2.1.4  Protection of the status of statutory law over customary law 
In South Africa, customary law is made subject to the Constitution and statute. Courts have 
therefore exercised discretion in the course of ascertaining and applying customary law, in 
favour of statutory provisions against evidence of living customary law as in the high court case 
of Pilane & Anor v Pilane & Anor.36 This case tells of the struggle by certain segments of a 
traditional community to assert their rights under their customary law to hold meetings to 
enable them hold their leaders accountable. This was also to establish legitimacy, and to 
exercise their rights to secede from any leadership structure that impedes such accountability.  
The first applicant is the Chief (Senior Traditional leader) of the Bakgatla Ba Baghafela 
community in Pilanesburg. Relying on the North West Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Act,37 and the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 38 he sought an interdict 
against the respondents themselves or in collaboration with anyone from calling for such 
meetings. The applicant’s position was that the Acts regulate and prescribe the application of 
customs and customary law in the process of resolution of disputes in the traditional 
community and the respondents have failed to follow such procedures.39 According to the 
respondents, by virtue of their customary law, they have been mandated by the royal family 
and clans constituting the community to hold these meetings.  
The high court and the Supreme Court of Appeal focused on protecting ‘the terrain of 
constitutionally recognised structures’ based on the legislations referred to above by granting 
the interdict. This resulted in the violation of the respondents’ constitutionally guaranteed 
rights to practice their culture and freedom of association, assembly and expression.40 The 
Court was also reluctant to ascertain living customary law applicable in the circumstance.41 
However, where the provision of the legislation specifically states that it was passed to ensure 
compliance with customary law, the courts ought to reconsider its position indeptly. The 
Framework Act42 expressly states that it was enacted to ‘restore the integrity and legitimacy of 
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No. 2 2005. 
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No 41 of 2003. 
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Sections 21 & 22 of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 2003. 
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See Pilane& Anor v Pilane& Anor (CCT 46/12) [2013] paras 16, 30 & 69 
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See para 19 of the judgment Landman J of the North West High Court. 
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the institution of traditional leadership in line with customary law and practices’ so the court 
should have subjected its provisions to the applicable living customary law on the subject. 
The heads of argument of the respondents (now appellants at the Constitutional Court) 
in Pilane v Pilane43 introduced this line of argument and the court in a majority decision of 8 to 
2 upheld their appeal on the ground that the respondents’ rights to culture and freedom of 
association, assembly and expression are constitutionally guaranteed rights. This says much 
about what may spur the court toward the direction of ascertaining living customary law over 
official version. 
 
5.2.1.5  Convergence of positivism and pluralism 
The convergence of positivist and pluralist laws have varied implications which may or may not 
enhance the ascertainment and application of customary law and this is discussed under 
different circumstances.  
 First, it is important to state at this stage that legislation of customary law is done in two 
ways in Nigeria and South Africa: when customary rules are legislated and where the legislation 
merely states that the appropriate customary rules should apply. An example of the former is 
the South African Reform of Customary law of Succession which specifically prescribes 
purportedly, the content of customary law on succession. For Nigeria it is the Land Use Act 
which prescribes customary law interest in land.  
 Sometimes when statutory and customary law converge, the streamlined manner in 
which the statute preserves the space of customary law creates room for the ascertainment 
and application of customary law. For Nigeria, is the case of Aragbui of Iragbui-Oba Olabomi & 
Anor v Olabode Oyewinle which was on the applicable customary law governing ascendancy to 
the chieftain of Iragbiji.44 Section 22 (2) of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State45 provided that 
appointment of minor chiefs will be by customary law and shall be done by those entitled to 
appoint under customary law. The chief’s law which is positivistic did not specifically state what 
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the content of the customary law is, but provided for its application. By this, it preserved the 
space of living customary law and gave room for it to be ascertained. See also the cases of 
Uwaifo v Uwaifo46 and Agidigbi v Agidigbi47 both of which are on the application of the 
customary rule of male primogeniture to certain dispositions under the will of the 
deceased.Here,a similar provision in the Will’s Law which is positivistic subjects the testator’s 
freedom of testamentary disposition to the applicable customary law on certain items of the 
deceased’s estate without stating the content of the applicable customary norm.  
For South Africa it is the case of Mayelane v Ngwenyama48 which sought to determine 
whether the consent of the first wife was necessary for a valid second marriage by the husband. 
Section 3 (1) (b) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act provides that part of the 
requirements of a valid customary marriage includes that the marriage must be done in 
accordance with the applicable customary law. Again, the positivistic law provided for the 
application of living customary law without spelling out the content of the living customary law. 
The implication is that it gives room for its ascertainment without any statutory hindrance. Also 
relevant is the case of Segwagwa Mamogale v Premier North west province49on the recognition 
and appointment of the traditional chief of the Bakwena Ba Mogopa Tribe where the applicable 
legislations in Section 9 (1) of the National Traditional Leadership Act50has a similar provision 
that traditional leaders must ‘qualify in terms of customary law’. Section 13 (1) North West 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Act51 also states that the ‘Bogosi’52 shall be according to 
the ‘customary law and custom’ of the community. 
 Common to these laws applied in these cases is that the content of the applicable 
customary rules were not stated. Instead, the wording of the statutes gives the court the 
discretion to ascertain what these rules are and this gives room for the litigants to lead credible 
evidence before the court on the current customary law. Here, the judges’ discretion is not 
limited to official versions which might be distortions or obsolete, but is given a wide sphere to 
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determine living customary law from the evidence before the court. These provisions, enabled 
the presentation of evidence in these cases from notable elders, traditional chiefs, title holders 
(all these testified as custodians of the customs), experts and elderly members of the 
communities who testified on the contents of the living law. They put facts before the court to 
enable the ascertainment and application of living customary law. 
 Gaps exist in both categories but in varying degrees. For the former, the legislation 
cannot possibly cover all circumstances that can arise in the subject and the judge is open to 
the exercise of discretion. In the latter, a great deal of discretion is exercised by the judge 
because the content of the customary rule must be sourced. The exercise of the judge’s 
discretion towards the ascertainment and application of living customary law is more enhanced 
by the latter since it presents opportunities for the parties to lead evidence on the current 
norms of the society while the former has the limitations discussed under 4.3.2.1.7 in chapter 
four.    
 The second point relates to the situation where precedent is given primacy over living 
customary law. A judge explained that he will give pre-eminence to judicial precedent over a 
living customary law credibly proved before him on the ground that the former has been 
established by the court. He would do otherwise only when it is proved that the practice has 
evolved. This is giving pre-eminence to official customary law over living customary law for no 
other reason than that a court of superior jurisdiction has ascertained it. This position either 
reveals a misunderstanding of conceptualization of customary law or a positivist conception of 
law based on centralism which elevates laws affirmed by the state over what is proven to be 
authentically applicable to the community who are the sources of their own law. 
Thirdly, there are indeed challenges where the rules of positivism and pluralism 
converge.  This is generally typical of cases in the formal courts. Certain rules of Common/Civil 
law still find their way in the consideration of issues under customary law and have been used 
to determine what weight should be given to dispositions which may have been given much 
weight under the applicable customary law. An instance is the misapplication of the rules of 
English law on customary law such as the Nigerian case of Nwaigwe & Ors v Okere53 where the 
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customary court of appeal was not mindful that evidence of traditional history is an exception 
to hearsay rule. The Customary Court of Appeal rejected the evidence of the plaintiff’s second 
witness ‒ who was also a senior member of the defendant’s family ‒ on the traditional history 
of the defendant’s family as told to him by his father on the ground that it is hearsay. ‘Hearsay’ 
as explained by the Evidence Act does not accommodate oral history under customary law as 
admissible evidence. But that is how historical accounts are passed from one generation to the 
other under customary law and the customary court where the matter was heard is not bound 
by such provisions in the Evidence Act. This convergence frustrates the application of the rule of 
customary law in the process of ascertainment.  
This featured in South Africa on the issue of evidence based on oral history and backed 
by documents. Under statutory law, the author of the document must be indicated. However 
under customary law, credible account of the oral history of the origin of the document by 
persons recognised by the community as being in a position to know would be sufficient. A 
judge trained under the Eurocentric system and sitting in a formal court would be more inclined 
towards applying statutory rules of evidence as against customary law especially in the face of 
opposing evidence. This will place a stringent requirement on what may have sufficed under 
customary law.  For instance, the judge in the case of Bakgatla Ba Sesfikile Community v 
Bakgatla Ba Kafela Tribal Authority54 who despite oral evidence based on oral history to explain 
the origin, the authors, content and the circumstances that gave rise to a document presented 
by the applicants to prove their ownership of land purchased by their ancestors, held that it 
was not ‘authentic’ because the author is not indicated on the document. 
 One of the judges explained that one of the difficult issues at the Constitutional Court 
with respect to identifying the content of customary law is that ‘we no longer have a perfect 
system of customary law, it’s been inevitably and probably unavoidably tainted by its 
experience of colonialism’ and the fact that customary law methodology is bottom-up while 
that of a constitutional democracy is top-down and this creates a crisis.55 For instance, the 
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equal treatment of women at the bottom up system evolves gradually at different levels in 
communities at a pace not acceptable to a constitutional democracy which would expect an 
instant solution to such challenges. For this reason, some of the judges interviewed explained 
that a determining factor that directs their exercise of discretion is that they gravitate towards 
that version which most accommodates the provisions of the bill of rights. Expectedly, all the 
cases involving the ascertainment and application of customary law at the Constitutional Court 
were decided on the basis of constitutional rights. 
A fourth point concerns the intricacies of the state’s legal structure at the federal, state 
and local government levels and the applicability and implications of international treaties on a 
community that wishes to tap into its provisions. A good example is the case of Ndadili Mokwa 
& 11 Ors v Etsu Nupe & 4 Ors56 which concerns the cultural right to self-determination of the 
Mokwa people to choose their leaders from among themselves as against the practice of 
importing leaders for them from the royal house of Bida which is not part of their community. 
The plaintiffs relied on the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and 
Enforcement)57 (which provided for their right to cultural identity, liberty and development), 
historical (oral) traditions of the Mokwa people and Local Government Law of Niger State.58 
They also relied on the provisions of the North Western Policy Statement of Administration and 
Local Government Reform59 which provides that their leaders be appointed from persons 
indigenous to their community. According to them, the provisions of the Policy began to be 
applied in 2000 and they have since accepted this as their custom.60 The court held that local 
government matters are within the purview of state legislations and not federal legislations, 
therefore, the ratification of the African Charter by the national legislation has no effect on 
Niger State since it is yet to be ratified by its House of Assembly. It stated further that the Local 
Government Law of Niger State regulates chieftaincy matters which supports the practice of 
appointing chiefs for Mokwa from the royal house of Bida. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ current 
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customary norm cannot be recognised as regulating the appointments of its chiefs. Again, the 
court decided in favour of statute over the applicable customary law. 
 
5.2.1.6  Summary 
The institutional factors discussed pertain to judges’ exposure to customary law, statutory 
requirements of what constitutes customary law, protection of the status of statutory law over 
customary law, and the implication of the convergence of positivism and pluralism. 
In both Nigeria and South Africa, there are different circumstances under which a judge 
may have been exposed to customary law which are at their background, during studies and in 
their legal careers. Generally, the judges had very little exposure from their studies despite its 
featuring as part of their curriculum. Only very few were raised in communities where they 
were exposed to the practice of customary law. Even though likely, it is not determined by their 
race. However, these exposures do not on their own determine whether or not the judges had 
enough knowledge and appreciation of the nature of customary law. Though these factors 
contribute to how the judges exercise discretion in the ascertainment and application of 
customary law, they must be considered with other factors discussed in Part C.  
 It is a problem where statutory requirement of what constitutes customary includes 
features that exclude the nature of living customary law as the definition of customs in the 
Evidence Act in Nigeria. The statutory definition by South African statute discussed is broad 
enough to accommodate the features of living customary law. Again the protection of the 
status of statutory law over customary law compels courts away from the ascertainment and 
application of living customary law. The implication of the convergence of positivism and 
pluralism on the ascertainment and application of living customary law is determined by how 
legislation on customary law is framed. Where precedent is given primacy over living customary 
law, the misapplication of Common/Civil law rules on customary law and the implication of how 
the legal structure of the level of government affects the ratification of relevant treaties that 
promote the application of customary law have all influenced the exercise of the judges’ 
discretion away from the ascertainment and application of customary law. 
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5.2.2 Substantive factors 
 These pertain to the substantive knowledge or content of the law that one way or the other, 
impact on how judges exercise discretion in the ascertainment and application of customary 
law. They include the methods of ascertainment utilised by the judges, the judges’ prior 
knowledge and the college sitting of the court, judges’ perception of judicial discretion, the 
Constitutional mandate, Constitutional compliance, achievement of justice, repugnancy test, 
and consideration for legal certainty. 
5.2.2.1  Methods of ascertainment utilised by the judges 
Judges utilise judicial notice and proof as facts through evidence to ascertain customary law by 
using the varied methods which comprise precedents, texts, writings, codes, legislation, 
experts’ evidence as well as evidence from people of the subject communities collectively or 
alone.61 These methods have been discussed under 4.3.2.1 in chapter four. The way and 
manner these methods were utilised is dependent by the judges’ substantive knowledge of 
them and influenced the court’s ascertaining and application exercise in Nigeria and South 
Africa and it is discussed below. 
5.2.2.1.1 Use of precedents 
Precedents were used in certain instances as persuasive authority of specific customary norms 
which may not necessarily be of the particular community being considered in the court.62   Its 
usefulness in such instances were persuasive. Due to the distinctions or variations in the 
customary practices of diverse communities, most judges would prefer evidence of lived 
experiences. Such judges would give priority to credible evidence of reliable witnesses who 
convincingly contradict such precedent with respect to the content of living customary norms 
within their community. There are however others who would give priority to precedence over 
the evidence of such reliable witnesses simply on the ground that they are bound by the ratio 
decidendi of a court of higher jurisdiction.  This is an indication of a faulty understanding of the 
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concept of living customary law.  Courts have also relied on cases from the Native Authority 
Courts as reported in H W Warner’s Digest of South African Native Customary Case Law63 
without cross checking with the records to confirm its accurate reflections of the cases. 
 Even though judicial precedents that are available do not cover the various customary 
norms, precedents on broad principles of customary law have been applied by the courts where 
the parties affirm that they apply to the applicable custom. The outcome of what is ascertained 
and applied by the court is therefore dependent on whether the precedents are rightly or 
wrongly applied. Some judges in Nigeria indicate that they will rely on precedents on the 
condition that it must first have been notoriously dealt with in a number of cases. This is 
regardless of the statutory provision that states that judicial notice can be taken based on a 
single case but this caution is in favour of ascertaining and applying living customary law. A 
judge (who has adjudicated on several customary law cases) explained further that he may 
deviate from utilising precedent only where the facts are distinguished regardless of contrary 
credible evidence placed before him. 
 
5.2.2.1.2 Use of texts 
So far very few texts exist on the customary laws of the various communities in South Africa 
and Nigeria. Texts are relied upon by the courts to prove or confirm a customary norm. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Mthembu v Letsela held that succession in customary law is based 
on male primogeniture and referred to texts such as Bekker, Seymour's customary law in 
Southern Africa64 and Bennett’s A Source Book on African Customary Law,65 There was no 
attempt to determine what the norms were at the community level but rather upheld the male 
primogeniture on the assumption that it was the customary law and more so that it had 
legislative backing.  
 A good number of the texts relied upon by the judges to confirm current normativity are 
old texts written decades ago and may be obsolete and may be only useful to confirm norms 
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that operated during the period covered in the text.66 Sometimes they were used as sources 
with respect to certain customary norms of general application such as the concept of 
communal land ownership in South Africa or male primogeniture.67 
 More recent texts utilised by the court may also not be very useful where they do not 
accommodate variations of the norms of the particular community sought to be ascertained 
but are relied upon by the courts as persuasive authorities.  With the dearth of research 
materials on contents of customary law, texts written several years ago are utilised such as 
Anthony Allott’s texts on customary law and, Paul and Laura Bohannan’s on Tiv customary law 
from the 1950s, G.B A. Coker on Yoruba customary law of land 1958, SNC Obi on Igbo 
customary law, 1963, and E I Nwogugu on family law first published in 1974. Nwogugu’s text 
however was revised in 2014.68 Texts are still plagued by the limitations discussed under 
4.3.2.1.3in chapter four. 
5.2.2.1.3 Use of legislation 
Where official customary law such as legislation, precedents and codes were relied upon, the 
courts felt bound to work with these official laws and thereby in some cases such as Gumede 
(born Shange) v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others69 and Bhe, living customary 
law was not ascertained. In  Gumede, the applicant applied to the court to annul the provision 
of  section 7 (1) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act that excluded her from 
benefiting from the provision that made the proprietary consequence of her marriage as 
communal which is contrary to the applicable customary law. The applicable customary law was 
codified and bestowed all the property rights on her husband70 who at that time had 
commenced proceedings to divorce her after over 40 years of marriage. In Bhe, the applicable 
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customary law was the Black’s Administration Act which also excluded the minor female 
children of the deceased from inheriting from their father’s estate. The deceased’s father was 
the beneficiary of the deceased estate and was going to dispose of the estate to pay for burial 
expenses and this would render the minor daughters of the deceased homeless. A few judges 
who presided in the cases of Bhe, explained that even though the case was based on male 
primogeniture rule validated by legislature, the principles had been endorsed by the courts. The 
court held that it was also a rule of living customary law because the father of the deceased 
was set to enforce his right of ownership by selling the house and none of the parties disputed 
that it was not a rule of customary law. It also held that it was the reality that confronted the 
plaintiffs therefore the court did not find it necessary to ascertain what obtained at that time, 
in the particular community but had to subject the patriarchal practice to constitutional 
scrutiny. The same explanation applied to the assertion in Gumede, which is that the woman 
had no rights to the property. The court’s decision was that to the extent that these rules were 
applicable, they were unconstitutional. In other words, reality superseded living customary law 
(if different).  
Subject to the limitations of official customary law, where the provisions of the statute 
is in line with the living customary law, since the court feels bound by statutes, the application 
of the statute will be the application of living customary law. This may however be hampered 
by other considerations. Such was the case in Segwagwa Mamogale v Premier North West 
Province71where sections 15 and 16 of the North West Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Act72 provides in line with the applicable living customary law as admitted by the parties in the 
suit. The Act provided that where a chief dies and the successor is still a minor, the royal family 
of the community shall in accordance with the customs ‘assume leadership on behalf of the 
minor and inform the premier of the regent identified for appointment.’ The court affirmed the 
regent’s selection as being in line with the Act but refrained from granting an order for his 
appointment by the premier stating instead that the applicant should wait for the premier to 
get to it. The implication of the court’s decision left the applicants and his subjects in a helpless 
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situation against the might of the state institution which seemed interested in the position and 
had delayed in affirming the regent’s appointment.73 
The Constitutional Court in Bhe did otherwise in a similar situation. It responded to the 
plea to rule on male primogeniture ‘once and for all’ and not transfer that to the legislature 
which at that time had delayed for up to six years since it was first urged to correct the anomaly 
by the Law Reform Commission.74 These two situations show that judges exercise discretion 
after ascertainment very differently and this is determined by other factors.   
This was the situation in the Nigerian case of Ndadili Mokwa& 11 Ors v Etsu Nupe & 4 
Ors75 discussed above under 5.2.1.5. Some Nigerian judges have adopted evidence of 
indigenous communities that contradict statutes. A judge explained that where there is a 
statutory law such as the chief’s law and the community leads evidence to show that the 
statute does not reflect their customary practices, he will exercise his discretion against the 
statutory law in favour of the indigenous practice. Another judge however indicated a reliance 
on legislations in the belief that the commission of enquiry established to confirm customary 
norms with respect to the subject of the particular legislation did thoroughly investigate the 
customary norms before they were adopted in the legislation. 
 
5.2.2.1.4 Use of witnesses and experts 
In proving the content of customary law, experts have been utilised particularly from the 
universities or people who have carried out extensive research to explain knotty issues and 
their testimonies were affirmed by members of the particular community. To determine which 
version of customary law to accept required the application of the law of evidence. For 
instance, where two experts explain a customary practice differently, the more probable and 
convincing version is adopted by the court. The court also endeavoured to observe 
demeanours, countenance and comportment of witnesses who testified before it. In the South 
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African case of Amantungwa & Ors v Mabuyakhulu,76 the high court rejected the testimony of 
the respondent’s expert on the following grounds ‒ that his knowledge had ‘certain limitations 
… as far as the Bogosi are concerned'. Also, that he 'labours under the same limitations as a 
common tribesman' and 'he [had] no certainty about the veracity of his information’, that he 
was obviously biased in his manner and demeanour in favour of the respondent even by 
conduct.  The court observed that he acted more like an attorney for the respondent and was 
the most active person in court for the respondent from how he counselled the attorney, 
disputed interpretations by the official interpreter, took advice from persons in court and 
'seemed to be the prime adviser of the respondent. The weight given to his evidence was 
hearsay since he never attended any meeting of the tribe nor the initiation school. The rules of 
‘probability, credibility and consistency’ were applied.77 
 Conflicting expert evidence have been resolved by rejecting the version that is of 
general application to the broader community as against that for the specific subject 
community. Credible evidence of traditional leaders of the subject community who are 
custodians of the customs have also been preferred over those of traditional leaders of 
neighbouring communities. In the case of Southon v Moropane,78  there was a joint expert 
notice in which the experts of the respective parties indicated where they agree and differ.  In 
resolving an area of contradiction central to the case with respect to what constitutes a Pedi 
customary marriage, the Defendant’s expert under cross examination admitted that his 
research was based on the traditional Pedi marriage conducted in the rural community based 
on the information he obtained from the elderly people of the community. He admited that his 
research did not include how urban people conduct the traditional Pedi marriage which had 
evolved and adapted to socio-economic changes which the plaintiff’s expert witness claimed to 
testify on. The court resolved in favour of the plaintiff’s expert evidence and held that there 
was a valid customary marriage between the parties. Thus the court accepted the version that 
specifically related to the parties’ circumstance. 
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 Witnesses from the communities have testified as well as academic experts and local 
chiefs. Testimonies of persons from the subject communities are confirmed by experts. Experts 
such as anthropologists, historians, and sociologists have been utilised and even archaeological 
reports have been used to confirm testimonies of people from the community which would 
have been simply based on oral history. The courts have looked at the experts’ qualifications 
and experience with respect to determining the weight to accord to their evidence.79 There 
however, have been instances where the court’s reliance on the evidence of an expert should 
be questioned based on the expert’s qualification and experience.  The judges show a 
preference for testimonies of the elderly from the community over those of experts.80 One of 
the judges explained that he: 
A]lways preferred … these old men who would explain the nuances of those 
customs and perhaps give the anthropological background because the 
problem with the English anthropologists ... they just came with their 
prejudices … they judged our customs with foreign parameters, and that’s 
where they got it wrong and so they had to subject our customs to their 
taste. 
This leaning by the judge is geared towards the ascertainment and application of 
living customary law.  
5.2.2.1.5  Judges’ perceptions 
 This pertains to the judge’s perceptions under different circumstances in Nigeria and 
South Africa. The judges’ opinion with respect to whether or not they exercise judicial 
discretion in the ascertaining and applying of customary law is not immaterial. While some 
assert that they do not have discretion, others insist that they do. Where judges believed that 
they do not have discretion, they have restricted themselves to the evidence before the court 
and ruled against any party who failed to present sufficient evidence to cover the 
circumstances of the case. The judges’ position was on the ground that there are no gaps in 
customary law as customary law should cover every circumstance. This was done on the basis 
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that a judge cannot exercise discretion by supplying what a witness did not supply unless he 
wants to be examined in the witness box.  
A judge in Nigeria explained that he merely applies the customary law proved before 
him even if it violates the constitution on rights of equality in so far as it is confirmed that it 
correctly represents the customary law of the people and the Constitution has nothing to do 
with it. He however admits that his knowledge of customary law is shallow not having really 
dealt with it until his appointment to an appellate court. While this judge’s stance would aid 
towards the ascertainment and application of living customary law, it would fail Constitutional 
compliance and a chance to develop same. To this extent, the judge’s perception does 
influence how he ascertains and applies customary law and whether the exercise of his 
discretion would be in the direction of living customary law. 
The college sitting of appellate courts impact on how discretion is utilised. The top two 
echelons of appeals in both countries sit as a team and the practical experiences of the judges 
come to bear as they contribute actively to debates from their wealth of experience, research 
and prior direct in-depth involvement with people subject to customary law such as women’s 
movements. This association with the communities gives insights into the circumstances of 
poor rural African women and these insights contribute to how discretion is exercised.  
 
5.2.2.1.6 Constitutional compliance and other considerations 
A high number of judges who exercise discretion in the ascertainment and application of 
customary law are influenced by the desire to achieve justice, the need to apply the repugnancy 
clause standard, respect for constitutional rights, and the desire to do that which will be 
beneficial to the society in both Nigeria and South Africa. Constitutional provisions subject the 
recognition, application and development of customary law to the bill of rights/fundamental 
human rights81 and judges have consciously endeavoured to comply with this.  
 Hence, some judges, where there are conflicting versions of the content of customary 
law, would choose that which is more consistent with or more likely to be consistent with the 
Constitution. The explanation given here for judges of the Constitutional Court in South Africa is 
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that based on the Constitution, the judge’s primary duty is not to customary law but to the 
Constitution, and their oath of office supports this. They take into account that Courts must 
consider the ‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ when developing customary law 
and are conscious that the Country paid a huge price to assert these values.82 
 One of the judges explained that customary law is not facts but law and where there are 
conflicting evidence, it should not be treated in the same way facts are weighed against each 
other but rather, the rules should be identified and that which is more in line with the 
constitution should be adopted. This position fails to consider that even though customary law 
is law, this status is based on its own defining features discussed in chapter two, part of which is 
that it emanates from the community. If this is ignored, it would lead to ascertaining distortions 
since the rules are identified from the evidence placed before the court which often are in form 
of facts. 
However, the premise for the Constitutional’s Court decision in Shilubana v 
Mwamitwa83 seemed to be in line with constitutional values.  A strong consideration for the 
exercise of judicial discretion by the Court in favour of a particular proposition as opposed to a 
proven practice was the deliberate voluntary evolution of a customary law by the community to 
conform to constitutional values. In this case, succession to the throne as Hosi practiced by the 
community was proved and the decision to adopt an evolved position was also explained to the 
court. The court’s decision was whether to confirm the proven customary norm, or accept the 
voluntarily proven evolution. It considered evidence on the happenings in the village and 
general meeting of the villages where the decision was made, the opposing parties’ view, 
opinions of counsel, appointment made by the royal council, reports of the development of the 
law reform commission, the provision of section 9 of the Constitution and the court’s 
independent research. The Court exercised wide discretion here but the legality of its decision 
is however questioned as going beyond legal standards as discussed under 8.5.3. in chapter 
eight. 
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However, the court in the Nigerian case of Shaba Ndadile & Ors v Etsu Nupe & 
Ors84discussed under 5.2.1.5 above rejected the development sought by the plaintiffs’ 
community of their customary law which had begun to be implemented. There was no 
Constitutional provision for the plaintiffs to rely on to enforce their rights. The comparison 
between the courts’ position in these two cases is discussed in chapter eight. 
 These considerations for constitutional compliance, achievement of justice and 
repugnancy test are not restricted to evidence of facts put before the court but apply even to 
judicial precedent. A judge explains that he would only apply judicial precedents that comply 
with constitutional standards. When faced with conflicting versions of the applicable customary 
law, some judges would gravitate towards that which will achieve justice, not conflict with 
public policy and would not fall short of the repugnancy test. This last consideration is based on 
the judge’s personal perception of what a reasonable person would do.  
 Other judges however, where the customary law proved does not cover all 
circumstances, would limit themselves to the evidence before the court and hold that the case 
has not been proved and would not exercise discretion outside these evidence even for the 
sake of achieving justice. A judge admits that in such a circumstance, he would ‘create’ a rule to 
apply to that particular circumstance in so far as the rule does not fail the repugnancy test. Yet, 
another judge explained that if the case is framed by the party, i.e. to depict the violation of 
constitutional rights, he may exercise discretion against the customary rule proved in court if it 
violates constitutional rights. In other words, where constitutional violation is not raised, the 
court may ignore it.  
 There appears to be some form of confusion with respect to ascertaining customary law 
and subjecting what is ascertained to constitutional and statutory compliance for application, 
and, accepting versions of customary law that comply with these standards as the ascertained 
customary law. Where the latter is adopted, the danger is that what is ascertained may be 
fictitious and that is not what judges are called upon to do.  
 The court’s responsibility is to ascertain customary law as it is and apply same to the 
case subject to constitutional and statutory compliance which may necessitate developing the 
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ascertained rules for application as was done in Ukeje v Ukeje & Ors.85 Here, the Igbo customary 
law that disentitles the female child and children born outside wedlock from inheriting from her 
father's estate on reason of their gender was ascertained by the court from the testimonies of 
the traditional ruler and an expert which was not contradicted by the plaintiff. However, the 
court declared the custom as void on the ground that it offends constitutional provisions86 that 
prohibit discrimination on ground of gender and on the circumstances of birth. The court also 
declared the customary law as repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience. This 
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.87 The court not only 
declared as void the Igbo customary law that denied a female child and a child born outside 
wedlock from inheriting from the father’s estate, it held that ‘no matter the circumstances of 
the birth of a female child, such a child is entitled to an inheritance from the late father’s 
estate’ hence developed it.88 Thus, the court first ascertained the customary law, and then 
subjected it to constitutional standards.  
 A judge explained that the court is bound by what the litigants state is their custom and 
cannot subject it to the notions of constitutional standards such as equality but it should be 
gauged through the limitations of the repugnancy clause. He explained that: 
That is the custom of the people and they have accepted it, so it has 
nothing to do with constitution … I have come across those cases … where 
a woman herself is a property subject to be inherited by the next of kin. If 
that is what they accept what can you do to them?  
The Supreme Court of Appeal case of Mthembu v Letsela was decided shortly after the 1996 
Constitution came into force. It was sort of a test case of how the provisions of the new 
Constitutional dispensation would be applied. What the court had to grapple with were first, 
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the elevated status of customary law at par with other sources of law and secondly, the 
application of the values of the new constitution to this distinct source of law. The court relied 
on old texts and precedents of NAC and did not seek to ascertain living customary law. It upheld 
the male primogeniture. The Constitutional Court overturned this decision in the Bhe case. 
With better resources and understanding, the Supreme Court of Appeal would decide the case 
differently.89 
 The sudden elevation of customary law as an independent source of law at the dawn of 
constitutional democracy, and the thrust on courts to ascertain, apply and where necessary 
develop them would require some form of activism. That some judges found this to be 
somewhat initially daunting and were somewhat uneasy since such judicial activism was foreign 
to the responsibilities of the judge in a civil law country is understandable. They needed some 
form of guidance which the Constitutional Court provided. The professional pedigree of the 
judges of the Constitutional Court and their constitutional mandate had prepared them for this. 
The constitutional court is a composite court of eleven justices and there are a lot of discussions 
and deliberations by the judges with respect of issues to be determined in a case and this has 
been useful.  
 A basic factor that determines why courts develop customary law is to bring it to 
conformity with constitutional values and, its relevance to the current lived realities of the 
people who are bound by it, i.e. the broader beneficiaries beyond the parties.90 According to 
Lewis, the development of customary law as explained91 by the court in the Mayelane case 
suggests a ‘"process" that takes "the traditions of the community concerned"’ into 
consideration and not a case of ‘replacing’ one norm with another, which promotes a bottom 
up approach92 which resonates with how customary law is sourced. 
 A judge states that she will exercise discretion against a proven customary practice in 
favour of advancements that would achieve justice, such as customary rules that deny the 
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paternity of the biological father of a child on the ground that he is yet to pay the dowry of the 
mother. 
The exercise of judicial discretion in the ascertainment and application of customary law 
is affected by the limitations of repugnancy clauses. According to the Supreme Court in the case 
of Ojiogu v Ojiogu, the argument that the applicable customary law fails the repugnancy test 
cannot be raised for the first time as a ground of appeal in the appellate court where it is not 
pleaded in the pleadings at the court a quo. It is interesting to note that the limitations on the 
ascertainment and application of customary, law with respect to the repugnancy doctrine 
imposed by the earliest pieces of legislation, have been retained in the current legislations in 
Nigeria and South Africa.93 Section 22 of Proclamation 140 of 1885, which provided that the 
application of customary law shall be subject to public policy and natural justice, is retained in 
section 1 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act and is similar with that applicable in Nigeria. 
The South African Constitution subjects the validity of customary law to its compatibility with 
the Constitution and legislation. Hlope J in the case of Mabuza v Mbatha94 declared that: 
The approach whereby African Law is recognised only when it does not 
conflict with the principles of public policy or natural justice leads to an 
absurd situation whereby it is continuously being undermined and not 
properly developed by the courts. 
 
The repugnancy provisions of the laws of evidence applicable in both countries fall 
under this. Rather, constitutional compliance dispenses with the need for the repugnancy test.  
In Nigeria, section 18 (3) of the Evidence Act provides that a custom shall not be 
enforced as law in a judicial proceeding ‘if it is contrary to public policy, or is not in accordance 
with natural justice, equity and good conscience’. This limitation is called the repugnancy test 
or doctrine. It’s forebear is found in the colonial era Supreme Court Ordinance of 1914 which 
precludes any custom that falls short of the standard of natural justice, equity and good 
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conscience or conflicts with any local legislation, English laws applicable in Nigeria or 
‘Indigenous local sanctions’.95 
Also, section 18(4) of the Evidence Act may be described as the compatibility test. 
According to the provision, a custom shall not be enforced by courts if it is directly 
incompatible, or can be implied to be incompatible with any written law in force 
Academics have argued that the repugnancy clause should no longer apply as a litmus 
test in determining whether an ascertained normative practice should be abolished by the 
court.96 Rather, they have advocated for the application of constitutional standards as an 
alternative. This is especially so for South Africa giving its elevated status. Another ground for 
this argument is the uncertainty of what really constitutes the repugnancy standards and the 
fact that they are usually based on Eurocentric concepts or views.97 If the constitutional 
standards would accommodate all considerations for humaneness and justice then the 
argument to do away with the repugnancy clause is apposite. 
. In all, it is clear that sometimes the consideration for constitutional compliance, the 
achievement of justice and the repugnancy and public policy test influence how the judges 
would exercise discretion in the ascertainment and application of customary law. While some 
judges see the application of the repugnancy and public policy tests as exercise of discretion, 
others do not on the ground that they are bound to apply them. Regardless of the judges’ 
opinions, in so far as the standard for the repugnancy and public policy test is not certain,98 
some form of discretion is exercised by the court. This is especially so where there is an attempt 
to develop the customary law ascertained. Here, the judge’s exercise of discretion becomes 
influenced by whatever factors the judge puts into consideration in developing the customary 
law. This also applies to Constitutional standards. 
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5.2.2.1.7  Consideration for legal certainty 
 Though certainty may not be the central reason for how judges ascertain and apply 
customary law in Nigeria and South Africa, it does influence some judges’ discretion in choosing 
or maintaining a position.  Some judges admit that the need to achieve certainty has influenced 
them in ascertaining and applying customary law. The circumstances under which they would 
do these are diverse. First, they would do so to exercise discretion and develop customary law 
on the issue being considered.99  Secondly, if there are uncertainties and both parties disagree 
on the content of customary law sought to be ascertained and there is a precedent on the 
matter, the judge would adopt the precedent if it agrees with the evidence of one of the parties 
for the sake of certainty.100  Thirdly, if there is uncertainty from the evidence led on the 
customary norm, the judge would, from the circumstances of the case, take a position in 
establishing a rule of customary law so the community can have a point of reference with 
respect to what is expected of them. The judges would therefore consider how the rule would 
impact the broader society beyond the interest of the parties.101 Fourthly, the judge would 
adopt the opinion of an expert who testified in the cases even if he is not satisfied with the 
evidence, for the sake of achieving certainty. 
 On the other hand, some judges explained that they will not exercise discretion to fill up 
gaps even for the sake of achieving legal certainty and would simply hold that the party has 
failed to attain the threshold of proof.  Their position is based on the reasoning that the judge 
should not impose norms on a community and that the only way certainty can be achieved is if 
the customary norm has been proved before the court. 
Though certainty is not particularly a value in customary law,102 it is relevant in 
constitutional justice as well as in values of precedent and equality. There is a strain to give 
consideration to the principles of customary law to ensure harmony and to satisfy parties that 
due consideration is given to their rights albeit subject to these constitutional values which 
cannot be ignored. A judge expressed that, in all, the desire to achieve legal certainty and 
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ensure that everyone is treated equally ‘militates against just letting living customary law find 
its way forward. It’s always a difficult balance’.103 Hence the approach to the consideration of 
legal certainty in customary law and constitutional justice is a paradigm clash.  
Granted that in the application of certain customary rules, its flexibility is 
accommodated to give considerations to particular circumstances, it would be erroneous to say 
that, for instance, there cannot be clear cut rules with respect to certain transactions, such as 
customary tenancy, succession to chieftainship etc. Parties and amici have sought the 
development of customary law to create certainty and judges have given consideration for this 
in endeavouring to ascertain customary law104 and this is contrary to the very nature of 
customary law. However, while a few judges have exercised their discretion on the basis of 
achieving certainty, the majority of those interviewed stated that their ascertainment of 
customary law in a case will not be compromised on the basis of achieving certainty. The 
Constitutional Court defended its judgement in the Bhe case on the basis that it would achieve 
certainty in order to protect rights.105 It however contradicted itself in its defense of its 
judgement in the Shilubana case when it stated that the basis of its decision is that ‘factors 
relating to legal certainty or the protection of rights’ cannot outweigh a community’s decision 
to develop its laws.106 
 
5.2.2.2  Summary 
How the substantive factors impact on the ascertainment and application of customary law in 
both countries depends on how they are applied. For instance, how judges utilise the various 
methods of ascertainment may enhance or mar the ascertainment and application of living 
customary law. The same applies to how the judges utilised their prior knowledge of the 
ascertainment process. The college sitting of the Constitutional Court where judges bring in 
their diverse experiences and knowledge has its own measure of impact on the process. A 
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crucial factor in South Africa is the need to ensure Constitutional compliance has also been a 
central consideration in the ascertainment process; so also the quest to achieve justice and to 
comply with the repugnancy and public policy test and consideration for legal certainty. All 
these indicate varying degrees of discretion exercised by the judges. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The data utilised in this analysis indicate that judicial discretion has been applied by the formal 
courts in the ascertainment and application of customary law under the two broad factors – 
institutional and substantive ‒ and these are basically similar for both Nigeria and South Africa. 
The institutional factors range from the judges’ exposure to customary law which included the 
content of the judges’ training and regulations on the minimal requirements for their 
appointment, to their grasp of the concept of customary law. Others factors include statutory 
requirements, protection of the status of statutory law over customary law and the 
convergence of positivism and pluralism. The substantive factors cover methods of 
ascertainment utilised by the judges, judges’ perception, constitutional compliance and other 
considerations and consideration for legal certainty.   
Judicial discretion was utilised by the higher courts under different circumstances such 
as where the evidence before the court are not conclusively satisfactory for proving the content 
of living customary law, where the customary law rules sought to be applied are open textured, 
and when the court’s analysis is based on other considerations outside merely ascertaining 
customary law such as the desire to achieve justice and constitutional compliance, and the 
application of the repugnancy and public policy test. It is clear that the higher courts have 
applied judicial discretion within wide latitude and also influenced by factors intrinsic and 
extraneous to the legal framework and rules that regulate the processes of its application. The 
chapter discussed how these factors can aid or impede the ascertainment and application of 
living customary law by the courts and states that however wide the discretions of a court may 
be, it should be exercised within the confines of the law to protect rights and it should be based 
on guiding principles. Where the court embarks on a frolic of its own, its decision will be short 
of ascertaining and applying living customary law.  
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Chapter Six 
 
Supplementary factors that influence the ascertainment and application of 
customary law in courts of superior jurisdiction in Nigeria and South Africa 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to identify factors that influence the exercise of discretion by courts in the 
ascertainment and application of customary law. The factors identified are intrinsic and 
extrinsic to the court process. They are derived from a triangulation of data garnered from the 
interviews conducted with judges and registrars of courts of superior jurisdiction in Nigeria and 
South Africa, records of proceedings of cases analysed for this purpose and other doctrinal 
sources such as the applicable laws. While the previous chapter discussed the common factors, 
this chapter discusses the supplementary factors which include procedural and, socio-economic 
and political factors which cover a generic range of factors. It is important to mention that the 
use of the word ‘supplementary’ does not mean auxiliary. ‘Supplementary’ as used here simply 
refers to further factors. I reiterate here that the classifications are based on my own creation 
based on common features and for the mere reason of enabling an easier discuss. Again, I state 
that it should be noted that the level or type of court of superior jurisdiction is not a relevant 
variable for the factors identified because the factors generally apply across the courts. 
However where there are factors distinct to a particular court type, it will be stated. I restate 
that it is essential to clarify that this thesis does not claim to have identified all factors possibly 
present, but merely identified factors that appear glaring to the researcher.  
The chapter is also based on the premise extensively discussed in chapter two and 
states that how discretion is exercised by the judge is determined by factors that enhance or 
impede the ascertainment of living customary law.  
6.2 Supplementary factors 
These factors include procedural, socio-economic and political factors.   
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6.2.1  Procedural factors 
These factors are tied to the rules and procedures in the process of ascertaining and applying 
customary law and include considerations in the resolution of evidential contradictions, the 
hindrance of technicalities, choice of court process in instituting an action, constraints of 
appellate courts, accuracy of interpreters and the role of court registrars. 
6.2.1.1  Considerations in the Resolution of evidential contradictions 
The exercise of a judge’s discretion in ascertaining and applying customary law in both 
countries can be affected by how evidential contradictions are resolved and judges have given 
consideration to a number of factors in resolving these contradictions. Ordinarily, the rules of 
evidence determine this and where the exercise of evaluation is faulty, it would affect what is 
ascertained and applied by the court.  
 Judges have juxtaposed the combination of texts, evidence and precedent to ascertain 
and apply customary norms when faced with contradictory evidence.1 A few, in addition to 
these, utilise research findings of sociologists, anthropologists and historians.2 The latter 
pattern usually is capital intensive and beyond the reach of most litigants. Though not all cases 
require the latter pattern, in some cases, it would be crucial to a veritable ascertainment and 
where the parties make these available, the court utilises them.3 Where they are not made 
available, the courts have either based their verdict within the bounds of the evidence before it, 
or called for further presentations on the knotty issues.4 Though the rules of court permit 
appellate courts to refer such a matter back to the court a quo to take further evidence, they 
have seldom done this.5 It is difficult to decipher what would have determined the courts’ path 
in these respects.  
 In resolving evidential contradictions, judges have given priority after evaluation of the 
evidence put forward by both parties to the version supported by a majority of the witnesses 
with particular consideration to their status within the community, for instance if they are 
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custodians of the customs.  For instance, a change in a customary practice such as one that 
permits a woman to inherit property will be accepted only if it is proved that a vast majority in 
the community endorse the change.  In Nigeria, where the court is not satisfied with the 
evidence of both parties, it invites paramount rulers as well as other elders of the communities 
to verify the rulers’ assertions. In order to ensure that credible evidence of customary norms 
are presented to the court, where paramount rulers are invited to testify in court, they are 
sometimes warned by the judge to be truthful.  
 Judges are conscious that in civil cases, they are required to ascertain customary law on 
the measure of balance of probabilities and not beyond all reasonable doubt and therefore 
endeavour to apply this standard. The implication is that when ascertaining customary law, 
they rule in favour of the party in whose favour the scale is tilted however slightly. This may be 
as a result of evidential principles and not necessarily conclusive that the favoured party’s 
account is authentic and truly representative of the current norms of the community. In the 
consideration of issues in cases before the courts, courts are bound by the prayers and 
evidence of the parties before them even though the issues sought to be resolved may require 
the engagement of additional evidence. In an adversarial system such as that practiced in 
Nigeria and South Africa, the judges are reluctant to request that the parties supply these 
additional evidence for fear of being seen as showing an overt interest in the case even though 
they may give hints in the course of the trial.6 
 Despite the adversarial system, there are instances where the court outrightly would 
request these additional evidence on the current normative practice of the subject community 
without which the issues cannot be justifiably resolved, such as in the case of Mayelane v 
Ngwenyama and Another.7In this case, the majority in the Constitutional Court could have 
restricted itself to the issues before the court and rule that the living customary law was 
proved. However, it thought it essential to sufficiently confirm the customary rule beyond 
‘mere assertion’ by the person relying on it and her witness, especially since the outcome 
would invariably apply to members of the broader community.8 Therefore, the need to 
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justifiably resolve the issues in order to attain justice did influence the court in the direction it 
took to aid the ascertainment and application of customary law even if to do this required going 
against the rules of procedure and evidence.9 
 No doubt the evidence before the court would be sufficient to get a verdict in favour of 
the applicant. However, the Constitutional Court’s position that such mere assertions are not 
sufficient to establish a customary rule supports the view that judicial notice based on such 
assertions are not conclusive proof of a position and must be applied cautiously by the courts. 
For some judgements, to deviate from a customary rule on which there is judicial precedence, it 
would take the testimony of a number of people to convince the judges to rule against the 
precedent.10 
 Appellate courts would ordinarily avoid calling for additional evidence in proof of a 
customary norm. Regarding this as the responsibility of the court a quo, they would rather stick 
to simply verifying whether the court below, based on the evidence before it, rightly or wrongly 
ascertained the customary norm. In exceptional cases however, the appellate courts may hear 
evidence. On appeal, the court relies on the grounds of appeal, briefs of argument and also oral 
address from the parties. Where the parties fail to raise issues that could aid the ascertainment 
of customary law, the exercise of the court’s discretion may not result in actually ascertaining 
customary law.  
 A judge explained that in ascertaining customary law, she would not look at the rules in 
isolation but would ‘look at the parties that are involved, the peculiar facts and circumstance of 
the case.’ For instance is the case of Nwaigwe & Ors v Okere11which commenced at the 
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customary court and went through appeals right up to the Supreme Court. The customary court 
decided in the plaintiffs’ favour and affirmed the rule of Umuogba Ezinna customary law put 
forward by the plaintiff on customary tenancy and the rules for the termination of that tenancy. 
Under this rule, the defendants were declared as customary tenants of the plaintiff and such 
tenancy terminated on their violating the grounds for termination. The defendant’s brother 
testified in favour of the plaintiff’s right of ownership to the land which was the subject of 
dispute, and his testimony was accepted by the court. He confirmed the content of Umuogba 
Ezinna customary law of tenancy and forfeiture put forward by the plaintiff against his own 
interest and this was a contributory factor in the court’s adoption of the plaintiff’s version. In 
evaluating which evidence to adopt, the customary court took this into consideration as well as 
the fact that the plaintiff’s witnesses were from within the community while the defendant’s 
lone witness was from another community. Added to this is also the fact that the elders had 
decided in the plaintiffs’ favour prior to the institution of the action in court.  
 Judges have, in evaluating evidence, given attention to witnesses’ demeanour, 
consistency under examination in chief and cross examination, the veracity of their evidence 
and reliability of their source of knowledge.12 One judge included common sense in this list and 
explained that even if a customary law is proved to exist, when it does not agree with common 
sense, it will not be applied. How common sense is measured is uncertain and open to the 
judge’s biases even though another judge asserts that her personal views will not determine 
what she ascertains since customs are not subject to her personal views.  
 In the case of Aragbui of Iragbui-Oba Olabomi& Anor v Olabode Oyewinle,13which was 
on the applicable customary law governing ascendancy to the chieftain of Iragbui, in 
considering the veracity of the conflicting oral traditional histories before the court, the court 
held that narrations that agree more with current facts such as features sighted at the locus in 
quo will carry more weight and ruled against the plaintiff. The court’s decision was however 
overturned by the Court of Appeal on the ground that it misconstrued the ‘current facts’ by 
reading unnecessary meaning into the evidence before it. The point to this is that in achieving 
veracity, the court’s perception of the facts must also not be misconstrued. 
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 The case of Uwaifo v Uwaifo14 illustrates the application of evidential rules by the judge 
in ascertaining and applying the applicable customary law. In this case, the deceased left a will 
in which he distributed his estate to his beneficiaries but excluded the plaintiff who was his 
eldest son, contrary to Bini customary law. The Will’s Law15 subjects the testator’s freedom of 
testamentary disposition to the applicable customary law which provides that the eldest son 
inherits the Igiogbe i.e. the principal house where the deceased lived before his death. In this 
case, the Plaintiff who is the eldest son of the deceased insisted that the igiogbe consist of all 
the 23 rooms, a vacant land and a big store and that the portion of the will which bequeathed 
the igiogbe to another beneficiary be declared void. Not disputing the rule pertaining to 
igiogbe, the defendants insisted that the estate is in fact two separate properties at numbers 2 
and 4 and that only number 4 constitutes the principal house where the deceased lived in his 
lifetime.   
 The court held that the concept of igiogbe was not the problem. The dispute was 
whether it was just number 4 or whether it constituted all the properties including the vacant 
land. Elders who were traditional chiefs from the community testified on behalf of both parties 
with respect to the content of the customary law. There was also reliance by both parties on 
judicial precedent by the Supreme Court on the applicable customary law to buttress their 
respective averments.  The court held that the plaintiff’s own witness described igiogbe as the 
house where the deceased lived before his death and the plaintiff himself had testified that his 
father lived in number 4 and this is confirmed by the defendants’ witnesses. The deceased 
himself made specific reference to number 4 in his will as the house he lived, in which he 
devised to his second son, Henry, whom he appointed as the head of his estate.  
 In determining what weight the evidence should carry, the judge accepted the evidence 
of the plaintiff’s second witness over that of his third witness who said the igiogbe constituted 
all the houses in the compound because the second witness knew the premises and described it 
with precision while the third witness did not. The judge painstakingly pointed out distinctions 
between the respective averments by both parties and the judicial authorities they cited to 
support their respective assertions and made its conclusion. The court therefore held that the 
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igiogbe consisted of only number 4 and voided the particular provision of the will that 
bequeathed the property to the second son in line with the accepted practice in the 
community. The judgement was affirmed by both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.16 
The glaring factor that features here is the judges’ ability to apply evidential rules to the 
circumstances and facts of the case and what was put into consideration in the ascertainment 
and application of the content of the applicable customary law.  
The judge’s adroitness in the rules of Evidence does aid in how discretion is exercised in 
the process of ascertainment and is a vital factor. The case of Iorshashe V Ugbu & Anor17is a 
good illustration of this. Here, the content of the Tiv customary law of succession was pleaded 
and evidence was led by the people within the Tiv community, and their leaders and king 
makers testified. Texts which supported the plaintiff’s case were utilised. All parties were 
agreed on the general principle of succession which is yanawaangbain18 but disagreed on the 
point that it was not strictly applied and there could be circumstances that would justify a 
deviation from the rule as in the case of the plaintiff’s appointment.  The court decided, after 
some engagement in analysis grounded on the applicable rules of evidence, in favour of the 
plaintiff based on his testimony as well as those of his witnesses. The plaintiff’s position was 
also invariably confirmed by some of the defendants’ witnesses corroborated by documents 
relied upon as well as the circumstances of the case. The judge could achieve this because he 
was conversant with the rules of evidence.  
 For some judges, testimonies of elders well advanced in age will be considered even 
above a text written by a professor who has researched in the field because the elders should 
know best, and at that age, it is expected that such persons, except if they are ‘inveterate liars’ 
would be preparing to meet their God and would be more likely to tell the truth.19 Another 
judge explained that in order to check the authenticity of a testimony, he would ask further 
questions for clarity such as the level of the witness’ exposure to the community whose 
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customary norm he is testifying on.  A judge explained that he felt more at home with 
testimonies from elderly men: 
So if we call the oldest man, he will … explain the anthropological factors that 
prompted the emergence of these customs. A foreigner coming to interrogate 
such a custom would not understand the underlying rationale for the 
evolution of such a custom ... the living testimony of those who are aware of 
the custom. I am dealing with the current… living testimony of people, I will 
prefer of course the evidence of people who are before me. 
 
If at the close of a case the court is still uncertain that the customary law has been proved, 
judges react differently. While some would attempt to fill up the gap in different ways 
described in the third paragraph under 5.2.2.1.6, others would strike out or non-suit the case or 
decide against the party relying on the particular custom.  
 The courts have utilised evidence in previous cases to determine the veracity of 
evidence in cases before them. Sometimes this is done erroneously, while at other times it is 
done within the parametres of what is prescribed by the rules. Such was the situation in 
Aragbui of Iragbui-Oba Olabomi & Anor v Olabode Oyewinle20In this case, the court erroneously 
relied on a document and evidence in a different case on the same subject matter as the main 
ground for discounting the oral traditional evidence in favour of the plaintiff. The witness who 
testified in the earlier case and the document were not before the present court and were not 
verified and cross examined. The Court of Appeal held that though inference could be made 
from them, the court a quo could not rely on them as the main reason for discountenancing the 
plaintiff’s evidence. This analysis by the court reveals the judge’s adroit evidential 
considerations. This case is distinguished from Mahionu Aduku & Anor v Danjuma Achor & 
Anor.21Here, the plaintiffs challenged the appointment of the defendant as the Ohioga Okete 
and averred that under their customary law, a conviction as a thief is a disqualification for 
appointment to the Ohioga Okete clan stool. The Attah of Igala (chief of all Igalas), as the 2nd 
defendant, contradicted this averment. The court relied on the Attah’s averment in an earlier 
suit22 where he stated the above as the correct position in the applicable customary law which 
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was a contradiction to his testimony before the current court. The court also relied on an 
earlier judgment in a different case in which the judge held that the Attah 'elevates his personal 
preference over and above Igala native law and custom where there is conflict between the 
two on any issue’. The trial court therefore rejected the veracity of the Attah’s testimony on the 
content of the applicable customary law and upheld the plaintiff’s position corroborated by the 
oldest man in the community.  
 The distinction between the two cases is that the Attah was before the court and was 
given an opportunity to respond to the issues in his earlier averments.23 At the Court of Appeal, 
however, the decision of the trial court was reversed. The Court of Appeal strangely chose to 
rely on the Attah’s testimony that under the Igala custom, since the plaintiff had been removed 
from the stool in his lifetime and, none of his descendants can have any say with respect to the 
stool. On this basis, the Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiff’s averments on the ground that 
under the applicable customary law, the plaintiff was not in a position to have a say with 
respect to the stool and therefore lacked locus standi in the case. It is interesting to note that 
the court utilised what might be the customary law process of ascertainment which is that 
under the applicable customary law, the plaintiffs have no say in asserting any position with 
respect to the stool.24 Unfortunately however, the lower court’s analysis seemed more 
probable of the content of the customary law. 
 The courts have also affirmed customary norms put forward by a party where it is not 
disputed. In Temile & Ors v Awani,25 the high court held that though the plaintiff did not lead 
evidence in support of the Itsekiri native law and custom which he relied upon, because its 
content was not disputed, and having found the account of events made by the plaintiff to be 
proved, it held in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed against this judgment on the 
ground that the plaintiff did not prove his case and also failed to prove the content of Itsekiri 
customary law (on the ‘validity and exclusivity’ of the gift of land which is the subject matter in 
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the case) and that the plaintiff’s case ought to stand on its strength and not based on the 
loopholes in the defendant’s case. Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld the 
decision of the high court and stated that Itsekiri native law and custom was actually pleaded 
and sufficiently supported with testimonies which were not refuted by the defendants. In this 
case, though the court a quo’s decision was in favour of the plaintiff, it erroneously held that 
the plaintiff did not lead evidence to prove the content of the customary law. The appellate 
courts rectified this error. The point being made here, however, is that the court a quo ruled in 
favour of the plaintiff’s assertions believing that no evidence was put before the court but on 
the premise that it was not disputed. The basis for the court a quo’s decision was erroneous 
and what it reveals is that courts could ascertain and apply customary law on mistaken grounds. 
For customary law to be applied in court, it must be proved irrespective of whether it is 
disputed or not. The customary court of appeal set aside the decision of the customary court 
granting divorce and full custody of the children of the marriage to the petitioner in the case of 
Emenalo Omi v Chinwe Emenalo.26 The decision of the appeal court was on the basis that 
although the petitioner’s assertions on the validity of her marriage and circumstances that led 
to her applying for divorce and custody of the children were uncontroverted, she failed to lead 
evidence on the Igbo customary law of marriage, divorce and custody upon which to base the 
judgement of the customary court and this responsibility is on the party that asserts. 
Despite the presentation of evidence by the parties of the content of the applicable 
customary law, the courts may exercise discretion by choosing to dwell more on other issues 
that would produce the same result as that sought to be enforced under the applicable 
customary law. The court may therefore consider it superfluous to ascertain the customary law 
for application. The reason for not ascertaining the customary law already in evidence before 
the court may be tied to the court’s erroneous understanding of the rules of court. Both 
situations played out in the case of Mayelane v Ngwenyama27 where the court a quo based its 
judgment on the interpretation of the 7(6) of the Recognition Act and ignored ascertaining the 
applicable customary law on the prerequisite of consent of the first wife to the validity of a 
subsequent marriage of the husband based on evidence already before it. The Supreme Court 
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of Appeal on the other hand erroneously held that it could not ascertain and apply the 
applicable customary law even from the evidence presented at the high court because there 
was no cross appeal before it on the issue, but rather considered section 7 (6) of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.28 On appeal, the Constitutional Court, in my view, 
correctly held that it did not require a cross appeal to do that. By dwelling on other alternative 
routes, the high court and Supreme Court of Appeal failed to ascertain the content of the 
applicable customary law which formed the crux of the case.  
Again, the Supreme Court of Appeal showed a lack of clear understanding of the 
statutory requirement of a valid customary marriage in s 3 (1) (b) when it held that the 
requirement of celebrating a marriage in accordance with the applicable customary law was 
fulfilled without ascertaining whether the consent of a first wife was a requirement for a valid 
subsequent marriage in the particular custom. Section 3 (1) (b) provides that ‘the marriages 
must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary law.’ It ought 
to have first ascertained the content of the law on whether or not consent is required before 
determining whether the requirement was met. The court also held that the intention of the 
drafters of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act could not have been to alter customary 
law by subjecting polygyny to consent. There was no way it could have deciphered this 
intention when the Act did not provide for the content of the applicable customary law. This 
decision was therefore based on assumptions that consent was not a requirement under 
customary law and the said section 3 (1) (b) was abstractly determined by the court.  
The courts may refrain from ascertaining and applying the applicable customary law 
despite the evidence before it if it finds an easy way out that addresses the issues. This is 
indicated in the case of the Segwagwa Mamogale v Premier North West Province29where the 
judge did not seek to ascertain the applicable customary law procedure for the appointment 
and removal of a regent, but granted the application of the applicant nullifying his removal and 
the appointment of the 2nd respondent as regent by the Premier. This was on the ground that it 
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violated the provisions of the bill of rights, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act30 and 
the Bophuthatswana Traditional Authorities Act31 because the applicant was not given a right to 
fair hearing. Even though the applicant relied on these laws in his application, it was a major 
part of this contention that the procedure adopted by the Premier went contrary to customary 
law procedures and evidence was led by both parties on their respective position. These laws 
provided for the application of customary in such removal and the ascertainment of the 
applicable customary law was crucial to the determination of the case but the court did not 
ascertain the relevant customary law because it found an easier way out. Fortunately, the 
applicant’s right was not adversely affected by the court’s omission.  
The exercise of discretion in ascertaining and applying customary law by the court may 
not be based on the strict application of the rules of evidence but on what the court deems as 
the best way to determine the content of the applicable customary law. The three differing 
judgements in the case of Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Anor32 in the Constitutional Court is a 
good example of the exercise of a judge’s discretion in ascertaining and applying customary 
law. This is despite the fact that all the judgements made similar orders by holding that the 
purported marriage of the respondent to the deceased was invalid having been conducted 
contrary to the applicable customary norm that required consent. The second and third 
judgements differed from the majority judgment on the ground that it was not necessary for 
the Constitutional Court to develop the Tsonga customary law of marriage after it was 
ascertained. It could have based its judgement on the evidence presented at the high court 
where the content of the Tsonga customary marriage asserted by the appellant was not 
controverted by the respondent.33Rather, it requested further evidence to satisfactorily confirm 
the content of the law since the outcome of the case would apply to the broader community.  
Parties have been known to introduce a ground to their cases for the first time on 
appeal thereby not giving the earlier courts the opportunity to consider the issues canvassed. 
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Generally, parties are not supposed to raise new points of law for the first time on appeal but 
the Constitutional Court has explained that ‘it is open to a party to raise a new point of law on 
appeal for the first time if it involves no unfairness . . . and raises no new factual issues.’34 In the 
case of Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Another35however, new facts were introduced by the 
respondent who took advantage of the court’s direction for further evidence on the content of 
the applicable customary law. This opening in the law aided a more thorough ascertainment 
process adopted by the court.  
 There are also instances where judges may not be well versed in the concept and values 
of customary law but may generally seek to do equity in the cases before them and this will 
influence what they apply. This is the position of one of the judges interviewed with no prior 
experience in customary law before his appointment to the bench. He admits that one way or 
the other, his concept of equity would rub off on his application of customary law rules. 
Another judge would look for what would ultimately benefit the larger community. She states: 
I think we mustn’t create too much of a fetish about it. Legal rules are 
not magic. They are tools for the service of human beings, and human 
beings remain the primary beneficiaries of those rules. 
 
In all, different evidential considerations give rise to how judges exercise their discretion in the 
ascertainment and application of customary law and these are testaments to the fact that 
judges do exercise discretion and often in a wide manner. Whether or not these lead to the 
ascertainment of living customary law is dependent on the circumstances of the case, how 
judges apply the rules of evidence and other factors. 
 
6.2.1.2  The hindrance of technicalities 
A factor that impedes an appellate court from having a say on whether customary law 
was properly ascertained and applied at the court a quo pertains to the ground of appeal. In 
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such an instance, the ground of appeal may be on technical points of law which though not 
directly related to the ascertained customary law, are central to the appeal. The determination 
of such technical ground invariably leads to upholding or reversing the judgement of the lower 
court which includes what was ascertained even where the appellate court does not consider 
the customary law ascertained because it was not a ground of appeal. 
6.2.1.3  Choice of court process in instituting an action 
One factor that influences how a judge exercises discretion in the process of ascertaining 
customary law in South Africa is interestingly tied to the court process utilised in instituting the 
case. This is whether by way of a motion application where affidavits are filed which dispense 
with the need for oral evidence or through a process which accommodates pleadings and oral 
evidence. Litigants may prefer motion application because it is speedier. However, the parties 
may not have the chance to present sufficient evidence to prove the content of the customary 
law before the court. The court may consequently be compelled to make a decision based on 
insufficient evidence which could be decided otherwise if more evidence were before the court.  
The case of Bakgatla Ba Sesfikile Community v Bakgatla Ba Kafela Tribal Authority36 clearly 
illustrates this. Here, the applicants claimed exclusive right to a farm which, according to them, 
was held on their behalf by the traditional ruler of a broader community which they belong to. 
They claimed that this information was passed down to them through oral history and had a 
document with the names of their predecessors who paid the purchase price. Their claim was 
based on the proof of a customary law practice that entitled them as a sub- group to purchase 
and own lands even without proof of possession. The court held that the applicants failed to 
prove their claim and admitted that the issues to be determined could not be resolved on 
affidavit evidence. It held that the applicants ‘should have realised that there are or might be 
serious dispute of facts’ that would require further evidence.37 The court therefore rejected the 
applicant’s account of the content of the applicable customary law on the ground that the 
evidence before the court was insufficient to establish the customary practice.  
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In the case of Pilane v Pilane38 the court had only affidavit evidence to consider due to 
the process adopted by the applicant to commence the action. No oral evidence could be taken 
to resolve the contradictions in the affidavit evidence with respect to the contents of the 
applicable customary law on the appropriate person to convene a village meeting to hold the 
community leadership accountable. The judge at the court a quo therefore sought to apply the 
Plascon-Evans rule.39This rule states that where there are factual disputes, the applicants’ relief 
will only be granted if his admitted facts and the respondent’s position justify it. The court a 
quo ruled in favour of the applicant but was overturned by the Constitutional Court on the 
ground that it applied the Plascon-Evans rule wrongly. The basis for this was that the 
respondents’ uncontradicted accounts backed by expert evidence refuted the applicant’s 
version in their founding affidavit. This was clearly a technical application of the rules of 
evidence upon which the discretion of the court was exercised in an attempt to ascertain the 
applicable customary law. It is common cause that wrong application of the rules of evidence 
occasion error in the decision of the courts, and the process of ascertainment and application of 
customary law is no exception.  
6.2.1.4  Constraints of appellate courts 
 Appellate courts do not have the opportunity to study the demeanour of the witnesses 
who testify in court in order to determine the veracity of their testimonies by observing their 
demeanour, character and behavioural pattern. These contribute to the determination of the 
credibility of the evidence given for the ascertainment of customary law in the court. Since 
appellate courts can overturn the decisions of the court a quo, they may not be in a position to 
fully appreciate the reason behind the decision of the judge at the court a quo who had the 
privilege to not only consider the evidence before him, but to observe the demeanour and 
mannerisms of the witnesses. 
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6.2.1.5  Accuracy of interpreters 
 One of the challenges identified at the customary court of appeal that would affect the 
ascertainment and application of customary law by the court is with respect to the services of 
interpreters in the court as well as in the customary courts from where appeals come to the 
court. The court has not engaged professional interpreters but utilises people with secondary 
level education who speak passable English and some local languages restricted to Gbagyi, 
Hausa and Bassa. The court also uses volunteers as interpreters such as a lady versed in a 
number of languages who offers her services for free in one of the customary courts within its 
jurisdiction. It is in doubtful whether the interpretation done by these people is accurate and 
this can work against accurate ascertainment, as witnesses may not really understand 
questions put to them in the court and their responses may not be correctly relayed to the 
court. For instance, one registrar explained that: 
Sometimes when we are sitting here, the judges most especially Justice 
[X], because [he/she] is very versed in Hausa, when 
somebody(interpreter) is translating, …[ he/she] says … but that is not 
what the guy is saying. That is not what he is saying … so why is he saying 
something else. 
This is also a challenge in South African courts. In the case of Southon v Moropane,40the court 
cautioned the interpreter not to testify but simply interpret the plaintiff’s witness’ testimony 
crucial to the plaintiff’s case with respect to how her customary marriage was conducted. The 
interpreter was cautioned about three times by the judge for both misinterpreting the question 
put to the witness and relating the witnesses’ response. Had the judge not been well versed in 
the local language, the error of the interpreter would not have been discovered and the 
ascertainment and application by the court could have been affected by this error. It is vital to 
note that this factor applies in courts that hear evidence as well and not in solely appellate 
courts. 
6.2.1.6  The role of court registrars 
Though registrars are not directly involved in the process of ascertainment in court, they play 
certain vital roles in the administration that could make credible evidence accessible to the 
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court to enhance a prudent exercise of discretion in the ascertainment and application of 
customary law. The roles they play do not necessarily require legal qualification. Their 
experience in customary law prior to their appointment and thereafter, range from none to 
extensive.  Though the responsibilities of court registrars is administrative, their roles may 
affect the process of ascertainment of customary law by the courts when it pertains to 
requesting for witnesses to testify in court which on the order of the judge sometimes come 
within their purview. Their background and professional experience with respect to customary 
law range from almost none to extensive.   
 The rules of court permit further evidence, e.g. expert evidence to be obtained in 
exceptional circumstances for the court at the instance of either the court or the parties to the 
case. This is if the additional evidence will affect the determination of the appeal and will cause 
‘a miscarriage of justice’ where the new evidence is not brought in.41The acceptance of further 
evidence to aid the ascertainment and application of customary law is accommodated under 
the provision of the Court of Appeal Act which confers general powers on the court ‘to do all 
such things in the utmost interest of justice’.42 
In South Africa, where the court is dissatisfied with the evidence on the content of the 
applicable customary law before it, and opts to invite amici to address it on the related issue,43 
the registrar’s role will be to simply convey the decision of the court to the amici. Except where 
the court specifically requests a particular amicus, the registrars would have to scout for 
organizations and groups that could act as amici; this could be done through the internet and 
by contacting cultural groups, institutions that promote such, provincial bars and the Human 
Rights Council for suggestions. Newspapers and law journals for possible persons or 
organisations who could act as amici are also checked.  It is crucial who is invited and where the 
registrar understands this and the requisite persons are invited, the contribution may impact on 
the courts’ discretion with respect to what the amici brings to the case. 
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 In Nigeria, irrespective of who makes the request for expert evidence, the parties 
ordinarily supply the names of the experts to be invited, but there are instances where this is 
left in the registrar’s purview. The registrars would, when required by an order of the court, 
confirm the status of who is being invited as an expert. For instance, if the court specifically 
requested for a high chief or a principal member of the community, the registrar would confirm 
to ensure the status of who is brought.  
 The registrar, on the instruction of the judge, issues a letter of invitation to an expert 
identified by either the parties or a community association of the particular customary law in 
issue. Some of the heterogeneous communities’ resident in Abuja have each established their 
respective community associations guided by their respective customary laws. The customary 
court of Appeal in Abuja has never had to request for an expert witness from the villages of 
origin of the communities but have instead, utilised the custodians of these customs in these 
community associations. A good example is the case of Iorshashe V Ugbu & Anor44 where the 
elders of the community who testified on the contents of Tiv customary law of succession and 
the concept of yanawaanngbin–a rule of succession – came from the community within the 
Federal Capital Territory and not from the State of origin.45 
 The experts invited have always honoured the invitation though they are not paid but 
are given just stipends by the court to barely cover their transportation and in some cases, 
inconveniences. Where the experts are requested by the parties, the parties are left to cater for 
the cost of bringing them. However, where the party is not able to bear the financial cost, they 
may make a special application to the court for assistance which may not be successful because 
of the fear of the being viewed as favouring one party against the other. Therefore, the efficacy 
of the registrar in identifying community association, confirming the status of the witnesses 
invited, and the court’s financial assistance to witnesses invited by the parties could directly or 
indirect affect the ascertainment process. The underlying aim is to ensure that credible 
evidence of living customary law is put before the court while it exercises its discretion in the 
ascertainment process.   
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6.2.1.7  Summary 
There are many factors the courts put into consideration in resolving evidential contradictions 
in the course of ascertaining and applying customary law and these cover a wide range. This 
reveals that a great deal of discretion is exercised by the court and is in certain instances, 
misapplied, i.e. applied outside the purview of the rules and principles of evidence, while in 
other instances they are utilised within the purview of the rules and principles of evidence. 
Other procedural factors such as the hindrance of technicalities, choice of court process in 
instituting an action and constrains of appellate courts emanate from the applicable rules of 
court but still affect the ascertainment and application of customary law either directly or 
indirectly. The accuracy of interpreters and the role of court registrars also contribute to what is 
put before the court for ascertainment. In all, the exercise of discretion by the judge in 
ascertaining and applying customary law is influenced by how these factors play out based on 
the discussion above. 
 
6.2.2  Socio-economic and political factors 
These factors cover the range of judges’ ideology and experience, transformation agenda and 
Constitutional mandate, inability to afford legal representation and incompetence of counsel, 
and the impact of the participation of non-governmental organizations and government 
commissions on the courts’ decisions. These are discussed below. 
6.2.2.1  Judges’ ideology and experience 
Judges have applied discretion to protect vulnerable rights and in particular, women’s rights. 
Such judges were influenced by a number of factors such as the profound impact of the 
knowledge of the historical background on the plight of the African widows. The basis for this is 
their vulnerability and their being viewed as the least protected under statist laws which 
includes distorted versions of customary law mainly for the benefit of the colonial and 
eventually the Apartheid government (for South Africa).   
 In South Africa, one of the judges interviewed talked extensively of his socialist ideology 
and revolutionary activities centred on nation building and the promotion of central principles 
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of the constitution focused on equal treatment of genders and social hierarchies. According to 
him, these define how he views customary law and influence how he exercises discretion in the 
ascertainment and application of customary law. In addition is his close observation of the 
negotiations at Kempton Park that involved the active participation of women’s groups who 
insisted on the recognition of customary law subject to the bill of rights. According to him, 
people did play an active role in defining how they want to be governed and the recognition 
accorded customary law by the Constitution reflects their desire and he would not overlook 
that in ascertaining and applying customary law to cases before him. 
 For the most part, there was little indication that male judges would rule differently 
from their female colleagues on gender issues simply on ground of their gender. The observed 
indication towards the protection of the rights of women and children is knowledge and 
experience of the plight of women irrespective of the gender of the judge.  The decisions 
against male primogeniture in the case of Ukeje v Ukeje at the Nigerian Supreme Court and the 
Bhe case at the South African Constitutional Court were endorsed by both male and female 
judges. However, for some female judges in one of the apex courts, the decision against male 
primogeniture was particularly significant. Having worked very closely with rural women who 
have suffered similar plights, they understood their challenges. Their position was also stirred 
by ‘the fear that in fact the promise of the Constitution would not live for women across [the 
country] if we didn’t make a very clear statement, that this rule is absolutely not acceptable.’46 
When questioned about male primogeniture, a Nigerian female judge looking indignant 
responded emotionally: 
How dare you now start to quote custom when there is glaring evidence 
that these two jointly put funds together… I still find it repugnant to 
endorse the view that a stranger who had nothing whatsoever to do with 
the property is now coming up to say that he is the sole beneficiary. 
She admitted that as a female judge who feels as a woman, the tendency to refrain from 
sanctioning a custom where a widow is deprived of her husband’s property is present.  It is also 
interesting to note that a male judge, when asked the same question, stated sarcastically that 
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he sees nothing wrong with the principle of male primogeniture and would endorse such 
customary practice if satisfactorily proved before him regardless of the equality rights in the 
Constitution. It is uncertain if his views are tied to his gender. For whatever reason, it is worthy 
to note that the cases of Ukeje v Ukeje & Orsa  which overruled male primogeniture, and 
Obusez v Obusez were heard at the court a quo by female judges. In the latter case, the judge 
applied the Lagos State Administration of Justice Law which prescribed the widow and her 
children as the heirs of the deceased estate as against the applicable customary law which 
excludes the widow. Also the lead judgement in the Supreme Court case of Anekwe v Nwekwe47 
which upheld the judgements of the Court of Appeal and lower courts annulling the male 
primogeniture rule was written by a female judge who prescribed punitive measures against 
anyone seeking to implement the male primogeniture rule. 
6.2.2.2  Transformation agenda and constitutional mandate 
The transformation agenda being effected by the South African State is a vital consideration in 
the appointment of judges, particularly to the Constitutional Court, and its impact cannot be 
ignored in the judges output in the exercise of discretion.48 The judges are conscious of the 
need to reflect this in the adjudicatory duties. One of the judges explained that: 
[T]he whole court was open to this dynamic way of looking at law in 
our new country because it was an old country trying to become a 
new country and it required fresh ways of thinking about everything 
not just about customary law, but fresh ways of thinking about land 
and land law. 
While in almost all the customary law cases heard in the Constitutional Court, most normative 
practices of particular communities were developed to accommodate constitutional values, the 
normative practices of some communities and the rights that ensue from them have also been 
upheld even as being in line with constitutional values.49 The courts, particularly the 
Constitutional Court, are mindful of the commitment to the transformation of the society from 
the injustices of the past to the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
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(2014) LPELR-22697(SC). 
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Based on empirical data obtained. 
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 Such as in the cases of Pilane v Pilane supra and Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 
(CCT19/03) [2003]  
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and freedom.50   Therefore, there is a commitment to correct the past experiences of injustice 
and the goal of adopting corrective measures to achieve equality and dignity. This is coupled 
with the constitutional obligation to apply and develop customary law and these may have 
influenced the Constitutional Court’s approach in ascertaining and applying customary law 
which has struggled between its recognition as an independent source of law and constitutional 
compliance. This may explain its strident steps towards ensuring constitutional compliance in 
the cases it has heard, a step which the Nigerian courts have taken cautiously.  
 
6.2.2.3  Inability to afford legal representation and incompetence of counsel 
This factor was not identified in the cases in the superior courts in South Africa.  Legal 
practitioners have a right of audience in all courts of law in Nigeria which includes the 
customary court. Appeals to the customary court of appeal emanate from the customary courts 
which are mainly patronised by people from the grass roots who may not necessarily afford 
legal representations. Therefore, it is not uncommon to sometimes find a litigant with no legal 
representation.  
Where there is legal representation on only one side, the other party is placed at a 
disadvantage even with respect to ascertainment of customary law. Such a litigant would not 
know the rules of evidence which are crucial to the judge’s assessment and determination of 
evidence since the judges are trained under Eurocentric curriculum and may not diffuse its 
influence in their duties as judges. In particular, such a litigant may not know what exactly 
should be put before the court, or carefully articulate his/her evidence in a manner that would 
clearly present his/her position. The litigant would not be a match for the expertise of the 
lawyer on the other side who would articulately present the case of his/her client in ways that 
would influence a favourable outcome which would include the ascertainment of the applicable 
customary law in the case.  
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‘Accordingly, it would seem that South African constitutionalism attempts to transform … society from one 
deeply divided by the legacy of a racist and unequal past, into one based on democracy, social justice, equality, 
dignity and freedom’. See Marius Pieterse ‘What do we mean when we talk about transformative 
constitutionalism?’  SA Publiekreg = SA Public Law, Volume 20, Issue 1, Jan 2005, p. 155 – 166 at 158. 
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In the case of Rifkat Dogo v Yuan Musa51, the plaintiff, a woman, with no understanding 
of the English language, a farmer and married with eight children had no legal representation at 
the customary court. She was no match for the defendant’s counsel and had no legal 
knowledge in the act of advocacy or the ability to know what should be proved in a court of 
law. She did not re-examine her witnesses even when there was need to do so and her cross-
examination was very shallow. The court gave judgement against her. She appealed against the 
whole judgement which included the decision on the content of the applicable customary law 
on the ground that the judge relied on evidence that was not presented, and was based on 
'speculations and conjectures of customs'. On appeal, she engaged the services of a lawyer who 
applied for leave to appeal out of time but gave no reason for the delay and the matter was 
struck out on that ground.  Even though the grounds of appeal were very cogent, it is a rather 
unfortunate case where the appellant never had the chance to present her case for 
reconsideration of the customary law ascertained and applied by the court below.   The 
appellate court did not have the chance to review the judgement, hence the distortions 
supposedly ascertained and applied by the court below remained in force. This case contrast 
with the case of Nwaigwe & Ors v Okere52which commenced from the customary court and 
went all the way to the Supreme Court. All through, both parties had legal representation and 
the systematic presentation of each party’s evidence with respect to the content of the 
applicable customary law were matched. Therefore, the ascertainment of the applicable 
customary law was not jeopardised due to inadvertence resulting from lack of legal 
representation.  
Another case on this point is the case of Adamu Garba v Dorcas Adamu.53 Though at the 
customary court neither party had legal representation, the appellant had no legal 
representation at the customary court of appeal while the respondent did. The court advised 
that he engage the services of a legal practitioner but he declined saying that he could conduct 
the appeal on his own. No brief of argument was filed. The respondent also submitted no brief 
of argument. The ground of appeal was his dissatisfaction with the judgement of the lower 
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Unreported CCA/CVA/9/2011. 
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Unreported SC/392/2002. 
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court granting divorce without a refund of his dowry which is contrary to Gbagyi native law and 
custom. The appellant argued that the court determined the case based on Yangoji native law 
and custom which was not applicable to the case and is often mistaken to be the same as the 
Gbayi native law and custom.  
The court upheld the decision of the customary court confirming the customary rule 
ascertained on the appellant’s failure to show evidence that there is indeed a distinction 
between Gbagyi and Yangoji customary law. Despite the court’s assistance in the formulation of 
issues for determination, the respondent failed to properly articulate his position before the 
court which was the basis of its decision with respect to the customary law ascertained and 
applied in the case at the lower court.  
With respect to incompetence of counsel is the case of Aragbui of Iragbui-Oba 
Olabomi& Anor v Olabode Oyewinle54 where the judgement of the court a quo in the 
ascertainment and application of the applicable customary law had many loopholes. The 
appellant’s counsel on appeal filed a lone ground of appeal and a two paged brief of argument 
leaving out several issues that should be addressed. Fortunately, the appellant replaced his 
counsel and engaged the services of another law firm which filed ten additional grounds of 
appeal and well-articulated particulars of argument and submitted a very comprehensive 
appellant's brief of argument of over 40 pages. Without calling further evidence, he utilised the 
evidence at the trial court and articulately made a very clear explanation of the issues.  The 
change in counsel and the expertise and meticulous engagement with the case gave the 
appellant the chance of properly presenting his case before the Court of Appeal and addressed 
evidential weight to be attached to the plaintiffs’ evidence on the content of the applicable 
customary law. The Court of Appeal ruled in the plaintiff’s favour. Thus, the engagement of a 
competent counsel can enhance the ascertainment of living customary law.  
 In the case of Audu Adamu Huri & Ors v Shuaibu Ismaila55 the court greatly criticised the 
counsel of the appellant for incompetence. The appellant did not have the chance to have the 
judgment of the court reviewed and had to live with the supposed ascertainment of the Bassa 
customary law on the paternity of a child carried out by the court a quo. The appellant claimed 
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that no customary law was proved to entitle the plaintiff/respondent to the paternity of the 
child but did not get the chance to make his case due to the incompetence of his counsel.    
 
6.2.2.4 The impact of the participation of non-governmental organizations and 
government commissions on the courts’ decisions 
So far, the role of non-governmental organizations and government commissions either as 
amici or as counsel representing the parties and even as litigants in some instances have had 
tremendous impact on the court with respect to the ascertainment and application of 
customary law. Amici get involved in such cases either through invitations by the court or 
through media publicity by journalists who regularly monitor the courts to see the cases filed. 
The journalists publicise such cases and interested amici apply to the court to be joined.  The 
cases in which such NGOs and commissions are attracted to are usually those that border on 
public interest litigation in which the litigants are vulnerable, uneducated, with very limited 
resources and having to take on formidable institutions and confront practices that have held 
them bondage, often for centuries. Clearly, such litigants lack the resources to engage the 
services of competent lawyers, sustain the litigation, and do what is necessary to present a 
good case before the court. What is necessary might entail bringing in experts evidence, fund 
investigations and research to be conducted by anthropologists, historians, sociologists etc. 
whose research and investigations might be enormous and span a number of years. Examples 
of such cases are stated below.  
The involvement of the Legal Resource Centre in Pilane v Pilane is notable. See also the 
case of Alexkor & Anor v Richtersveld & Ors56 where Legal Resource Centre represented the 
respondents. The case of Shilubana v Nwamitwa saw the involvement of three amici – the 
Commission for Gender Equality,57 National Movement of Rural Women and the Congress of 
Traditional Leaders of South Africa. The Bhe case also saw the involvement of the Commission 
for Gender Equality. South African Human Rights Commission and Women’s Legal Centre Trust 
were parties in one of the three cases determined with Bhe. 
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Established via section 187 of the Constitution. 
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An illustration of the significance of the role played by amici in litigation is the case of 
Bakgatla Ba Sesfikile Community v Bakgatla Ba Kafela Tribal Authority58 where there was no 
amici. Perhaps, if amici had been involved in the case the outcome might have been different. 
In this case, the first applicants made up of 52 families in their local community, sought the 
transfer of the property held in trust for them by the 2nd respondent who is the traditional 
leader of the 1strespondent the Bakgatla Ba Kafela Tribal Authority established by the 
Traditional Leadership and framework Act59 made up of 32 villages. Their story is that in 1912, 
their predecessors, impeded from owning properties in their names due to discriminatory laws, 
contributed in cash and livestock, and bought the property which is the subject of this dispute, 
for €800. This purchase was made in the name of the then traditional leader of the Bakgatla Ba 
Kafela community on the understanding that it would be held in trust on their behalf. Legal title 
was never transferred to the community leader by their predecessors. The title document 
capturing the transaction had been transferred over the years to succeeding community 
leaders until the 2nd respondent, who is purported as holding the property as communal land 
on behalf on the entire community.  
The list of contributors of the purchase price was kept by their predecessors (discreetly 
for fear of victimization) and explanation of the transaction has been passed down to them 
through oral history. According to the first applicants, under customary law: 
[T]he existence of a community is not restricted to recognition by 
national and provincial government and ownership of property must 
not be preceded by recognition of a group of people as a community 
or tribe in terms of the traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework act 2003 or the provincial act to that effect.  
Central to their case was the assertion that the applicable customary law then did not 
preclude them from owning land through purchase. However, the Achilles heel to their case 
was the absence of historical and anthropological evidence to confirm their position and the 
judge decided against them. The applicants could not financially sustain this case and the 
involvement of a public interest NGO might have engaged experts to carry out requisite 
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research and present same to the court. This would have aided the process of ascertainment by 
the court. 
In the case of Alexkor v Richtersveld, for instance, the involvement of NGOs and amici 
aided the ascertainment of the applicable customary law by making available to the court a 
number of documents and expert evidence for consideration. This aided the court in 
ascertaining the applicable customary law at the time the subject matter of the suit occurred.60 
It is also important to note that a characteristic of such litigations involving amici is that 
they often lead to the development of customary law. Usually, very strong arguments are 
presented with rich research outcomes encouraging the courts to develop customary law after 
it has been ascertained and found wanting.61 This is not surprising because after all, one of the 
main objectives of public interest litigation is social change and this would usually entail the 
development of customary law away from perceived oppressive features. 
 The contributions of amici are not restricted to the provision of resources and 
accessibility to experts.  The practice is that when amici are permitted, they must bring 
additional legal arguments other than those already before the court.62 These NGOs and 
commissions have at their disposal resources that enable extensive research that will benefit a 
more appropriate finding by the court than the parties in the cases. Often, they present 
broader issues for consideration by the court beyond that brought by the parties.  
The Constitutional Court admitted in Mayelane that the written and oral arguments of 
the parties and amici 'contributed much to the substance of the judgment'. In particular, it 
stated that ‘the amici have provided invaluable submissions throughout the proceedings before 
this Court’. That the amici’s submissions in response to this Court’s request for further 
information regarding Xitsonga customary law have been crucial to the outcome of this case.’63 
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 Survey-General’s reports,  colonial office letters,  the Select Committee documents of  1888,   Cape of Good 
Hope Correspondence and Report Relative to the Lands in Namaqualand set apart for the Occupation of Natives 
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The court has also relied on commission reports such as the South African Law Reform 
Commission as indication that certain normative practices of particular communities have 
developed. In this line, it is also vital to state here that the court is also reluctant to depart from 
findings of facts by Commissions with respect to ascertainment. The Constitutional Court has 
glowingly conveyed their regard for such finding in the case of Bapedi Marota Mamone v 
Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims and Others64 on the basis of the 
enormity of what the Commission undertook to get to its decision. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal had rejected the position of the Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and 
Claims on the ground that it was not credible. The commission was deliberately misled in its 
instructions by the respondents which affected their findings. Such was also the position of the 
court in Amantungwa & Ors v Mabuyakhulu.65 
6.2.2.5  Summary 
The range of factors discussed under this section are socio-economic and political in nature and 
cover judges’ ideology and experience, transformation agenda and Constitutional mandate, 
inability to afford legal representation and incompetence of counsel and the impact of the 
participation of non-governmental organizations and government commissions on the courts’ 
decisions. All these show that extrinsic factors aside from the applicable rules also impact on 
how judges exercise discretion in the ascertainment and application of customary law. Directly 
or indirectly, they also determine the considerations that affect the judges when evaluating 
evidence and consequently determine the quality of what is put before the court for 
consideration. 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed supplementary factors comprising of procedural and socio-economic 
and political factors that influence the ascertainment and application of customary law as they 
impact on how judges exercise discretion in determining the content of what is ascertained and 
applied to cases before them. The procedural factors include – considerations in the resolution 
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of evidential contradictions, the hindrance of technicalities, choice of court process in 
instituting an action, accuracy of interpreters, the role of court registrars, and constrains of 
appellate courts. The socio-economic and political factors include the judges’ ideology and 
experience, transformation agenda and Constitutional mandate, inability to afford legal 
representation, incompetence of counsel and the impact of the participation of non-
governmental organizations and government commissions on the courts. 
The range of these factors glaringly indicates that judges necessarily exercise discretion 
in the process of ascertainment and application and these discretion are often wide and 
sometimes misplaced, go outside the legal framework applicable to the process of 
ascertainment and application of customary law. They cover the range of the professional and 
extraneous experiences of the judges’, their orientation, their mandate, professional expertise, 
requisite knowledge or the lack of it and incompetence. Notwithstanding, they impact on how 
judges exercise discretion in this process and reveal the mind-set of the judges as they do this, 
at least to an extent. These factors also impede or ensure the ascertainment and application of 
living customary law and should be carefully considered to ensure that they do not block the 
ascertainment and application of living customary law by the courts of superior jurisdiction in 
Nigeria and South Africa. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Factors that influence the ascertainment of customary law in the lower courts in 
Nigeria and South Africa. 
 
7.1  Introduction 
This chapter focuses on identifying the factors that influence how lower courts in Nigeria and 
South Africa ascertain and apply customary law. At the lower courts in Nigeria are the 
magistrate courts, customary courts and area courts; in South Africa are the magistrate courts 
and the courts of chiefs and headmen. Area courts and magistrate courts are excluded here 
since in the Federal Capital Territory, they do not ordinarily apply customary law. The courts 
discussed in this chapter are quite distinct in particular ways from what may be seen as their 
counterparts across the two jurisdictions. Their similarities and differences are probed in order 
to discover how certain goals are achieved differently.1 A reference to each of the court types in 
this chapter also indicates the particular country where they are based.2 The use of the terms 
‘magistrate’ connotes a reference to the magistrate court, ‘judge’ connotes a reference to the 
customary court unless indicated otherwise, and ‘chief/headman’ connotes a reference to the 
chiefs’ and headmen’s court. 
 At the initial stage of this chapter is a brief overview of the establishment and 
jurisdictions of these courts. Their distinctions in jurisdiction and form are stated and factors 
that influence how the judges ascertain and apply customary law are identified and most of 
these factors are common across the court types in both jurisdictions. Where the factors are 
distinct or feature differently for any particular court type, it is indicated. The primary data 
utilised here were garnered from the interviews conducted with the judges, magistrates, court 
registrars, clerks, chiefs and counsellors triangulated with records of proceedings of cases heard 
by these courts as well as relevant laws and rules of court.  
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John C. Reitz ‘How to do comparative law’ (1998) AJCL 622. 
2
For instance, a reference to the customary court in the discussion indicates that the situation in Nigeria is being 
discussed. 
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As with the two previous chapters, this chapter is located on the premise of the concepts and 
theories discussed in chapter two and confirm that judges do exercise discretion in the 
ascertainment and application of customary law and that this discretion is often widely 
exercised. The factors identified are broadly classified under the categories of institutional, 
substantive and procedural. Again, I state that these categorizations are based on my own 
parametres and are meant for easier discussions. Even though they broadly appear similar with 
those identified from the superior courts, in details they distinctly reflect the peculiarities of the 
nature and structure of the lower courts. This chapter supports the premise that where 
discretion applies, it is influenced by a number of factors which are also intrinsic and external to 
the applicable rules of court. It also states that there is another form of discretion which 
exercised in the purview of the flexibility of customary law which is contextual but is discretion 
nonetheless. 
 
7.2 Lower courts with jurisdiction to hear matters of customary law – Nigeria (Abuja, FCT) 
and South Africa (North West Province) 
 
These courts are briefly discussed below: 
 
7.2.1  Customary courts in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja – A brief background 
Abuja, as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Nigeria, is located in central Nigeria and carved 
out of the Northern Region. It is originally comprised of mainly Gbagyi, Toro, Ganagana, 
Gwandara and Bassa speaking people.3 Being the Federal Capital Territory and housing the 
headquarters of federal ministries and parastatals, it has a diverse population comprising 
peoples of the diverse language groups and other communities in Nigeria.  
With respect to the adjudication of customary law, as in other Northern States, different 
grades of Area Courts were established in the FCT with jurisdiction over cases of customary law. 
However in 2007, being a FCT for the entire Country, customary courts were established to also 
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See ‘A Brief Overview of Abuja (Federal Capital Territory)’ available at 
http://www.abujagalleria.com/Abuja/about-abuja.html (accessed on 28/12/2016). See also ‘Abuja’ available at 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Abuja (accessed on 28/12/2016).  
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reflect the structure in the Southern part of the Country.  However, since these customary 
courts were given the sole jurisdiction over customary law matters, the area courts were 
divested of their jurisdiction over same.4 The customary courts are therefore the sole courts of 
first instance in customary law adjudication in the formal court structure.5 
The customary courts in the FCT have two certain distinguishing features from other 
customary courts in Southern Nigeria and their counterparts called area courts in Northern 
Nigeria. First is the fact that despite the provisions of the Customary Court Act which provides 
for the establishment of different grades of A, B and C customary courts, it has only the highest 
grade which is grade A.6 Secondly, only qualified legal practitioners sit as its judges.7 Appeals go 
from these customary courts to the Customary Court of Appeal, FCT on customary law matters 
and to the FCT High Court on other matters not related to customary law.8 The FCT customary 
courts are in the different Local Government Councils (LGC) of the FCT which consist of Abaji, 
Abuja Municipal, Gwagwalada, Kuje, Bwari and Kwali.  Interviews were conducted in customary 
courts situated in four locations within three LGC which are Dutse (Bwari LGC), Kubwa (Bwari 
LGC), Gwagwalada LGC, and Garki (Abuja Municipal LGC situated in the heart of the City).  
The customary courts exercise jurisdiction only over persons who reside within the FCT 
and submit to its jurisdiction.9 The applicable customary laws in a case are those to which the 
person agrees to be subject to, or that are applicable to a person’s community of origin, or 
customary law applicable in a location where a person does an act, or that is applicable to an 
estate on which a person makes a claim.10 The scope of the customary courts’ jurisdiction 
covers issues bordering on customary law, on succession and administration of estate, 
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The area courts had jurisdiction over customary law and Islamic law. The Area courts later became Islamic courts 
after customary law matters were transferred to the newly formed customary courts even though they are still 
called area courts. The judges at the area court who were not learned in Islamic law but were versed in customary 
law were eased out of the system and could not be absorbed into the customary courts because the customary 
courts employed only legal practitioners as judges.  
5
See sections 62-64 which are transitional provisions of the FCT Customary Court Act no.8 2007. 
6
Section 1 (1) and the Schedule to the Act ibid. 
7
Section 4 (1) (a) & (b) ibid. 
8
 These matters pertain to procedures and statutes.  
9
Section 14 (1) of the Act. 
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Section 18 (1). 
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matrimonial causes, custody and guardianship of children, civil causes that pertain to debt and 
demand of dowry and damages.11 
The procedure in this court commences with an aggrieved person filing a case in the 
court. The defendant is then notified and responds to the plaintiff’s claim in person as to 
whether the plaintiff’s complaint is true or not. The plaintiff is then given the opportunity to 
state his/her case and calls witnesses to testify in his/her favour.12 The court will then 
determine the case through a ruling on whether or not the defendant has a case to answer. 
Where the court finds that the defendant has a case to answer, the defendant is then invited to 
present his/her defense before the court. The defendant may choose to testify and call 
witnesses to testify on his/her behalf and then close his/her case. It is at the stage of testifying 
before the court that evidence is led towards the ascertainment of the applicable customary 
law. A final address is made by either party or their counsel and the court gives its judgment 
applying the customary law ascertained.13 This brief narration gives insight into the operation of 
the courts on which the analysis below is conducted for the identification of the factors that 
influence its ascertainment and application of customary law. 
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Section 14 (2) and Part 1 of the Schedule to the Customary Court Act. Note that the court has jurisdiction over 
other civil claims outside customary law under certain debts, demands and damages. See also section 16. 
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Order 9 rules (1) & (2), order 10 rules (4) & (5) of the FCT Customary Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2007. 
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Order 10 rules (6) – (7) & (9) of the rules ibid. 
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7.2.2  The courts of chiefs and headmen South Africa – a brief background 
The Bahurutshe, sometimes called Lehurutshe, are part of the Bakwena tribe which are 
sometimes known as the Bakon14 and descended from the Tswana people part of whomare 
located in the North West Province of South Africa.15 Interviews were conducted in three courts 
in Gopane, Dinokana and Moshana Lencoe from which appeals go to the magistrate court at 
Lehurutshe. These three communities’ courts are part of the six communities that fall under the 
clan of Bahurutshe. These communities are Bagalencoe (Moshana Lencoe), Gopane, Dinokana, 
Suting, Tshiete, and Motswedi. 
These courts of chiefs and headmen were established by the Blacks Administration Act16 
with jurisdiction to hear customary law cases. The courts of chiefs are composed of traditional 
leaders and their counsellors while the headmen sit as judges in headmen courts. Though the 
Black Administration Act is repealed,17 these courts still subsist by virtue of section 16 (1) of 
Schedule 6 of the South African Constitution which states: 
Every court, including courts of traditional leaders existing when 
the new Constitution took effect, continues to function to 
exercise jurisdiction in terms of the legislation applicable to it, 
and anyone holding office as a judicial officer continues to hold 
office in terms of the legislation applicable to that office, subject 
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Mpotokwan J ‘A short history of the bahurutshe of king motebele, senior son of King Mohurut’ Botswana (1974) 
6 NR 37 available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40959208.pdf (accessed on 20/11/2016). 
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to- (a) any amendment or repeal of that legislation; and (b) 
consistency with the new Constitution. 
In addition, section 211 (1) of the Constitution specifically recognizes the ‘institution, status and 
role of traditional leadership, according to customary law’ which is also subject to the 
Constitution. In the Recertification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
199618case, the Constitutional Court affirmed these provisions as ensuring the continued 
existence and legitimacy of the courts of chiefs and headmen and their adjudicatory roles in the 
constitutional era.19According to Himonga et al ‘the perpetuation of the institution meets the 
needs of the indigenous people in the communities who otherwise would have challenges 
accessing other mediums to seek justice’.20 
The jurisdiction of this court is conferred by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development on any traditional leader appointed or empowered by the Act.21 Jurisdiction is 
limited to civil matters of customary law and custom between black persons who reside within 
the community. It excludes matrimonial causes deriving from statutory and customary law 
marriages. The court can however hear cases of petty crimes. 
The courts of chiefs and headmen are located in the particular rural community of the 
chiefs. They are traditional institutions co-opted into the formal court structures because they 
are statutorily recognized and regulated.  Appeal goes from the court of chiefs and headmen to 
the magistrate courts, then to the high court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and finally to the 
Constitutional Court if it raises constitutional issues such as the violation of Constitutional 
rights.22 
The Chiefs’ and Headmen’s Civil Court Rules23 regulate their proceedings throughout 
South Africa. Section 1 of this Rules provides that ‘the recognized customs and laws of the tribe’ 
shall regulate procedures on civil claims and legal practitioners have no right of audience in the 
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 This is an unprecedented case in which the court affirmed that the provisions of the proposed Constitution is in 
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court.24 Adjudication is participatory and everyone present may participate in examination of 
the parties and their witnesses. Chiefs and headmen’s courts in North West Province keep 
written records of proceedings.25 
The chief’s court sits as an appellate court over the decisions of khotlas, i.e. headmen, 
either with the kothlas or with the council made up of the chief’s uncles and are well advanced 
in age. For Gopane, the chief sits with his kothlas on certain days to hear any matter referred 
from the kothlas which could it not resolve, or considers above its jurisdiction to resolve. 
Matters could also be referred from one kothla to another if the headman is not confident that 
he would be unbiased.26 The matters that come before the chief are generally in areas of cattle, 
marriage, seduction, breach of promise, claim of fields, misconducts etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7.2.3  The magistrate court 
Interviews were conducted in the magistrate courts at Lehurutshe and Mafikeng and the 
regional magistrate court also at Mafikeng. The magistrate court is comprised of the regional 
and the district courts established by the Magistrate Court Act.27 Its jurisdiction is territorial.  
                                                          
24
Rule 5. 
25
Step 7 sub (3) of Guidelines and Procedures Department of the President’s Administration in Tribal and 
Community Authority Offices enabled by the Bophuthatswana Code Traditional Courts Act 29 of 1979. 
26
 In the case of Moruakgomo David Molefe v Sello Solomon Mokgatlhe Unreported Bahurutshe Ba Ga Gopane 
Tribal Court Case No. 03/2002 the plaintiff had filed the case in the defendant’s kothla but it was transferred to the 
head kothla because the first headman admitted to being afraid of the defendant. 
27
 Magistrate Court Act 32 of 1944 as amended. 
Features of courts of chiefs and 
headmen 
Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act not 
used. 
Lay men as judges 
Lawyers cannot 
appear 
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The Magistrate Court’s Rules regulate its proceedings.28 The criminal jurisdiction of the regional 
courts for which assessors are engaged are excluded here29 because this thesis is restricted to 
the engagement of customary law in civil cases.30 The district magistrate courts hear appeals 
from the courts of chiefs and headmen.31These appeals are not conducted in the conventional 
style because the cases are heard denovo as in a court of first instance.  Though some of the 
cases on appeal may not involve customary law per se, such as cases of petty theft, some do.  
The procedure in the magistrate court is similar to that of the customary courts in 
Nigeria except that the magistrates sit with assessors. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
7.3 Factors that influence the ascertainment of customary law in the lower courts 
The factors that determine how judges ascertain and apply customary law at the lower courts 
are not exactly the same for the customary courts and the magistrate courts on the one hand, 
and the courts of chiefs and headsmen on the other hand for obvious reasons. The first is that 
these courts differ in nature. While the former broadly speaking are English styled, the latter is 
a cooption of a traditional institution legitimated in the community where it serves. The second 
is that they are manned by judges whose competence is measured differently. The former have 
qualified legal practitioners schooled in Eurocentric concepts while the courts of chiefs and 
headsmen are measured by their knowledge of the customary practices of their community 
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 GN R1108 in Regulation Gazette 980 of 1968 as amended by GN R 880 GG26601 of 2004. 
29
 Section 93 Magistrate Court Act. 
30
 They hear matters on divorce and child custody where customary law is applied 
31
 Section 29 (a) Magistrate Courts Act. 
Courts of chiefs and headsmen Magistrate courts 
Lower courts with jurisdiction to hear 
customary law matters in South Africa 
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where they are and how they apply these two cases before them. The third is the 
epistemological differences of the requisite knowledge. While that of the magistrate has 
leanings to positivism, the other is rooted in a different jurisprudential sphere under legal 
pluralism. Yet these courts have to apply customary law which they may do differently at least 
to an extent. The magistrates hear appeals from decisions of the chiefs’ courts and sit with two 
assessors to do so. The customary courts utilise experts, i.e. people versed in the particular 
customary law who are usually chiefs or elders from the community.  
This segment therefore identifies factors that may be peculiar to each court, or may be 
common to all. The discussion indicates whether the factors identified apply to each or all of 
these courts. These courts are treated together in this chapter simply because they fall under 
the category of lower courts according to how the chapters are arranged. The factors identified 
are discussed below as institutional, substantive and procedural. 
7.3.1   Institutional factors 
As explained for the superior courts, these factors are associated by a common feature which is 
that they occur, either directly or indirectly, as a consequence of institutional arrangements. 
They comprise exposure to customary law, hierarchy of magistrate courts over customary 
courts, systems of consultations, impact of the state law on customary law and the engagement 
of lawyers.  
7.3.1.1  Exposure to customary law 
All the judges in the customary courts and the magistrate courts are qualified legal practitioners 
and the contents of their formal training as it relates to customary law is sparse and does not 
adequately prepare them for adjudication in customary law cases.32 The magistrates 
interviewed admit to not having the expertise to adjudicate on customary law matters but for 
the assistance of assessors. Though the judges in the customary courts primarily hear 
customary law matters, they had no special training on customary law during their studies 
except for one of the judges who had extensive exposure to customary law during his study due 
to the special interest of one of his lecturers. The situation with some of the magistrates is 
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 The content of their training is similar to that discussed under 5.2.1.1.1 in chapter five. 
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similar.  All the customary court judges interviewed are from other parts of the Country outside 
the communities indigenous to the location of the courts.33 Yet, these judges all hear matters 
that require the application of different customary laws including that of the community where 
the courts are situated as a result of the cosmopolitan and heterogeneous residents of the 
FCT.34 
For both the magistrates and the judges, their exposure to their respective indigenous 
customary laws were either extensive, moderate or none. This is either because they grew up in 
their community of origin or had spent some time there, or they grew up outside their 
community of origin, such as in a township or in an urban area, with no exposure to customary 
law. While the magistrates had only worked as prosecutors prior to their appointment as 
magistrates and had no or very little engagement in customary law at that level, some of the 
judges had extensively handled customary law cases while in legal practice before their 
appointments.35 Yet these magistrates hear appeal from the decisions of the courts of chiefs 
and headmen and sometimes overrule the decisions of the chiefs. Judges with little prior 
experience in customary law also serve as customary court judges. In judicial capacity, the 
experience gained in adjudication on customary law issues has helped both the judges and 
magistrates in appreciation of its concepts and nature. 
With the deficiencies in the training of these judges and magistrates, trainings that aid 
judges and magistrates in ascertaining customary law could be adopted to augment this 
challenge but this is not given the seriousness it deserves. In Nigeria, there have been seminars 
and workshops organized on customary law to aid the judges in its adjudication even though 
they are sparsely done.36 Judges have indicated the usefulness of these seminars/workshops 
but not all judges have had the opportunity to attend them due to cost. In South Africa, the 
                                                          
33
Except a retired area court judge who served as a lay judge under the area court before the establishment of the 
customary court in the FCT. He was relieved of his appointment because he was not a qualified legal practitioner. 
34
Such as the case of Haruna Kaye v Yusuf Sarki where none of the judges who presided is from the community of 
the subjects within the jurisdictional location of the court. 
35
The reason for this could be that magistrates may be normally appointed from prosecutors and they are not 
usually exposed to customary law in their line of work. 
36
 The Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies organized one in 2014 and some judges were sponsored by the 
government to attend. See also the All Lower Court Judges Biannual Conference in Nigeria. 
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magistrates interviewed stated that there have been no seminars and workshops organized to 
educate them on the concept of customary law and its adjudication but some are in view. 
It is vital to also mention here that the residual knowledge of the judges and magistrates 
one way or the other influences how they exercise discretion in the ascertainment and 
application of customary law. The residual knowledge is either based on Eurocentric 
conceptions of law derived from their training or based on their own perception of what they 
think the content of the applicable customary law is. The latter is especially so where they are 
from the community where the courts are located.  
With respect to the chiefs and headmen, there are no formal academic requirements for 
their appointment and they are therefore gauged under different parametres, i.e. their 
‘familiarity’ with the applicable customary law which is recognized as one of the advantages of 
the court.37  One of the traditional leaders was born and grew up in his community of origin. He 
attended a school for chief’s leadership in 1969 within the North West Province and thereafter 
took up other employment in another town not related to customary law. He returned to 
become as a chief in the community in 1985 after the death of his father who was a chief. He 
was born in 1946.  
The second traditional leader was born in 1954 in his community which is also where he 
grew up. He was educated as a teacher and commenced the study of law at the university 
before he dropped out in his second year. He worked as a recruitment officer for the public 
service commission until he returned to the village in 2000 and worked closely with his father in 
the administration of the village until his father passed on in 2001. He was appointed as the 
chief in 2002 to replace his father. His knowledge of customary law was based on his lived 
experience and the oral education he obtained from his elders.  
The third traditional leader is the eldest son of the last chief. He was born in the village 
and grew up there except for a four year absence in his teens and when he worked at the mines 
in Rustenburg after his matric. He returned in 2013 to succeed his father just about a year to 
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 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 82 Project 90 The Harmonization of the Common Law and 
Indigenous Law: Traditional Courts and the Judicial Function of Traditional May, 1999 2.  
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the date of the interview. He appeared a bit uncertain about the contents of customary law and 
referred me to his uncle who according to him, ‘knows everything’.  
In summary, the training received by magistrates and judges, as one of them stated, 
‘was a general overview’ and not sufficient to prepare them in the adjudication of customary 
law cases particularly with respect to its ascertainment and application. This training cannot on 
its own enhance the exercise of discretion towards living customary law. However, juxtaposed 
with other factors discussed in this chapter, their ascertainment and application of living 
customary law may be aided. While the chiefs are more suited from their exposure to apply 
living customary law to cases before them, the deliberations with kothlas and elders make this 
even more guaranteed.  
 
7.3.1.2  Systems of consultations 
There are systems of consultations utilised in the lower courts of both jurisdictions with 
differing effects. The systems of consultation utilised in the customary courts aid the exercise of 
discretion towards the ascertainment of living customary law because these consultations make 
relevant information available to the court for consideration. The term ‘systems of 
consultations’ is used here to collectively refer to the different types of consultations that take 
place at the lower courts. These extend beyond the use of assessors and amici as done at the 
higher courts to include information received outside the formal sittings of the courts.  
In Nigeria, where there is contradiction in what constitutes the content of the applicable 
customary law, the courts have invited chiefs either on its own motion or as suggested by the 
parties. This is in order to obtain further evidence from the community indigenous to the FCT 
where it pertains to its customary law as in the case of Dorcas Adamu v Adamu Garba.38Here, a 
title holder in the palace of Sarkin Pada of yangodi was invited by the court to testify on the 
content of the applicable customary law.39With respect to tribal communities outside the FCT, 
the courts have also invited chiefs from the communities’ tribal associations based in the FCT. 
This is for reasons tied to convenience, cost effectiveness and the more likelihood of the 
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Unreported FCT/CC/YAN/CV/31/2013. 
39
His testimony was with respect to whether the bride price and the cost of the wedding ceremony should be 
refunded by the bride at the dissolution of marriage. 
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presentation of the variations that may have evolved in the particular urban community. Such 
was the case in Ukauwa & Ors v Chineye & Ors40where the chief of the Igbo community in the 
FCT was invited to testify on the content of the customary law of the community with respect 
to where a deceased titled holder shoulder be buried.41 
The court usually gives the parties the chance to suggest whom they would want the 
court to invite but the court sometimes chooses whom to invite and prefer that the parties 
have no prior knowledge of who is being invited for the sake of neutrality and, the credibility of 
the evidence to be presented. An instance is the case of Haruna Kaye v Yusuf Sarki42 where 
after the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties, the court, after the visit to the Locus in 
quo, invited the oldest and second oldest men, and the chief Imam of the village to testify on 
the content of the applicable customary law. After answering questions put to them by the 
court, counsel to both parties cross examined them. These consultations aid the court is in 
determining living customary law. 
One of the flaws to this system of consultations is where an expert suggested by a party 
fails to appear, and the court is left with the evidence of that invited by the other party which is 
not in favour of the opposing party. In such an instance, the court took the position of the 
evidence of the chief which agreed with the version of the party by whose suggestion he was 
summoned with regard to whether, at the dissolution of marriage under customary law, only 
the bride price should be returned without the customary gifts.43 The court’s exercise of 
discretion was based on the evidence before it without credence to what the other evidence 
might have been had the other chief testified.  Another flaw is where litigants cannot afford the 
cost of bringing these traditional experts, since some of the courts do not cover the expenses of 
the witnesses summoned.  
There are instances where the evidence of the independent witness summoned by the 
court is not convincing. A judge explained that in such an instance, she further consults other 
persons who may be in a position to have the requisite knowledge as well as other superior 
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Unreported FCT/CC/GWA/CV/13/2011. 
41
Title holder simply means a person bestowed with a form of honourary recognition by his community. 
42
Unreported FCT/JD/CC/Kwa/CV.15/11. 
43
Based on interview conducted. 
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officers and colleagues as to what to do. She further consults texts and precedents on the 
matter as a guide. These further consultations have their loopholes where the information 
gotten is not made available to the parties for examination. Other loopholes are the limitations 
of texts and precedents. 
Also, the court can require any person present to give evidence where it is of the 
opinion that the evidence may be relevant to the matter as in the case of Dorcas Adamu v 
Adamu Garba.44 Here, the court formally adopted the assertions of the petitioner’s father as 
testimony on the content of the applicable customary law on divorce with respect to the 
requirements for a valid divorce.45 The father was in court to ask for more time to explore 
reconciliation between the parties and merely responded to the court’s questions as to the 
content of the applicable customary law on divorce. The court asked subsequently if his 
response could be adopted as evidence on the applicable customary law to which he agreed. 
He subsequently took an oath and his testimony was regarded by the court as that of an expert. 
The step taken by the court was made possible by the court rules which allowed for a flexible 
trial to enable the court to take certain steps for the overall aim of attaining justice.46 
In South Africa, the application of customary law in the court is mainly done by the 
magistrates and the chiefs in their respective courts even though they both consult with 
persons regarded as being conversant in the applicable customary law. This is not on the same 
basis since the magistrates are not necessarily versed in the customary laws but the reverse is 
generally the case for the chiefs. While the chiefs sit with a group of councilors, the magistrates 
operate with the assistance of assessors. These assessors sit with the magistrates and hear the 
testimonies of the witnesses in court, and then give their opinion with respect to the veracity of 
the testimonies and the issues raised from the perspective of customary law.  
Crucial to the magistrates exercising their discretion appropriately is how versed the 
persons who serve as assessors are in the applicable customary law. Assessors are appointed 
through the office of the Premier. Persons appointed as assessors are presumed to be versed in 
the customary law of their respective communities.  Though chiefs sometimes serve as 
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Supra. 
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This is in accordance with section 34 of the Act. 
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Order 11 rule 2 FCT Customary Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007. 
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assessors in the district and regional courts, persons who have lived in the community and are 
usually advanced in age are usually appointed even from retired teachers, policemen and civil 
servants.  
When faced with a case in which the customary law ought to be ascertained, the 
magistrates would consult from the list of assessors and nominate two to sit with them on a 
case. These assessors advise the magistrate in chambers when the case of being determined. 
This system of consultations should enhance the ascertainment and application of living 
customary law but this is determined by the assessors’ knowledge and credibility  
On the other hand, the chiefs and headmen’s court sit with their councilors who fully 
participate in the cases and where the chiefs are in doubt with respect to any particular 
customary practice, they consult with their councilors. This is necessary because the chiefs are 
sometimes young or may have been recalled from other places outside the community to 
assume their position after the demise of their predecessors. As such, they need time to be 
properly groomed in the customs and traditions of the community and may come across cases 
where they will need the guidance of the councilors. This system of consultations no doubt has 
greatly aided the ascertainment and application of living customary law.  
At the community level, there are also some form of referrals from the headmen court 
to the chief’s court and vice versa. Where the headmen regard the matters to be too serious for 
them to hear and where the chief believes that the issue raised in a matter should be addressed 
internally within the family, referrals are made. In all circumstances, where customary law is 
applicable, it is done by those best suited to do so and hence enhances the application of the 
living customary law. Also not directly connected to this is the procedure at the chief’s court 
hearing an appeal from the headman’s court where the headman can be summoned to testify 
and explain the reasons for his decision. This no doubt will enhance a discretion towards the 
ascertainment and application of living customary law by bringing to bear issues that may be 
relevant to content and variations of the applicable customary law.47 
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See the case of Kharu Matlhoko v Bothonoka Pheto Unreported Magistrate Court Lehurutshe case no. 04/11 
where the chief’s court hearing appeals from the headman’s court summoned the headman who explained the 
reasons for his decision. 
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One of the chiefs, where there is uncertainty within the councilors, would further 
consult with some elders in the village and within the chieftainship which include his aunties 
and nephews and other chiefs who are outside the community but are his brothers. Another 
chief consults with the elders and the magistrate. Another explained that he consults with the 
elders and the magistrate before he passes judgment when he is faced with a difficulty in the 
application of customary law. He states that though he is not required to consult with the 
magistrate, he does so all the same to be able to integrate customary law to constitutional 
standards.  With respect to purely customary law matters however, he consults with his elders 
who sit with him and are presumed to be versed in customary law and may adjourn a case for 
in-depth consultation. These elders are also from the royal family. Their role is advisory and the 
final decision lies with him. Where the elders disagree on the content of the customary law, he 
further consults other elders who are outside the court for advice and he also follows his 
instinct and personal knowledge.   
Where a case requires the application of a customary law foreign to the community, the 
chiefs’ courts handle this differently. One chief explained that the foreign community of the 
party will first be confirmed, and then the chief of the foreign community will be contacted 
through a letter relating the issues in detail. Thereafter, someone may either be sent to the 
foreign community or from the foreign community to sit over the matter together with the host 
community. Both chiefs on the same hierarchy may jointly preside over the matter or a 
headman or one of the tribal authority may be sent to join in presiding over the matter. Such 
matters are usually amicably settled by both chiefs/ headmen and dissatisfied parties appeal to 
the magistrate courts.  
Another chief would invite the family and elders of the foreigner who are versed in the 
particular custom as suggested by the party to participate in the adjudication for their inputs. 
Another chief however, would refer any such matter to the magistrate for resolution. On my 
enquiry as to why he has not considered collaborating with the chiefs and headmen of such 
persons with respect to resolving such disputes, he expressed that he would endeavor to try 
this practice should he be faced with a similar situation. The consultations adopted by the first 
two chiefs would lead more towards the ascertainment of living customary law.  
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The systems of consultations practiced by the customary courts and the magistrate 
courts differ on the ground that for the customary courts in Nigeria, the parties often have a say 
as to the experts to be invited and these experts are subject to cross examination by the 
opposing party. For the magistrate courts in South Africa, on the other hand, the parties have 
no say in the assessors selected to sit with the magistrate. These assessors are also not subject 
to cross examination and cannot be challenged on their knowledge of the applicable customary 
law. Yet based on their inputs, the magistrate court can annul the decisions of the chiefs’ 
courts. Therefore, the practice of the customary is more likely to lead towards the 
ascertainment of living customary law. With respect to the chiefs and headmen courts, their 
systems of consultation aid the exercise of discretion towards living customary law beyond that 
utilised by both the magistrate and customary court, except the consultation with the 
magistrate which raises caution. 
 
7.3.1.3  Hierarchy of magistrate courts over chiefs and headmen’s courts 
On appeal, magistrates may confirm or overrule the decisions of the chiefs and 
headmen on the content of the applicable customary law which the chiefs and headmen are 
better versed in. The chances that the magistrate might err in their exercise of discretion in 
ascertaining and applying living customary law to the particular case is there even with the aid 
of assessors. This is even so where the assessors are unaware of the variations and nuances of 
the particular clan or family.   
Although these assessors are sometimes chiefs, the mode of trial at the chiefs and 
headmen courts presents more avenue for the application of living customary law due to the 
deliberation of the entire council of chiefs who are well versed in the applicable customary law. 
Added to this is the less tendency for bias having regard to the number of the council members 
which are sometimes up to twelve as opposed to just two assessors that sit with 
magistrates.48In addition, there is the ability to capture the nuances and give particular 
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These members range from about 7 to 12 in number. See Mongae Tiro V Sebogodi Israel Bahurutshe Ba Ga 
Gopane Tribal Court Case No. 15/2003 and Molokwane Modise Vs Molokwane Semakaleng Tribal Court of 
Bahurutshe Ba Ga Gopane Case No. 01/2011. The record of proceedings in the case of Magakala M. Versus 
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attention to the circumstances of the cases before them which reflects the flexibility of 
customary law. This is very crucial in the application of customary law because in such 
instances, what is at play is not just the customary rules but the encompassed social, economic 
and relational context geared towards reconciliation, restoration and justice. Who then is 
better situated to address this than the chiefs and headmen who live within the communities 
and are familiar with the situations? Discretion is at play on how this is resolved relying on 
general rules but applying the customary norms contextually. 
The records of appeal sent to the magistrate court from the chiefs and headmen’s court 
contain the facts and evidence before the court and the court’s decision which is devoid of any 
analysis. These records are handwritten by the tribal clerk during the trial in minute form 
usually in the Tswana language. The nature of the appeal proceedings at the magistrate court 
differs from the higher courts in that the proceedings entail both the use of the records of 
proceedings from the chiefs’ court and a fresh presentation of evidence which may include 
bringing people knowledgeable in the customary practices of the community to testify.  
The customary courts in the FCT do not have the privilege of being manned by the local 
chiefs and elders versed in the applicable customary law but the chiefs and elders  can be 
summoned to court to testify on the contents of the applicable customary law when needful. 
Also, appeals from the customary courts go to the customary court of appeal manned by judges 
who are supposed to be learned in customary law.49 The customary court of appeal sits in a 
panel of three and does not utilise assessors but may invite experts in the applicable customary 
law when necessary. The court works with a more detailed record of proceedings and usually 
an analytical judgement from the customary courts which gives them insights into the 
considerations and analysis of the basis for the decision. The customary court of appeal 
cautiously refrains from altering decisions of the customary courts unless a clear case of 
injustice is revealed even with respect to the content of customary law ascertained and applied 
by the court below. Not having local chiefs as judges cannot be down played as far as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Magakgala Magogwe Unreported Bahurutshe Ba Ga Gopane Tribal Court Case No. 02/2012 reveal such 
engagement of members of the council and others from the audience in the hearing of a case. 
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Even though it is not necessarily the case. See 5.2.1.1.1 in chapter five. 
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ascertaining and applying customary law is concerned. The utilization of chiefs and elders as 
experts however, would aid the ascertainment and application process.   
The material in this and the next sections would be interesting for an article on how 
living customary law evolves.  
7.3.1.4  Impact of the state law on customary law 
Flowing from the consultations of magistrates by chiefs in their adjudication mentioned 
above, is how the state laws impact on the application of customary law by the chiefs who 
ordinarily should apply living customary law.  This is a challenge to the application of living 
customary law by the chiefs and headmen’s courts. One of the chiefs admits to having a 
transitional experience in trying to strike a balance between keeping the customary laws on the 
one hand, and civil laws and democracy on the other. He explained a form of intermingling to 
accommodate the civil system within the framework of the values of customary law as he 
expressed in his own words: 
It’s a form of a transition  ... you see still keeping the customary 
kind of laws and traditional ones at the same time, we are not 
stagnant to it … we are sort of flexible to the new laws and 
democratic ones so the two find one another. 
 
Another chief expressed a form of dilemma. While he is very reluctant to develop 
customary law to bring it in line with the Constitution because he would want to protect 
customary law and its values as well as the Constitution, he will try to ‘strike a balance’ in every 
possible way to harmonise the provision of the Constitution and customary law by 
compromising on both sides. According to him: 
We should bear it in mind that even if it is a customary law, it’s 
got to be subject to the constitution.  It’s got to be in line with 
the constitutional dictates, imperatives and so on. 
 
He however explained that where there is a precedent from a high court that 
contradicts customary law, he will presume that the court correctly interpreted customary law 
and adopt the precedent. This is especially so where both the ascertainment by the high court 
and the actual practice of the community are in line with the Constitution yet they contradict 
each other. He states that he would go with the decision of the high court because ultimately 
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when it comes on appeal, the high court can overrule their decision. This chief appears to 
contradict himself.  
What this reveals is that the main concern for the chief is not solely to bring customary 
law to be in line with constitutional provisions. Rather it reveals a mind-set that undermines 
the customary law system by a faith in the state court’s ability to know better the content of 
the customary law of his community. This gives a picture of intimidation by the state centralist 
and positivist structure over the traditional structure responsible for the preservation of the 
customary law system.  No doubt this mind set will lead away from the ascertainment and 
application of living customary law even by the chiefs and headmen’s courts.  These courts 
should instead endeavour to preserve benign values and rules of customary law while seeking 
to comply with constitutional provisions.  
Though another chief admits to following the ‘rules of the Country’ and the Constitution 
as well as customary law in cases before him, he states that he would apply customary law to 
disputes before him despite the existence of a judgement of the high court that contradicts the 
applicable customary law.  
Another way of feeling the impact of state law over customary law is in the form of 
training given to chiefs and headmen. Even though one of the chiefs explained that there is no 
form of training to enable them to adjudicate on customary law,  the Judicial Education 
Institute under the office of the Chief Judge have commenced courses to train chiefs on judicial 
work so as to prepare them to give decisions that are consistent with the Constitution.50 There 
have also been other workshops organized by the government at Rustenburg in this respect.51 
The implication of these, with respect to the ascertainment and application of living customary 
law, is that it may reinforce the already felt domination of the state laws and its institutions and 
its impact might be far reaching.  
It does appears that chiefs are still guided by their lived realities which might be in 
conflict with decisions of superior courts. For instances, a vignette on the scenario of the facts 
of the Bhe case was presented. The facts used were: What happens to the estate of a man who 
dies leaving two daughters born outside wedlock with no son and is survived by his elder 
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Based on information received from one of the Magistrate interviewed. 
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brother and father. A chief confidently said the elder brother would inherit in such an instance 
and gave the vernacular term for the customary practice which is siyacu. The chief is however 
conscious that the courts would defend certain rights not permitted under customary law. 
Judgements of higher courts that affect customary law are not brought to their attention and 
there is no formal structure of bringing this to their awareness.  
Chiefs sometimes go to the magistrate courts to observe what is done there. This 
development threatens the traditional form of adjudication as the chiefs may be prone to alter 
their system of adjudication to suit the Western styled courts systems. Even though chiefs 
record proceedings in compliance with directives from the House of Traditional Leaders,52 one 
of them explained that he also keeps records as a guide, so that should he be faced with a 
similar matter he had previously adjudicated on, he would refer to the records to see what 
decisions he had made in the past in order to apply same to the current case before him.  
This again is an indication that the contextual application of living customary law based 
on its flexibility is being threatened and whether the application of living customary law is 
actually being affected. The extent of this threat calls for further focused research for 
confirmation. It is also an indication that gears towards Woodman’s propositions that once 
traditional courts become formal courts, they too cease to apply living customary law because 
the norms become institutionalized and assume a different form to fit into the formal courts.53 
This indication provides a basis for further research to investigate the effect of the 
circumstances created by the impact of the state law/institutions on customary law and its 
effect on the chiefs. The structure of the chiefs and headmen’s courts is still relevant with 
respect to the ability of the courts to apply living customary law.  
Chiefs sometimes apply both customary and the Roman-Dutch/Common law such as in 
the case of Batlaki Motsosi Mahibitswane Vs Defendant: Petrus Jonas – Ikageleng.54 Here, the 
chief acknowledged that the defendant’s marriage in community of property evidenced by a 
marriage certificate dated 19/07/1977 to the claimant’s late sister was central to the claims of 
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 For the chief of Gopane, their court records have been kept for decades even before he was born.  
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 Woodman G ‘Customary law, state courts, and the notion of institutionalization of norms in Ghana and Nigeria’ 
in Allott A& Woodman G (eds) People's Law and State Law: the Bellagio Papers (1985) 153-7. 
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the claimant. The claimant claimed the house which belonged to her deceased sister on the 
ground that there was no marriage between her sister and the defendant who played no role in 
her life and towards her burial. The chief’s court granted the house to the defendant but also 
ruled that he must refund the burial expenses of his late wife to the claimant which is a rule of 
customary law. The decision of the court was very contextual and in this case it was in the 
context of state law applicable in the circumstance of the case and had precedent over the 
applicable customary norm based on the nature of the marriage of the deceased.  
Another vital challenge is the pressure to conform to state institutions and procedures 
felt by lay judges. For the chiefs, the pressure was in the form of a desire to live up to the 
magistrates’ standards and this influenced how they applied customary law in cases before 
them. One of the chiefs admits that he applies the Roman-Dutch law in certain cases even 
though customary law also covers the particular issue to protect himself should the matter be 
appealed to the magistrate court. The chief would therefore address issues in ways that the 
magistrate will not fault their decision. He explained that to aid them in their application of the 
Roman-Dutch law, they source advice from their locals who are lawyers and magistrates and 
they sometimes try to integrate the advice they receive with the values of their customary law. 
For instance, in the area of damages, he explained that they apply the Roman-Dutch law on the 
basis of Ubuntu to ensure that the parties are reconciled at the end of the adjudication. In his 
words, ‘I follow the rules of our Country. I still use the rules according to our Constitution but 
together with the customary laws.’ The exercise of discretion here alters the content of living 
customary law even though it may incorporate Constitutional standards.   
Even though the pressure might be real or imagined, it does affect how the judge/chief 
ascertains customary law and such pressures can defeat the benefit of having a judge versed in 
the applicable customary law.  
Customary court judges are themselves legal practitioners and are not under such 
pressures.55 The only lay judge (retired) interviewed for the courts of lower jurisdiction in the 
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 Besides, the office of the principal inspector of customary courts in the FCT has statutory responsibilities to 
ensure that the courts operate credibly and efficiently and it serves as a check on the courts. Where complaints are 
received with respect to a judge’s credibility and, or competence, the inspectorate might withdraw the particular 
case from the judge or review the court proceedings and judgment or advise that the complaints can be addressed 
by the appellate court on appeal. See Section 42 and 43 of the Customary Court Act. 
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FCT exhibited this type of pressure. He discountenanced his knowledge of the applicable 
customary law for the evidence put before him because he felt bound by the evidence led and 
by the duty not to descend into the arena of the dispute as an impartial arbiter. He utilised 
assessors56 and chiefs who were custodians of the customary laws to resolve contradictions in 
the evidence of the parties. He clearly admits to being bound by precedent that conflicts with 
credible evidence of customary norms presented before him. He subjected all customary laws 
he applied to the repugnancy and public policy test. Where the customary rules on certain 
issues were not very clear, he exercised discretion in taking a position for the sake of legal 
certainty. The point here is that the pressure to conform to procedures of state institutions 
exists and they impede the ascertainment and application of living customary law by lay judges 
who are coopted into the formal court structure based on the reason of their being versed in 
customary law and this pressure threatens the basis of their cooption.  
7.3.1.5  The engagement of lawyers  
The participation of lawyers in the lower courts has its range of impact on how judges exercise 
discretion in the ascertainment and application of customary law. Legal practitioners have 
rights of audience in customary courts in the FCT.57 There are different instances of how the 
representation of litigants or the lack of it by legal practitioners aid how the courts exercise 
discretion in the ascertainment and application of living customary law.  
Where parties appear without legal representation, the court has tried to assist the 
litigants by seeking clarifications on knotty issues or requesting for further evidence where it 
perceives the need for such and issuing subpoenas to witnesses suggested by the parties.  This 
is done despite the adversarial system of adjudication in Nigeria in which the judges are not 
actively involved in the trial, such as in the case of Dorcas Adamu v Adamu Garba58 where 
neither party was represented by counsel and the court offered direction to both sides.  
Nonetheless, the judges do not want to be seen as being untowardly interested in the case and 
may not offer as much assistance as needed by the litigants who would be left on their own and 
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 Which at that time were utilised by area courts. 
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Section 21 of the Act. 
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Unreported FCT/CC/YAN/CV/31/2013. 
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may not present sufficient evidence before the court on the content of the applicable 
customary law.  
However helpful the court may be to the parties, there are instances where a party not 
represented by counsel is no match for the adroitness of the counsel on the other side, such as 
the case of Rifkat Dogo v Yuana Musa59 discussed under 6.2.2.3in chapter six. Here, the plaintiff 
sought to claim the property left behind by her late father under the Gbagyi native law and 
custom as his only child from the defendant. The defendant is not related to her father but 
claimed that the property had been given to his father by the plaintiff’s father before his 
demise and he inherited same from his father. The crux of the matter was Gbagyi native law 
and custom on succession and whether it allows a deceased to distribute his property before 
his death and if such distribution can be rescinded by his heirs. The defendant's counsel 
however submitted a written address and formulated four issues for determination and relied 
on several decided cases and provisions of the Evidence Act. He urged the court to strike out 
the plaintiff’s claim which it did. The plaintiff in the presentation of her evidence was no match 
for the defendant’s counsel.  
A good instance of where both parties were each represented by counsel is the case of 
Ukauwa & Ors v Chineye & Ors60where customary law was proved through the evidence of the 
traditional ruler and other witnesses who were duly cross examined.  
In South Africa, legal practitioners have no right of audience in the chiefs and headmen 
courts but can appear in magistrate courts. Their lack of appearance preserves the simple 
procedures in the chiefs and headmen’s’ court.  
Parties on appeal to the magistrate court engage legal practitioners who help to channel 
the cases more in line with the procedures of the court than the litigants would achieve 
because of the rules of evidence and this aids the magistrates since the court procedures are 
Roman-Dutch/Common law.61 As is the practice in the customary courts, it is vital to note that 
at the commencement of an appeal at the magistrate court, the court explains to the parties 
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Unreported FCT/CCK/CV19/2010. 
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Unreported FCT/CC/GWA/CV/13/2011. 
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Based on interviews conducted. 
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what the appeal is all about and the procedures even though this is more carefully done in the 
magistrate courts.   
Unlike the situation in the customary courts,62 the magistrate also explains to the 
litigants their rights to engage the services of a legal practitioner or if they lack the funds to do 
so, their options to apply for legal aid either at the Legal Aid South Africa or the law clinic at the 
North West University as was done in the case Ontibili Mokobata v Lesomo Mokobata.63The 
purpose for this is to enable a thorough presentation of evidence including the content of the 
applicable customary law since the cases are heard denovo on appeal.   
Where the parties choose not to be represented by legal practitioners, the magistrates 
carefully explain to them in simple and straight forward terms what they are expected to do at 
every stage and this helps in the presentation of their cases and evidence of the customary 
norms they assert. This was demonstrated in the case of Mongae Tiro V Sebogodi Israel 
Bahurutshe.64The court’s assistance is restricted to procedure. However where only one party is 
represented by a legal practitioner, the litigant would usually not be a match for the trained 
lawyer in the magistrate court as in the case of DitilePitso v Mogami Modiri.65 
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7.3.1.6  Summary 
In summary, the institutional factors that influence how the judges exercise discretion in the 
ascertainment and application of customary law are exposure to customary law, hierarchy of 
magistrate courts over customary courts, systems of consultations, impact of the state law on 
customary law, and the engagement of lawyers. While the different form of exposures do not 
sufficiently equip the judges in the adjudication of customary law matters, they do not on their 
own determine how the judges fare because they must be juxtaposed with other factors 
discussed in this chapter.  
The chiefs and headmen courts are well versed in their respective customary laws and 
even where they are deficient, the systems of consultations adopted by the courts are 
conducive to the ascertainment (where necessary) and application of living customary law. 
However, the impact of Western laws over customary law, the hierarchy of magistrate courts 
over the chiefs and headmen courts, and the pressures felt by these courts to conform to the 
expectations of the magistrate courts impede the ascertainment and application of living 
customary law.  
The systems of consultations adopted by the customary courts and the magistrate 
courts enhance the exercise of the judges’ discretion towards the ascertainment and 
application of customary law by enabling the presentation of credible evidence before the court 
but these systems are not without a few concerns. Both judges of the customary courts and the 
magistrates interviewed state that the involvement of legal practitioners aids in the 
presentation of cases and invariably evidence on the content of customary law in courts but 
where a legal practitioner is not engaged by one of the parties, the party is put to a 
disadvantage and this may affect the ascertainment and application of living customary law.  
7.3.2  Substantive factors 
These factors go to the substance of the knowledge of, or content of the law that one way or 
the other, impact on how judges exercise discretion in the ascertainment and application of 
customary law. These factors include gaps and consideration for legal certainty, constitutional 
compliance and the notion of justice, and the need for development of customary law. 
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7.3.2.1  On Gaps and consideration for legal certainty 
In Nigeria, all the judges admit that consideration for achieving certainty would 
determine how they exercise discretion in ascertaining and applying customary law.  They 
would ascertain and apply a version or fill up gaps in the face of little or no evidence on the 
content of the living norm  to achieve justice based on conscience and in line with ‘natural 
justice’, based on the inherent powers of the court to be exercised ‘judiciously and judicially’.  
In South Africa, a magistrate admits that the desire to achieve legal certainty would 
influence how he exercises his discretion in ascertaining and applying customary law.  Another 
magistrate however differs and states that the circumstances of each case are treated uniquely.  
They may exercise discretion with respect to what versions of customary law to employ using 
rules of evidence but would not for instance, fill in gaps in customary law in order to address the 
issues before the court.66 
A chief insisted that there are no gaps in customary law as it covers everything. 
However, in certain instances, the chief may fill up what appears to be gaps. In such instances, 
he may listen to the headmen’s opinion but the final decision is his which he discharges within 
the confinement of customary law. In the case of Patricia Nazo V Mogami Moeng67 the records 
indicate different positions taken by different members of the council with respect to what 
should be done in the circumstance of the case, and the chief’s final decision which was distinct 
from the different positions of the council members. The chief explained that he has never had 
to outrightly come up with rules outside customary law to address situations before him as he 
is always guided by the people’s practices. 
Another chief explained that a defined norm on an issue is collectively arrived at from 
the inputs of the elders as well as members of the traditional council from the different clans. 
This is in order to understand the views of the elders and all members of the community with 
respect to what is acceptable to the community. He however further explained that he then 
refers the matter to the magistrate because they are higher in hierarchy and their judgements 
are appealed to the magistrate courts. He believes that the magistrates will come up with 
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 Decided by the Barolong Boo Ratshidi Tribal Authority Mahikeng No Case File number was cited but obtained 
from the magistrate court. 
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‘better legal answers’ and bring the customary norm in line with the constitution. Subjecting all 
these inputs to the magistrate’s discretion therefore defeats the conceptualisation of 
customary law as deriving legitimacy from the people unless the magistrate’s discretion 
incorporates the values of the customary norms. 
According to another chief, where there is a gap i.e. where the customary law does not 
particularly provide for the details in the circumstances before him, he would fill up the gap, 
with the Constitution. He further explained that where the content of customary law is not so 
clear, he would import provision from applicable statutes. A traditional ruler in the chief’s 
council however explained that in cases of gaps, the elders rely on their reasoning and come to 
agreement as to what to do and they do this often without difficulty. He further explained that 
they will apply their customary law over a judgement of the high court that contradicts their 
customary law. This point clearly contradicts the chief’s position but then, the chief did explain 
at the outset of the interview that he was still new as a chief and leans on the counsel of his 
elders, and this goes to show that the role of the council of elders is integral to the 
ascertainment of living customary law where necessary, and in its application. The reliance of 
the chiefs on and seeming acceptance of the magistrate courts also poses a challenge that will 
impede ascertaining and applying of customary law by the chiefs and headmen’s courts. 
  
7.3.2.2. Constitutional compliance and the notion of justice 
Constitutional compliance and the notion of justice is a factor that influences how judges 
exercise discretion in the ascertaining and applying customary law even though it is done 
differently in certain details by the different court types in the two jurisdictions. This factor is 
manifested in different forms discussed below. 
Despite the Supreme Court judgement that customary law should now be gauged 
against Constitutional compliance rather than the repugnancy clause in Nigeria,68 customary 
court judges still subject customary norms to repugnancy standards of equity, natural justice 
and good conscience as a basis for the exercise of discretion. The reason for this may be that 
the provisions of both the Customary Court Act and the rules of court still provide for the 
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application of the repugnancy test which is the standard of natural justice, equity and good 
conscience.69 
The counterpart to section 18(4) of the Evidence Act can be found in Section 16 (a) of 
Federal Capital Territory Customary Court Act and may be described as the compatibility test. 
According to the provision, a custom shall not be enforced by courts if it is directly 
incompatible, or can be implied to be incompatible with any written law in force.70 
The customary courts have avoided unnecessary reliance on procedures and instead 
focused on the attainment of justice. This was illustrated in the case of Ann Okekeocha v Chuks 
Okekeocha & Ors.71Here, the members of the community associations, who were to testify on 
the applicable customary law of succession with respect to whether sons of the deceased were 
the rightful heir to the deceased properties and not the spouse, were reluctant to come and 
testify in court for some personal reasons. Based on the plaintiff's counsel’s information that if 
summoned they would be hostile, which may affect the content of their testimony with respect 
to the content of the applicable customary law, the court willingly granted several 
adjournments until one of them willingly came to testify in court and gave evidence of the 
content of the applicable customary law. Another notion of justice utilised in the customary 
court is the consideration for global standards on issues such as the call for the prohibition of 
Female Genital Mutilation.72 
According to the magistrates, the exercise of their discretion in the ascertainment and 
application of customary law will be determined by humaneness, justice and constitutional 
compliance and would therefore refrain from applying ascertained norms that violate these 
principles.73 For instance, they would not apply ascertained customary norms that ignore the 
plight of widows and the best interest of children who are sidelined in favour of male relatives 
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Order 28 of the Customary Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2007 and section 16 (a) of the Act. 
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Charles Mwalimu The Nigerian Legal System (2005) 119. See Elias T O Ground work of Nigerian Law (1954). 
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in succession matters.74 They would also not apply practices such as Ukuthwala75because they 
violate constitutional right to dignity.76 Magistrates are, however, impeded in exercising 
discretion in favour of widows with respect to succession where the property involved is in the 
village and subject to customary rules.77 
The chiefs give consideration to constitutional provisions in the application of customary 
law but it is not known how often this is done. One of the chiefs states in his own words that ‘I 
follow the rules of our Country. I still use the rules according to our Constitution but together 
with the customary laws.’  
Of all the records of proceedings analysed at the chiefs and headmen’s courts, there 
were hardly any that revealed an engagement with the ascertainment and application of 
customary law. Rather, the records reveal the claims and evidence through the testimonies of 
the parties and their witnesses and the court’s judgement. No doubt, the chiefs and headmen 
as well as their councilors already know the applicable customary law and did not need to 
ascertain them. Where there is any uncertainty, deliberations are done outside the sittings and 
decisions are arrived at and pronounced in court.  
Many times, the issues before the magistrate courts on appeal from the chiefs and 
headmen courts are not with respect to whether living customary law applied was ascertained 
but are in regards to fairness and whether in the circumstance, justice was attained. In such 
instances, the magistrate would measure the appropriateness of the decision which ordinarily is 
based on the applicable customary law. Usually where the magistrate holds that the decision of 
the chief and headmen court is not fair, the underlying basis is its complying with Constitutional 
standards, for instance, the principle of equality regarding succession that excludes the widow 
and her children and brings in a male relative. In the case of Tlogelang Mosagale V Nkaki 
Mooketsi78 where the appellant brought a claim for cattle against the defendant, the defendant 
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who was the respondent on appeal to the magistrate court relied on the principle of male 
primogeniture to state that the appellant being a woman, had no right to bring a claim on her 
deceased father’s estate. The magistrate court, relying on Constitutional provision of equality 
and the case of Mthenbu v Letsela79 held that the appellant though a woman could make such a 
claim but held that under customary law, the respondent had failed to present evidence that 
she had the authority of other heirs to bring such a claim in court and dismissed her appeal on 
lack of locus standi to institute the case.  
Some of the judges of the customary courts admit that they exercise discretion in the 
ascertainment and application of customary law for the sake of achieving equity based on 
conscience in the circumstances of a case by not dwelling on the custom which may not have 
been presented in evidence before the court, especially if both parties are ignorant of the 
custom and do not actually bother about it.  In this circumstance, they would thus exercise their 
discretion by applying any rule they think is best in the circumstance if the basis of their 
discretion is not outrageous and the circumstances of the case is sufficiently grave, having in 
mind the general principles of law. This is supported by the rules of court which provide that in 
the absence of any provision by the rules on an issue, the judges should utilise the ‘rules of the 
principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience’.80 
Some judges admit that a wide range of discretion is bestowed on the judge in applying 
the repugnancy test. This application is not only based on a Western conception of law but on a 
conception of law based on the customary law of the particular judge which might be foreign to 
the applicable customary law in a particular case. It would therefore be better if the people 
whose customary law is being considered are involved and their views consulted where it is 
necessary to develop the applicable customary law since this will amount to developing the 
customary law. 
7.3.2.3  The need for development of customary law 
This is peculiar to South Africa where the exercise of discretion in ascertaining and applying 
customary law is also influenced by the need to develop it based on the Constitutional 
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injunction.81 It is imperative that living customary law is ascertained first before development is 
embarked upon. Magistrates view developing customary law to mean to ‘enhance it a bit’ to 
bring it in line with the Constitution. They believe that judges of higher courts may take drastic 
measures and considerably alter the customary norm ascertained to be in line with the 
Constitution but they do not have the power to do so because they are merely courts of 
summary jurisdiction.82 
The chiefs and headmen’s courts on the other hand handle this differently. They have 
embarked on developments of customary law to bring it in line with statutory law. A good 
example is where the customary rule of lashing usually ordered by the chief on a boy who 
misbehaves83 was deliberately changed as a result of the promulgation of the statutory law 
against corporal punishment to bring it in line with the statute.84 Now, parents would be invited 
to administer the punishment on the child and where they are not available, the chief’s court 
would determine what steps should be taken in the circumstance, otherwise it would be 
referred to the police. For instance in the case of Semakaleng Sophie Molokwane v Modise 
Molokwane Bahurutshe,85 the chief refrained from the councilors’ order that the defendant be 
lashed for refusing to return the plaintiff’s cattle and goats. The chief instead, ordered a refund 
of three cows, five goats and payment of council fees as well as charged fees. 
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7.3.2.4  Summary 
The substantive factors discussed above include gaps and consideration for legal certainty, 
constitutional compliance and the notion of justice, and the need for development of 
customary law. It is clear that discretion is exercised by the judges at the ascertainment and 
application stages because what is ascertained may not be applied if it fails to meet 
constitutional and other standards such as the repugnancy standards and standards based on 
other notions of justice. How the chiefs’ and headmen’s courts fill up gaps involves the 
participation of the elders and people of the community and will enhance the application of 
living norms acceptable to the community. However, their referral to the magistrate courts and 
the utilization of statutes and the Constitution infringes on the domain of customary law with 
respect to how its rules are generated and will impede the ascertainment and application of 
living customary law. While the path taken by the customary courts may achieve justice in the 
circumstances of the case, the applied rules may be foreign to the applicable customary law 
thereby making the justice achieved to be relative. While gauging customary law against 
Constitutional and other standards, it is vital that living customary law is first ascertained and 
then developed where necessary with consideration of its values.   
 
7.3.3  Procedural factors 
These factors are connected to the rules and procedures applied in the courts in the process of 
ascertaining and applying customary law and are basically centred on how courts resolve 
evidential contradictions before them. 
7.3.3.1  Resolution of contradictions in evidence 
A number of factors determine how judges, magistrates and chiefs resolve evidential 
contradictions in Nigeria and South Africa with respect to ascertaining and applying customary 
law.  Generally, the exercise of discretion by the judges in this determination is based on the 
evidential rule of ‘he who asserts must prove’ and on a balance of probabilities whether or not 
they are clearly stated to be based on the law of evidence. Even though the judges of the 
customary courts are careful not to mention the rules of evidence, they are consciously applied 
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in magistrate courts but not necessarily so in the chiefs and headmen courts.86 Evidential 
contradictions are resolved in diverse ways by either giving considerations to a number of 
issues which generally confirm the principles of evidence, or by the misapplication of the 
principles of evidence. While some of the considerations will enhance the ascertainment and 
application of living customary law, others will not. 
The diverse issues considered by judges come in different forms and this confirms that 
not only do judges exercise discretion in this process, the sphere of their discretion is wide. 
However, the thesis asserts that the exercise of discretion is only justifiable when it is done 
within the confines of the rules, and it leads to the ascertainment of living customary law.  
For Nigeria, a judge states that when he is faced with contradictory evidence of the 
content of customary law from both parties, he would accept the version before him that is 
most aligned with current undisputed facts before the dispute arose.87 Another judge analyzes 
the authenticity of contradictory evidence of witnesses based on how they fare under cross 
examination. Some judges have preference for evidence presented before the court by 
members of a community who are bound by the custom over texts and this would more 
possibly lead to ascertainment and application of living customary law. Another would, where 
the evidence of the experts brought in by the parties are in contradiction, refer to texts to 
resolve the contradiction and would accept the version that agrees with the text. Where there 
are no texts, the registrar88  would be instructed to search for and identify the chief of the 
particular community whose customary law is being considered to come as an independent 
witness.  A witness summons would be issued to the chief to testify on the contents of the 
customary law on the subject in issue. This testimony will be accepted if it is not in conflict with 
public policy and if it is convincing.  
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 This confirms Dlamini’s findings in his research on the chiefs’ courts in Kwazulu where he explained that it 
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The order of preference for a judge is precedents, texts and then independent 
witnesses. The reliance on text and precedence over the evidence of independent witnesses 
will more likely influence discretion away from the ascertainment and application of living 
customary law unless these sources clearly represent the living customary law of the 
community as discussed in previous chapters.89 
Judges have failed to ascertain and apply customary law by going outside the rules of 
evidence under circumstances that can be best described as incompetence, and, a dearth in the 
knowledge of and the conceptualization of customary law.  One of such instance is where 
principles of Common law and statutory provisions are applied in place of the applicable 
customary law. In the case of Rifkat Dogo v Yuana Musa,90one of the issues to be determined 
was whether under Gbagyi customary law, a person can make an oral will. The court held that 
the plaintiff's father made a valid oral will in the absence of any evidence of what constitutes a 
valid will and the vitiating factors to a valid will under customary law, and specifically  Gbagyi 
customary law before the court.  The court held that a testator has absolute freedom of 
testamentary capacity to bequeath his estate to either family or stranger in a customary law 
will while no evidence was led on this. The court also held that the will was valid because the 
subject and the beneficiaries were specifically identified and referred to the case of Ayinke v 
Ibidun91 which had nothing to do with Gbagyi customary law. The court clearly relied on 
principles under common law and statutory law on wills and the cases it referred to were with 
respect to statutory wills. Hence, no customary law was ascertained and applied here as a 
result of the judges’ blatant misapplication which may have been occasioned by incompetence.    
Another dimension to this is the case of Chinwe Emenalo v Emenalo Oni.92 Here, the 
petitioner filed for divorce on grounds of physical violence. The court granted the prayer and 
ordered the return of the dowry by the petitioner even though the respondent did not request 
it. The court relied on Order 13 r1 of its rules and the case of Registrar of Marriages v 
Igbinomwanhia which held that for a divorce to take place, the dowry must be returned. No 
                                                          
89
 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.2.1 in Chapter three, and 4.3.2.1.3 in chapter four. 
90
Supra. See facts of the case in 7.3.1.5. 
91
(1959) 4FSC 280. 
92
 FCT/CC/CV/DU/16/2010 CC. 
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evidence was led to prove that the return of dowry was a prerequisite to the dissolution of 
marriage under the applicable customary law. Despite the petitioner’s opposition to the 
respondent’s application for the restoration of his conjugal rights pending the determination of 
the suit, the court ruled in favour of the respondent without confirming the content of the 
applicable customary law on the issue. 
Another instance is the case of ShuaibuI smaila v Audu Adamu & Ors93where the court 
determined the paternity of the child in favour of the plaintiff without medical evidence based 
on the slight contradictions in the evidence of the defense witnesses which could simply be 
credibly explained away. Although the unchallenged evidence by the petitioner’s witness was 
that under the applicable customary law, the child of an unmarried woman belonged to the 
biological father, there were strong evidence by the respondents claiming that the child 
belongs to the respondent’s husband who conceived the child during the pendency of her 
marriage which was still subsisting at the time of this case.   
These cases clearly indicate a misapplication of discretion by the courts where 
customary law was not ascertained, where principles of Common law and statutory law were 
applied, incorrect utilization of precedent, and the application of customary law not supported 
by the facts of the case. These clearly jeopardize the ascertainment and application of living 
customary law. 
There are instances where though the courts’ discretion may be in line with the rules of 
evidence, no customary law was ascertained and applied to the dispute. For instance, in certain 
cases, courts have simply accepted contents of customary law presented by petitioners if not 
contested. One of the judges said about fifty percent of the divorce cases heard in his court are 
not contested and the other parties do not bother to appear in court. The implication is that in 
such instances, the judge has before him undisputed evidence of the content of the applicable 
customary law which may not correctly represent the customary norms of the community but 
the court accepts it nonetheless because it meets evidential standards. 
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Unreported CV/39/2005. 
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Another instance is illustrated in the case of Rolf Schneider v Felicia Schneider94 where 
the court exercised its discretion in dispensing with the ascertainment of customary law with 
respect to the custody of children because the respondent who is the mother of the children 
had conceded to all the reliefs sought by the petitioner which included the custody of the 
children. What the court considered instead was the best interest of the children. Indeed the 
Customary Court Act does provide that ‘In any matter relating to the guardianship of a child, 
the best interest and welfare of the child shall be the first and paramount consideration’.95 
All the judges interviewed in the customary courts did indicate that they would give 
preference to precedents over convincing evidence from the community on the content of the 
applicable customary law. This is similar to the views of a magistrate in South Africa who 
explained that his main source of living customary law are judgements from the high courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal. In this instance, the courts reject the primary sources of living 
customary law, which is the people, for sources derived from institutions established on 
different jurisprudential foundation of positivism due to the centralist arrangements that 
elevate sources from such institutions through the principle of judicial precedent as opposed to 
legal pluralism. The implication is that where such precedents are not reflective of the actual 
normative practice of the communities, they will not enhance the ascertainment and 
application of living customary law.  
In South Africa, with respect to evidence of members of the community, a magistrate 
explained that she would give consideration to the evidence of a smart older witness.  
Magistrates would also not necessarily prefer the evidence of a traditional leader who 
ordinarily is the custodian of the customs over the evidence of elderly persons. The reason for 
this is that the elderly person who has lived in that community should know better than the 
traditional leader who these days are sometimes very young and therefore would not be as 
well versed in the contents of the customary law and still rely on their uncles for guidance. 
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Unreported FCT/CC/GWA/CC/03/2008. 
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The decision of the customary court in this case was however set aside on appeal. This was on the ground that 
since the supposed union between the parties under customary law was void abinitio having been made during 
the subsistence of the Petitioner’s statutory marriage with another woman, the customary court lacked the 
jurisdiction to hear the matter and grant any relief sought. See Felicia Ochuola Schneider v Chief Rolf Schneider 
Unreported FCT/CCA/CVA/10/2010. 
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Sometimes they also may not have lived in the community long enough to experience its 
customary practices. This is crucial as the data obtained from some of the chiefs’ courts confirm 
this. 
Magistrates admit to heavy reliance on evidence of witnesses, precedents and assessors 
because of limited texts on the content of customary law. Sometimes on appeal, the assessors 
have contradicted the decisions of the chiefs even though they have been satisfied with their 
decisions many times. The chief’s decisions are set aside on a number of occasions not 
necessarily because the content of the customary law were wrong but because the judgement 
was against the weight of the evidence before the court based on the content of the customary 
law ascertained.96 With respect to the chiefs’ and headmen’s courts, their decisions are often 
times based on common sense steeped in the customs. For instance, the principles of contract 
in customary law as well as common sense are applied.   
Magistrates rely on assessors to resolve conflicts in the evidence related to the content 
of the applicable customary law but where this is not to their satisfaction, they would absolve 
the matter on the basis that they are unable to make a finding in the matter. There are also 
cases where the assessors contradict themselves and were not helpful and the magistrate had 
to absolve the case. They however also rely on what they view as the most probable of the 
evidence before them, that which they regard as ‘good practice’ and as not oppressive. 
Credibility of the witnesses is also crucial.  
It is important to also mention the role of interpreters which may be crucial to the 
ascertainment and application of customary law. Customary courts endeavour to accommodate 
some of the languages spoken by parties and their witnesses. For instance, in each of the cases 
of Rifkat Dago v Yuana Musa97 and Haruna Kaye v Yusuf Sarki,98 English, Gbagyi and Hausa 
languages were spoken in the course of the trial and the court had to provide interpreters for 
all these languages. However, there are instances where interpreters wrongly interpret integral 
parts of the testimonies of the witnesses as discussed in chapter six,99 thereby placing before 
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For instance see Morule v Matlhaku unreported Case No. 04/2004. 
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Supra. 
98
Unreported FCT/JD/CC/Kwa/CV.15/11. 
99
See 6.2.1.5. 
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the court evidence that contradicts the content of the applicable customary law sought to be 
ascertained and applied. 
Evidence are usually not led on the content of customary law before the chiefs and 
headmen’s court and where there are uncertainties with respect to the content, they are 
addressed in the manners discussed in 7.3.2.1 through consultations. 
  
 
  
 
 
7.3.3.2  Summary 
The procedural factors discussed above are connected to how courts resolve evidential 
contradictions before them. From the discussion in this section, it is not in doubt that judges 
exercise discretion in their application of the rules and principles of evidence in the proof and 
application of customary law, and at a wide range. It is also clear that while some evidential 
considerations are done within the confines of the applicable rules, some are clearly 
misapplications of the rules of evidence and even of the relevant customary laws and these will 
not foster the ascertainment and application of living customary law. While evidential 
considerations applied within the confines of the rules justify the process of ascertainment by 
the courts and lead to the ascertainment of what is convincing before the court, what is before 
the court may not necessarily be living customary law. The chapter also disclosed that the 
dearth in the jurisprudential conceptualization of customary law and the theory of legal 
pluralism impact on how judges exercise discretion and this leads away from the ascertainment 
and application of living customary law. In all, these factors are common in the customary 
courts in Nigeria and the magistrate courts in South Africa. Evidence on the content of 
customary law is not led in the chiefs and headmen’s courts and how they resolve gaps and 
uncertainties were already discussed in 7.3.2.1 above  
Procedural factors 
Resolution of contradictions in 
evidence 
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7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed factors that influence how courts of lower jurisdiction in Nigeria and 
South Africa ascertain and apply customary law. It discussed the variation of factors which 
broadly include institutional, substantive and procedural. These factors also featured in the 
previous chapters on courts of superior jurisdiction and are broadly similar in how they apply to 
the lower courts in certain ways, such as training and exposure to customary law, gaps and 
consideration for legal certainty, constitutional compliance and the notion of justice, and the 
need for development of customary law. They however feature their own distinctiveness in the 
uniqueness of each lower court, the hierarchy of magistrate courts over customary courts, 
systems of consultations, impact of the state law on customary law, and the engagement of 
lawyers.  
Other forms of distinctiveness is in how each of the factors engage with the peculiarity 
of each of the lowers courts. In all, the chapter clearly reveals that wide discretion is exercised 
in the courts in the process of ascertainment and application of customary law, and it is 
influenced by the range of factors identified under the broad categories. The chapter states 
that while some of these factors enhance the ascertainment and application of living customary 
law, some do not. The chapter finds that exposure of the judges to customary law under the 
different circumstances discussed do not on their own determine how the judges fare and they 
must be juxtaposed with other factors discussed in this chapter. The chapter also reveals that 
the dearth in the jurisprudential conceptualization of customary law and the theory of legal 
pluralism by the judges affect the exercise of the judges’ discretion away from  living customary 
law. In all, the factors identified here cover the range of those intrinsic and extraneous to the 
rules of evidence and court procedures. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This research set out to analyse the process of ascertaining and applying customary law in 
formal courts in Nigeria and South Africa and how they enable the ascertainment of living 
customary law, and to identify factors that inform the judge’s determination and application of 
living customary law.  To address these, the research examined theories on the 
conceptualisation of customary law and its regulation in a formal state structure, analysed how 
customary law which operates under legal pluralism fits into a positivistic centralised legal 
system, and reviewed the central role of judicial discretion in the ascertainment and application 
of customary law. The positivistic doctrine of judicial discretion was examined against the 
backdrop of legal realism and formalism as they affect the application of customary law. It 
established that judges do in fact exercise discretion in this process when applying rules of 
evidence and procedure, as well as customary norms and that judicial versions of customary 
law are justified only when they ascertain living customary law. 
The thesis discovered answers to its research question of ‘[W]hat factors influence the 
judge’s determination and application of living customary law?’ by identifying factors that are 
both intrinsic and extraneous to the court and its rules and procedures. These influence how 
discretion is exercised by the judge in ascertaining and applying living customary law.  
The factors are institutional, substantive, procedural, socio-economic and political, and can 
lead the court’s exercise of discretion either towards or away from ascertaining and applying 
living customary law. This finding agrees with Kronman’s view that judicial discretion involves 
an: 
[E]lement of free creativity, of interpretative freedom, in the adjudicative 
process which is left over, so to speak, after one has taken account of all 
the rules that might conceivably bear on the case at hand.1 
 
                                                          
1
Kronman A T ‘The problem of judicial discretion’ (1986) 1063 FSS available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1063 (accessed on 11/01/2017) 481. 
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No single factor necessarily influences how judges ascertain and apply customary law. 
Multiple factors typically do. Thus, this research asserts that a judge’s exercise of judicial 
discretion is only justifiable where it aids the ascertainment and application of living customary 
law, or where it is developed to comply with the standards of justice following a consideration 
of the acceptable non-harmful practices of a given community. 
The first chapter laid out the background, purpose, scope and research methodology of 
this research. Chapter two sketched the conceptual framework of the research. It argued that 
judges exercise mild or wide discretion influenced by factors that could lead them to or away 
from ascertaining and applying living customary law.  This chapter specifically addressed the 
sub question of ‘[D]oes the doctrine of judicial discretion under the theory of positivism justify 
judicial versions of customary law?’ Here, the thesis asserts that the only ground on which the 
exercise of judicial discretion can justify judicial versions of customary law is if it conforms to 
the contents of the applicable living customary law and standards of justice explained above. It 
argued that the exercise of discretion by the judges must ensure that the status of customary 
law as law is preserved. 
Chapters three and four specifically addressed the sub question of ‘[W]hat processes do 
formal courts adopt for ascertaining and applying customary law and how do these processes 
enable the ascertainment of living customary law?’ These chapters elaborately spelt out the 
processes utilised by the courts and identified challenges in the processes adopted in both 
countries. The thesis found that this process is regulated by laws of evidence, court rules and 
court laws in both countries which provide that customary law will be ascertained and applied 
through judicial notice and proof as facts through evidence. These chapters addressed the 
concepts of judicial notice and proof, which are the two ways of ascertaining and applying 
customary law by formal courts. They also discussed the legal framework and the challenges 
that frustrate the process of ascertaining living customary law and the utilization of different 
methods of ascertainment when used as aids by the courts while taking judicial notice or when 
requiring proof as facts through evidence.  
 Chapters five, six and seven answered the main research question of ‘[What] factors 
influence the judge’s determination and application of living customary law?’ Several factors 
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where identified under broad categories for both courts of superior jurisdiction and courts of 
lower jurisdiction in both Nigeria and South Africa. The factors identified are intrinsic and 
extraneous to the court and its rules and procedures. They influence the process of 
ascertainment and invariably how judicial discretion is exercised. While chapters five and six 
identified factors for the courts of superior jurisdiction, chapter seven examined how the 
factors feature in lower courts 
Chapter eight therefore commences with linking concepts, with findings on process and 
factors that impact ascertainment and application of customary law, and then discusses some 
salient issues from the thesis. It thereafter states the summary of the similarities and 
differences in the factors identified, and briefly states the summary of factors that influence the 
ascertainment and application of customary law. The thesis concludes by presenting a model 
process of ascertainment and application of customary law by the courts, and with concluding 
remarks. 
 
8.2 Linking concepts, with findings on process and factors that impact ascertainment and 
application of customary law 
The process of ascertainment in Nigeria and South Africa is similar. It is by judicial notice and 
proof as facts.  In applying judicial notice, the rules of evidence give more room for exercise of 
judicial discretion in Nigeria than they do in South Africa due to its scanty provisions as 
discussed in chapter three. However, judicial notice was seldom used by Nigerian and South 
African courts in the cases analysed in this research. This is mainly because official versions of 
customary laws that capture the many nuanced differences between normative customary 
practices in a community, clan or even family are not exhaustive. Judicial notice was used in 
relation to broad and common principles, such as male primogeniture. Where used, it was 
mainly in relation to the official customary law and it was assumed to be the current normative 
practice of the communities in the dispute and was developed without any reference to what 
the living norm might be.  In this regard, the provisions of the old Evidence Act of Nigeria offer a 
better way of proving customary law through judicial notice. It required a degree of proof2 that 
                                                          
2
Already discussed under 3.4.1.1 in chapter three. 
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justifies the use of judicial notice and confines such use to laid down rules and principles. This is 
what currently obtains in South Africa. This thesis recommends that what is sought to be 
judicially noticed should first be affirmed by the subject community. This ensures that a 
customary norm derives validity from the community and not from state institutions. It ensures 
that living law is taken into consideration and that however it is developed, it will be practically 
relevant to the community. 
The very same methods that facilitate judicial ascertainment of customary law can also 
aid the ascertainment of living customary law. However, they are not without problems that 
could impede ascertaining living customary law.3  Where for instance the approach or 
processes employed to ascertain is only suitable to ascertain written customary law, where the 
written law is markedly different from the living version, the result will be a distortion or official 
version of customary law that deviates from the living version. Such distortions can be 
exacerbated if courts, when exercising discretion, are led by some of the intrinsic or extrinsic 
factors identified in this research, into developing the official version further away from the 
lived normative practices in the relevant community.4 
Ascertaining customary law as facts that must be led in evidence is more frequently 
utilised in both countries and is done differently by specialized customary law courts and by 
regular courts. For the former, customary rules of procedure are utilised in South Africa by the 
chiefs and headmen’s court and in Nigeria by customary courts though the source of the rules 
utilised in Nigeria is questioned. Since the courts of chiefs and headmen are versed and 
knowledgeable in the customary law of their locale, they do not need to ascertain customary 
law. However, they confer together to fill up gaps, confirm grey areas and agree on what is just 
in the context of the circumstances of each case.  The discretion they exercise in this regard 
accords with the flexibility imbedded in the very nature of customary law adjudication, which 
focuses on the context and conciliatory justice that accords with practical realities and norms in 
                                                          
3
 See 4.3.2 under chapter four.  
4
Adeyemi Ajani agrees that the exercise of judicial discretion by courts in Nigeria is determined by factors beyond 
the black letter of the law. Ajani B A ‘The nature of judicial process in Anglo-Nigerian jurisprudence’ (2016) 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2742586 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2742586 (accessed on 
14/01/2016) 3 & 6. 
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the community. This approach engenders customary law ascertainment (where applicable) and 
application. This is not exactly so for customary courts in Nigeria because their judges are 
lawyers and are not necessarily knowledgeable in the contents of applicable customary law 
before them, and the operation of the court does not fully foster this. For the regular courts, 
statutory rules and principles of evidence and procedure are utilised. Though the customary 
court of appeal in Nigeria falls under the category of customary courts, rules of evidence apply 
and to this extent, it operates in similar fashion as the latter.   
The conceptual and processual issues that have been raised in chapters two, three and 
four as well as the factors that influence discretion raise salient issues that are further 
addressed in this chapter.  
 
8.3 Salient issues 
8.3.1 Undue adherence to court’s rules and procedures 
While the ascertainment of customary law is subject to procedural rules, compliance to these 
rules need not be rigid. The rules should be relaxed where that would aid ascertainment 
without compromising the nature and peculiarity of a customary law system. The Court of 
Appeal Rules in order 20 rule2 provides that ‘The Court may direct a departure from the court 
rules in any way this is required in the interest of justice’.   Bone and Cover have long 
challenged a uniform application of a procedural rule across board ‘regardless of the 
substantive stakes’.5 In line with this view, Cover urges flexibility in applying procedural rules in 
order ‘to serve different substantive interests,’6 and has cautioned that they should only be 
utilised where they ‘successfully enforce the substantive policies at stake’.  
In customary law adjudication, especially by the customary courts in Nigeria, there are 
instances of strict adherence to procedural rules which have impeded the ascertainment of 
customary law. In Rifkat Dogo v Yuana Musa,7 the appellant had a cogent ground for 
                                                          
5
Bone R G ‘Securing the normative foundation of litigation reform’ (1975) 86 BULR 1156. Bone referring to Robert 
M Clover ‘For James Wm. Moore: Reflections on a reading of the rules’ 84 Y LJ 718.  
6
Ibid. 
7
Unreported CCA/CVA/9/2011.Discussed under 6.2.2.3 in chapter six and 7.3.1.5 in chapter seven. 
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challenging the content of the applicable customary law adopted by the judge, but the appeal 
was thrown out by the FCT Customary Court of Appeal because the appellant’s counsel did not 
give reasons for filing a late appeal. This was clearly a technicality. Under section 19 (2) of the 
Customary Court Act, the Customary Court of Appeal is enjoined to exercise its appellate 
powers with a view to achieving ‘substantive justice without undue regard to technicalities’.8 
The court clearly did not comply with this provision. The court ought to have entertained the 
appellant’s substantive grounds challenging the content of the customary law applied by the 
court a quo by giving the appellant a chance to make oral explanation for the late filing. By 
failing to do this, the court missed the chance to ascertain the true content of the applicable 
customary law in the consideration of the lower court’s judgement.9 
The customary court rules provide that the underlying aim of litigation before the court 
is substantive justice without undue regard for procedures.10 Thus, certain rules of evidence are 
excluded from application to customary courts. It does not make logical sense that the 
Customary Court of Appeal will follow procedure very strictly on appeal from customary courts 
where strict rules of procedure and evidence do not apply, especially when the category of the 
parties are the same. It defeats the cause of justice when adherence to procedural rules 
precludes a consideration of the substantive matter in such a case.  Indiscriminate adherence to 
procedures in cases litigated before customary courts is capable of impeding the exercise of 
judicial discretion in addressing the substance of the customary law that is to be ascertained. 
The overarching objective in such cases must be substantive justice.  
Indeed, section 24 of the Customary Court Act emphasizes substantive justice. It 
empowers the court to require any person present in court to give evidence where it believes 
such evidence may be relevant to, for example, determining the content of the applicable 
                                                          
8
 The Act also seeks to promote the attainment of reconciliatory justice - a value known to customary law - by 
providing that in all civil matters, the ‘customary court may promote reconciliation among the parties thereto and 
encourage and facilitate amicable settlement thereof’. See Section 15 (2) of the Act. 
9
 This is especially so since order 7 rule 15 Customary Court of Appeal Rules 1996 allows for additional evidence on 
appeal either by the customary court of appeal or by the customary court. This would give the appellant the 
opportunity to have the appropriate customary law ascertained. The court is willing to grant concession to the 
litigant not represented by counsel under order 5 rule 10 to ‘waive compliance … in so far as they relate to the 
preparation and filling of briefs of argument; either wholly or in part…’ This concession appears more serious than 
application for extension of time and the lapse should not have been penalised in this manner. 
10
Order 11 rule 2. 
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customary rule. This was done in the case of Dorcas Adamu v Adamu Garba.11 In Ann 
Okekeocha v Chuks Okekeocha & Ors,12 the court ignored procedural rules to issue summons to 
compel vital witnesses to appear court when it was informed that compelling the witnesses 
would affect the quality of their testimony on the content of the applicable customary law.  It 
rather agreed to a number of adjournments until such vital witness was prepared to testify in 
court. 
The exercise of discretion to give weight to evidence is not arbitrary but it is to ‘discern 
the course prescribed by law’.13  Even though the exercise of discretion on procedural matters 
is also important, the weight of the substance of the evidence is greater.14 Chief Justice Marshal 
had long cautioned that the judge’s exercise of discretion in procedural matters should not be 
exercised to such extent as to ‘penalize’ the consideration of the substantive rights of the 
parties on merits.15 This is so because how judges exercise discretion in procedural matters 
affects the substantive rights of parties.16 
Kludze, writing on customary law in Ghana, observed differences in the rules and 
procedures of official and informal courts.17He noted in particular a considerable degree of 
flexibility ‘in the rules of customary courts’ which lean on ‘reconciliation and neighbourliness 
rather than blind justice’.18Such flexibility, notwithstanding the informality of their procedures, 
has been noted to achieve ‘forensic ends’ comparable to formal courts.19A considerable degree 
of flexibility and emphasis on reconciliation attends to proceedings of the courts of chiefs and 
headmen in South Africa than in customary courts in Nigeria, due to the institutional status and 
the greater levels of formality in procedures in the customary courts.  
                                                          
11
Supra discussed under 7.3.1.5 in chapter seven. 
12
Unreported FCT/CC/NYA/CV/008/2012 FCT. 
13
 Spindle R B ‘Judicial discretion in Common law courts’ (2012) 4.2/3 WLLR 148. 
14
Ibid. 
15
Ibid at 147-8. 
16
Ibid p 147. The judges view discretion as the ‘exercise of judicial judgment based on facts and guided by the law 
or equitable decisions’ expressed in the Nigerian case of UBA Ltd v Stalibau GMBH and co. KG Justice Nweze JCA as 
he then was in Oshisanya, I O An Almanac of Contemporary and Convergent Jurisprudential Restatements (2015) 
445. 
17
Kludze AKP ‘Evolution of the different regimes of customary law in Ghana within the framework of the principle 
of stare decisis in Allott A & Woodman G (eds) People's Law and State Law: the Bellagio Papers  (1985) 102. 
18
Ibid. 
19
Allott A N, Epstein A L & Gluckman M ‘Procedures: Proceedings and evidence in African customary law’ in 
Gluckman (ed) Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law (1969) OUP 22. 
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8.3.2  Engaging the rules of evidence 
Judges analyse and weigh evidence to justify their decisions. According to Perry, besides 
applying applicable principles when adjudicating in a case, it must also be practically possible 
for the judge to access the uniquely correct answer, and where there is no consensus in the 
evidence before him//her, to adopt the ‘judicial point of view’.20To adopt a judicial point of 
view, the ‘judge [must] study [the] case carefully, paying close attention to relevant legal 
standards and legally significant facts…’ and must ‘be sincerely rational.’21 
A judge may reach any decision that may seem to him/her to be rational, provided 
he/she can offer a legally reasonable basis for it, and sincerely considers it the most plausible in 
the circumstances.22Only then can there be judicial justification for the decision even though it 
must be borne in mind that other factors outside the judge’s control may also have a bearing 
on the decision. As much as it depends on the judge, he/she must apply a level of judicial 
rationality, discreetly working within the ambit of the rules, in order to ascertain the applicable 
living customary law. In this manner, the majority of the judges in the Mayelane23case were 
able to ground their decision on a sound judicial basis. And though the minority judgement 
could well conform to Perry’s proposition, the majority approach was more comprehensive 
because it went beyond the narrower strictures of the rules of evidence to ensure that 
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Perry T D 'Judicial method and the concept of reasoning,’ (1969) 80 EIJSPLP 5 & 6. 
21
Hoffmaster B ‘Understanding judicial discretion’ (1982) 1.1 LPS 39-40. 
22
 Perry op cit note 20 at 9. 
23
Supra. As discussed under 5.2.1.3 in chapter five. Judges must exercise caution in adopting any norms put before 
them as representing the applicable customary law. Kingdom C J in the case of Balogun v Oshodi (1931) 10 NLR 36 
at 57 expressed his hesitation to apply a customary practice proved before him as being the practice adopted by a 
number of people within that community where he is not fully convinced that the custom had evolved. Elias 
commended this caution due to the consequences of the court’s vital role in giving judicial backing to ‘alleged’ 
customs. He however stated that the court’s hesitation could ‘tend towards legal conservatism’. Elias T Ground 
Work of Nigerian Law (1954) 15 -16. As a solution, he advised that the court may apply to the Native Authority for 
a declaration, which may recommend modifications based on the current circumstance prevailing in the 
community. In line with the Native Authority (Amendment) Ordinance No. 3 of 1945. This however raises the 
concern of whether or how the Native Authority’s position is censored and validated by the community who are 
supposed to be the generators of their customary law. Allott had observed the rule of confirming modifications of 
customs by the community and adopted by the courts. See Allott A N ‘The judicial ascertainment of customary law 
in British Africa’ (1957) 20.3 MLR 255-256. 
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necessary proof of living customary law could be admitted while still working within the 
broader scope of the court’s rules of procedure. 
The thesis therefore recommends against an undue reliance on procedures that impede 
a more thorough ascertainment process. Where what is at stake is a vital customary rule that 
affects the broader community, the court must go beyond mere compliance with rules that 
limit its ability to establish the content of the applicable living customary law. The court’s 
approach in Mayelane, which allowed epistemological findings to be admitted, generated 
valuable evidence that strengthened its decision on the content of the applicable customary 
law.24 The court had to push to the edge of boundaries to request for further evidence 
regardless that there were evidence of the content of the applicable customary law already 
before it. The step taken by the Constitutional Court was also informed by the transformation 
thrust on the court which is explained as being somewhere in between a ‘reform’ and 
‘revolution’.25 Though the exercise of discretion by the court in this case was wide, it was within 
the confines of the applicable rules26 
8.3.3  Constitutional recognition and mandate 
As pointed out in chapter one, while the Constitution of South Africa expressly recognizes 
customary law as a distinct source of law, the Nigerian Constitution’s recognition is not so 
explicit. This omission in the Nigerian Constitution explains why customary law remains 
subservient to the Common law. In South Africa also, there is fiercer resistance to the 
repugnancy clause than in Nigeria.   Nevertheless, the application of customary law is subject to 
constitutional rights in both countries. In South Africa, there is a clear constitutional mandate 
for courts to develop customary law in accordance with the bill of rights. This, without doubt, 
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 Maurice Pieterse explained that ‘constitutional transformation in South Africa includes the dismantling of the 
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243 
 
 
was the basis for the radical stance that the courts adopted in Shilibana, Bhe and Mayelane.  As 
a result of this stance, South African courts have consistently premised the development and 
application of customary law on the bill of rights. However, while the Nigerian Constitution may 
not expressly provide for development, courts have been alert to constitutional rights 
restrictions on customary law in certain cases.  The question is whether they have attempted 
some engineering that corrects something flawed in the norm, but keep it close as much as 
possible to what the people largely accept. The tendency, when they are called upon to 
ascertain and apply customary law, is to pronounce upon the constitutionality or otherwise, or 
the repugnancy or otherwise of a customary norm asserted before them. Such 
pronouncements may in some instances constitute developments on the customary norm, but 
such are few. In the Nigerian case of Agbai v. Okogbue27 Justice Nwokedi JSC, as he then was, 
stated that: 
The doctrine of repugnancy in my view affords the courts the opportunity 
for fine tuning customary laws to meet changed social conditions where 
necessary, more especially as there is no forum for repealing or amending 
customary laws. I do not intend to be understood as holding that the courts 
are there to enact customary laws. When however customary law is 
confronted by a novel situation, the courts have to consider its application 
under existing social environment. 
 
South African courts have, in some instances, endeavoured to develop a norm so as to 
conform it to the constitution while retaining the essential character of the norm. 
 Customary law is developed with the object of ensuring conformity with constitutional 
and statutory provisions, and with the repugnancy and public policy tests. Development is also 
essential to bring it in line with living customary law; and, in accordance with current socio-
economic realities of the communities in situations where the customary law is yet to adapt to 
these realities. Nigerian and South African courts have been unfavourably disposed towards the 
repugnancy and public policy standard in order to validate customary law in its ascertainment 
and application because the standards utilised are foreign to customary law concepts. In 
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Mabuza v Mbatha28, the court regarded the repugnancy and public policy standard as flawed, 
antithetical to the development of customary law, and therefore irrelevant in South Africa’s 
constitutional dispensation. The court preferred the rule of constitutional compliance. By 
contrast in Nigeria, though the Supreme Court has held in Agbai v Okogbue29that constitutional 
compliance replaced the repugnancy clause, some judges still utilise the standards set by the 
repugnancy and public policy clause. Indeed, in the 2014 judgement of the Supreme Court in 
the case of Anekwe v Nweke,30 the repugnancy test featured greatly as a basis for which the 
Awka customary norm that disinherited a widow because she had no male child for the 
deceased was annulled. There may be a political rationality behind this divergence between the 
two countries. The Mabuza case strongly associated the repugnancy and public policy standard 
to Apartheid, for which there is a concerted effort to move away from.  In Nigeria, even though 
this is associated with colonial repression, such concerted efforts are not that evident and 
besides, court rules and even the Evidence Act still retain the repugnancy standard 
notwithstanding calls for discontinuing its use, hence judges still utilise them.31 
 
8.3.4  Adversarial system of adjudication 
The adversarial system in civil trials determines to an extent how trials are conducted and may 
influence the process of ascertainment and application of customary law. Comparative law now 
recognises that most legal systems do not necessarily operate strictly as inquisitorial and 
adversarial systems but may blend elements of both at different points of a trial.32 The 
adversarial system presupposes that the parties are in control of the trials and judges play 
passive roles as impartial umpires.33 Hence where litigants are unrepresented by counsel, 
judges feel restrained and refrain from adequately seeking clarification during adjudication lest 
they be said to have descended into the arena. On the other hand, in the inquisitorial system, 
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judges control the trial, can call witnesses, put questions to them34 and adequately satisfy 
whatever enquiry they may have.35 
Although the adversarial system requires judicial detachment, Mcwen asserts that this is 
not entirely the case because judges do show some level of engagement to discover the truth 
and achieve justice.36Thus, while both systems may appear to be direct contrasts, in practice, 
they infuse certain features of each other, with the legal system determining which elements 
dominate.37Thus, while Nigeria and South Africa are adversarial systems, judges are not as 
passive as would be expected in an adversarial system. They sometimes participate during trials 
by seeking further clarification, requesting further evidence, or by inviting amici, assessors and 
experts to aid how they exercise discretion in the ascertainment and application of customary 
law.38However, judges have also restrained themselves from seeking further clarity in order to 
appear impartial. But there is a tendency among South African judges to be more engaged 
during proceedings than their Nigerian counterparts. This could be attributed to South Africa’s 
Roman-Dutch civil law heritage and the stronger constitutional imperative in South Africa for 
courts to apply customary law than in Nigeria.  
A roundtable on the adversarial system which was organised by the Nigerian Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies recommends against operating the adversarial system in Nigeria’s 
courts.39According to one recommendation, judges should be allowed to ‘descend into the 
arena’ whenever there is a need to clarify issues in the particular cases. Secondly, that ‘[t]he 
concept of judicial precedent should be minimised because it stalls [judicial] imaginativeness, 
initiative and thought.’ These recommendations are relevant as they indicate that judges 
should be free to apply their minds to credible evidence on a question of customary law where 
a judicial precedent would suggest a different outcome. 
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8.3.5  Systems of consultations 
The systems of official and unofficial consultations adopted by the courts of lower jurisdiction, 
in so far as they entail the consultations of persons versed in the applicable customary law, 
would influence the exercise of the judges’ discretion towards the ascertainment and 
application of living customary law. There are however concerns where chiefs and headmen 
consult magistrates who themselves require assessors to ascertain and apply customary law. 
Even though this is unofficially done, it reveals the risk of tampering with the adjudicatory 
structure of these courts with the same challenge faced by the Western styled courts, i.e. the 
encroachment of Western conceptions of law on the otherwise revered knowledge of the chiefs 
and headmen, which is an advantage it has over western trained judges. Part of the reason why 
these chiefs and headsmen’s courts consult magistrates is the underlying pressures they feel to 
comply with standards of the magistrates with respect to their judgements.40 This is similar to 
the experience of the commissioner’s courts in Nigeria who were overwhelmed by Eurocentric 
conceptions and away from the application of living customary law.41 
One way the pressure to consult magistrates has impacted courts of chiefs and a 
headsman is the use of judicial notice, which is not ordinarily applicable to them. This has led 
them away from the primary focus of attaining substantive justice towards compliance with 
‘pre-ordained rules’.42 The empirical data reveal that the pressures to conform to statutory pre-
ordained rules have now set in and the implication unfortunately is that it will hinder its focus 
on applying living customary law.43 
The pressure to conform to the standards of a higher appellate court takes another form 
for judges of the customary courts in Nigeria but the results are similar. Their preference for 
precedents over the lived experiences of indigenes, elders and custodians of the applicable 
customary law calls for concern and is tended away from the ascertainment and application of 
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living customary law. A recommendation is therefore made for the implementation of 
measures to stall these pressures that threaten the efficiency of these traditional institutions as 
primary custodians of living customary law. Judges of customary courts also need to be made 
mindful of their responsibility to ascertain and apply customary law.   
 
8.3.6  Indices of the lower courts 
The customary courts, in resolving contradictory evidence have relied on a number of 
considerations discussed in chapter seven. One of the considerations is the preference for 
judicial precedent over evidence of lived experiences. There is a challenge where these 
precedents are generally applied without credence to the lived realities and nuances of the 
particular community. The judges of the customary courts in the ascertainment and application 
of customary law have exercised their discretion by inventing the contents of customary law 
where no evidence is presented before the court. They have also misapplied precedents that 
have no bearing on the particular content before the court, and have applied rules of statutes 
based on Common law.44Order 13 r 145 provides that ‘the court may in its discretion make any 
order within its powers and jurisdiction which it considers the justice of the case demands 
whether or not the order has been asked for by the party who is entitled to the benefit 
thereof’. This thesis contends that the court cannot make such orders outside the proved 
applicable customary law. 
Generally, the lower courts in both countries are reluctant to delve into the domain of 
the development of customary law and are careful to exercise discretion in ways that would 
develop customary law. This is especially so for the magistrate courts in South Africa who view 
the act of developing customary law as outside their power and the customary court judges in 
Nigeria who feel that it is the right of the communities to develop their customary law. 
However, in certain instances, in the customary courts, the judge exercises discretion to fill up 
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gaps for the sake of achieving certainty and compliance to repugnancy standards and this may 
be a form of development and positivist inclined.  
The suggestion by one of the customary court judges that the development of 
customary law should imbibe the broad principles of the customs of major communities could 
lead to the application of customary law that is foreign to that particular community. Since 
these lower courts are reluctant to attempt development, the tendency will at worst be a case 
of absolution or a declaration of unconstitutionality or failing to meet the repugnancy 
standard.46 
Development at the chief’s court is done differently. Where they are aware of statutory 
provisions that conflict with the customary practices, at the point of making a decision in a case 
before them, they confer with the council and the community at large to develop the living 
customary law.  Sometimes the chief may, where he considers it reasonable, on his own 
volition, develop the customary law to conform to statutory provisions.   
Two practices at the chiefs’ courts may affect the courts discretion towards living 
customary law. The first is the fact that the chiefs sometimes go to the magistrate courts to 
observe what is done there to be guided as to what to do in adjudication. As earlier mentioned, 
this may alter the system of adjudication to suit the Western styled courts systems. The second 
is the utilisation of their own records of proceedings as a guide to decision-making in similar 
cases. This will amount to producing official customary law even in the chiefs’ court. The danger 
is that after a period of time, what the chiefs’ and headmen’s courts apply as customary law will 
have little bearing with living customary practices.  
Both magistrates and judges of the customary courts indicated that legal representation 
of litigants aids them in adjudication and particularly in ascertaining and applying living 
customary law. According to them, being Western styled courts manned by trained lawyers, the 
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legal practitioners understand the procedure and standard of proof and endeavour to ensure 
that sufficient evidence is put before the court.  
Another challenge in the lower courts is where the court approaches the ascertainment 
of customary law using a legalistic approach to problem solving, as opposed to the customary 
law preference for a commonsensical approach.47 Such a legalistic approach, which draws a 
clear distinction between ‘procedure, evidence and substantive law’,would be inappropriate, 
because customary law knows no such distinction since it is not  divided along lines of 
specialisation as ‘an European type court would in an abstract sense deal with a legal 
principle.’48 
Even a customary court constituted by trained lawyers which ostensibly acknowledges 
that no such distinction can be applied to customary law, may yet approach ascertainment 
oblivious to a mind-set that has been shaped by European legal traditions. The courts may still 
resort to the strict rules of evidence, and may also view, interpret and approach the application 
of customary rules very differently from a traditional chief. This is because there are distinctions 
on how the judge and the traditional chief view customary law. While a judge who is a trained 
lawyer views the rules of customary law as ‘guidelines’, a traditional chief views them as 
‘prescriptive’.49   Thus, the result produced from ascertaining and applying customary law could 
be drastically different.  Indeed, none traditional courts are more likely to produce an outcome 
that fails to affirm the actual practice relating to the custom.50 
The day to day adjudication on customary law issues gives the judge of a customary 
court and even the customary court of appeal an edge over that of a regular court who might 
become more overwhelmed by English law concepts which he/she unconsciously imports into 
the customary law cases before it.  
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Though the chiefs and headmen’s courts have resources that are useful to the 
ascertainment and application of customary law, the earlier proposals in the Traditional Court’s 
Bill giving enormous powers to traditional leaders did overstretch customary law practices.51  It 
attempted to centralise powers on the chiefs and fence out other vital roles played by 
traditional hierarchies in the communities and this may foster an environment that could create 
a form of customary law emanating from the chiefs without any consensus from the people.52 
  
*                              *                                           * 
In sum, it is vital to note that this thesis acknowledges the limitations of associating living 
customary with only its rules. Rightly ascertaining customary law must go beyond the 
conventional methods of ascertainment as Himonga et al state that customary law: 
[I]s found in sources such as language, rituals, history, folktales and 
storytelling as well as current issues that are prevalent in oral 
communications …. In the normal course of events, participants have 
access these sources and have no difficulty in interpreting them.53 
 
These sources cannot be adequately captured by official customary law and hence 
continue to make necessary evidence of lived experiences of the people whose customary law 
is sought to be ascertained. Bekker and van der Merwe endorse the recommendation of the 
South African Law Reform Commission for courts to appoint assessors from communities or 
experts in the field to aid the ascertainment of customary law which could dispense with the 
need and cost of calling witnesses by litigants.54 This thesis asserts that given the volatile nature 
of customary law, even chiefs who are its custodians need to confer with their counsellors and 
elders. Therefore utilising assessors whose knowledge cannot be challenged under cross 
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examination has a higher tendency to give room for errors that conflict with living customary 
law.55 
Having discussed the salient issues that emerged from this research, the summary of the 
similarities and differences in the factors that impact on the court’s ascertainment and 
application of customary law identified in both countries are stated below. 
 
8.4   Summary of similarities and differences in the factors identified 
The jurisdiction of superior and lower courts to hear customary law cases in Nigeria and South 
Africa are not the same.56 Similarities and differences exist in the structure of their courts, rules, 
processes and practices, as well as in the factors that influence discretion. With regards to 
superior courts, judges basically utilise similar methods of ascertainment such as precedents, 
texts, codes or legislations, witnesses and experts. However, South African courts tend to place 
greater reliance on the expert evidence of historians, anthropologists, sociologist and 
archaeological reports. Other similar factors include considerations in the resolution of 
evidential contradictions in terms of the weight apportioned to the evidence before the court, 
constraints of appellate courts, legislative protection of the status of statutory law over 
customary law, constitutional and statutory compliance, interface between the rules of 
positivism and pluralism and consideration for legal certainty.  
The distinctions in the factors identified and peculiar to South Africa cover areas of 
choice of court process in instituting an action where the commencement of an action by way 
of motion may restrict the judges from accessing sufficient evidence for clarification of grey 
areas or gaps in the affidavit evidence. There is also the particular distinctiveness of the judges’ 
ideology and experience and how these impact on how they ascertain and apply customary 
law. Others include the transformation agenda and Constitutional mandate to develop 
customary law and the impact of the participation of non-governmental organizations and 
government commissions on the courts’ decisions.  
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For Nigeria, these distinctions cover the hindrance of technicalities where the ground of 
appeal may not be directly linked to ascertainment of customary law, but would impact it 
nonetheless, accuracy of interpreters,   the inability to afford legal representation and 
incompetence of counsel. All these factors were categorised under institutional, substantive, 
socio-economic and political, and procedural factors respectively. 
The Summary of factors that influence the ascertainment and application of customary 
law are highlighted below. 
 
8.5  Summary of factors that influence the ascertainment and application of 
customary law 
 
8.5.1  Institutional factors 
Institutional factors that influence how judges exercise discretion when ascertaining and 
applying customary law pertain to the judges’ exposure to customary law during training, the 
judge’s background, and law career. They also include statutory prescripts and the limitations 
of the adversarial system.  
When statutory provisions prescribe what courts may ascertain, they invariably regulate 
the exercise of discretion. Under the Nigeria Evidence Act for example, the requirement that 
‘long usage’ may be used as evidence of the existence of a custom invariably constrains the 
ascertainment of living customary law. Also, the absence of notoriety as a requirement for 
judicial notice does not mandate reference to sufficient judgements to credibly validate the 
establishment of a customary norm which may also constrain the ascertainment and 
application of living customary law. On the other hand, the statutory definition of customary 
law in South Africa can clearly accommodate the features of living customary law.  
Giving primacy to statutory law over the living norms where they differ – as it frequently 
happens, also impedes the ascertainment and application of living customary law. Likewise 
when statutory rules are misapplied in relation to customary procedures. An example is where 
rules pertaining to hearsay evidence are applied on historical narrations which under customary 
law are valid normative sources rather than hearsay evidence. However, where a statute 
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provides for the application of a customary norm without prescribing its content, it gives room 
for the exercise of judicial discretion in the ascertainment and application of living customary 
law. 
Inadequacy of the law curricula on customary law in both countries constitutes another 
persistent institutional constraint, which has prompted57many jurists to express the need for 
change in the curricula. In South Africa, the need is hinged on the transformation objectives 
that underpin the Constitution.58 According to Dennis David, change is necessary to avoid a 
conflict between the ‘legal culture conveyed through existing legal education’ and the 
constitutional ambition.’59Indeed, some steps have been initiated in that direction, with the 
Council of Higher Education ‘responsible for quality assurance of higher education 
qualifications’60 in South Africa having mandated a review of the LL.B curriculum to incorporate, 
amongst others, cultural rights that are rooted in the Constitution and its transformative 
mandate.61 Nigeria should tow the same line. There is good reason for this. Law curricula in the 
country already offer LL.B degrees on sharia and common law. A curriculum that offers 
specialized LLB degrees on customary law and common law should also be established. Though 
partly applicable in Nigeria, for both jurisdictions, training in customary law should be a 
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prerequisite for at least some judicial appointments into courts that exercise jurisdiction in 
customary law.62 
 
8.5.2  Substantive factors 
Substantive factors identified include the judges’ grasps of the concept of customary law and its 
development, methods of ascertainment, constitutional standards, the quest to achieve justice, 
the repugnancy and public policy tests, the judges’ perception of judicial discretion, and 
considerations of legal certainty. These play significant roles on how the judges exercise 
discretion.  
Other considerations such as equity, humaneness, conscience, justice and even 
constitutional compliance have influenced the exercise of discretion by judges in both the 
courts of superior and lower jurisdiction. According to Aldrich and Cass, ‘[e]ach judge brings 
different values and life experiences to law and facts, often coming to a different conclusion 
than another judge might in a similar situation.’63Sometimes, pragmatism is tied to it. Posner 
asserts, with respect to American courts, that pragmatism has featured considerably as a factor 
that determines how judges adjudicate.64The findings in this thesis also confirm that 
pragmatism sometimes influence how judges exercise discretion in ascertaining and applying 
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customary law in Nigeria and South Africa. Depending on the circumstances, it may impede or 
enhance the ascertainment and application of living customary law.65 
 Judges subject the ascertainment and application of customary law to Constitutional 
standards in two ways. First, some judges (a few) would at the point of ascertainment accept 
evidence of the content of customary law that is more consistent with Constitutional 
provisions. Secondly, almost all judges first ascertain the customary norm and thereafter 
subject what has been ascertained to a Constitutional standard applying same to the facts of 
the case. In the first category, the judge’s discretion could deviate from ascertaining living 
customary law if at the point of ascertainment it rejects a customary norm after finding that it 
fails a Constitutional standard. This may result in imposing a fictitious version on the parties.   
With respect to subjecting what has been ascertained to constitutional standards, the 
challenge arises over whether what has been ascertained complies with Constitutional 
provisions such as the bill of rights. Where it fails, it may be developed. In this regard, Lehnert is 
of the view that the court may invoke the choice of law rule and apply another norm or 
statutory provision and that only the legislature can develop customary law through 
legislation.66 In other words, courts may only make pronouncements on constitutionality.67 
Should courts adopt such a view, it would severely impede the development of customary law 
where necessary.  
The values of customary law which may conflict with Eurocentric conception of rights 
should not be ignored in considering what the justice in a case should be.68 Cobbah explained 
that Western philosophy of law is not ‘the only rational way of living human life’.69 His position 
is that efforts ‘should be directed to searching out homeomorphic equivalents in different 
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cultures’.  Lehnert, writing on the South African situation,70 asserts that customary law values 
are not necessarily inimical to constitutional values and should also be considered in the 
determination of the constitutionality of the customary rule in question.71 At least the right to 
culture in sections 30 and 31 assures this. Lehnert advocates for the development of customary 
law which entails ‘the application and interpretation of the law in light of the Constitution’ 
rather than merely ‘striking down a rule’ that violates the Constitution.72 His advocating 
interpreting customary law ‘to accommodate human rights … by taking into account the 
different societal mechanism’73 is apt. However, his position that the choice of law rule be 
invoked, and that statute be adopted by the courts where the applicable customary rule 
offends constitutional provisions would impede the application of living customary law. 
Section 39(2) of the South African Constitution specifically confers this responsibility on 
the court. There are two factors that determine why courts develop customary law. The first is 
to bring it into conformity with the Constitution and its underlying values. The second is to 
ensure its relevance to the lived realities of the people who are bound by it. Similar 
considerations underpin subjecting customary law to a repugnancy, public policy and statutory 
compliance review.  However, every review must be moderated by one overarching principle, 
namely the preservation and development of customary law rules or values that are not 
necessarily harmful. This thesis recommends the practice at the chiefs and headmen courts in 
the North West, South Africa where the community and the elders would be consulted on what 
they would want the development to entail. Vulnerable members of the community should not 
be excluded in the consultations.74 This may be a cumbersome task for an adjudicatory 
institution to embark upon but a pragmatic way to address this should be considered. Where 
judges for the sake of achieving legal certainty take a position or manufacture customary rules, 
they exercise wide discretion outside the confines of evidential rules.  
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A factor that features in all court types in both jurisdictions apart from the chiefs and 
headmen’s court is the consideration for certainty. While some judges admit that it influences 
how they ascertain and apply customary law, a few indicated otherwise. While for the latter, it 
leads to an absolution, the application of the former may lead away from living customary law, 
therefore, the format taken by the judge in Lewis v Bankole discussed below is suggested. What 
is crucial here though, is the fact that the way and manner the chiefs and headmen’s court 
handle this promotes the ascertainment and application of living customary law. 
 One of the chiefs’ interviewed on the consideration of certainty, would ensure the 
participation of the entire community to agree on a rule within the bounds of what is 
acceptable to the community. Another chief would be guided by the people’s practices or what 
rule the community agrees should guide them. These methods would lead towards living 
customary law.   However for another chief, where the content of customary law is not so clear, 
he would import provisions from applicable statutes and the Constitution for the sake of 
achieving certainty or covering up gaps, and this exercise of discretion would most likely lead 
away from the ascertainment and application of customary law.  
Ubink alludes to the fact that endeavours by governments and researchers to reduce 
customary law into writing is to avoid ‘uncertainty and discretion caused by its flexibility and to 
come to grips with the content and nature of customary law for their own understanding’.75 
While this is true for the attempts made and being made in both countries, the achievement of 
certainty is not a value in customary law and seeking certainty should never defeat the 
ascertainment and application of living customary law, or result in its crystallization.76 
Lastly, subjecting customary law to legislation, the constitution and its bill of rights 
should never fail to acknowledge the concept of rights under customary law. Fortunately, South 
Africa’s Constitution guarantees the right to culture.77 According to Mnisi, the debates on 
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constitutional and customary law rights can be analysed in two ways. First, are Eurocentric or 
universalist views about human rights, for which the concept of the universality of human rights 
is essentially focused on the individual. These views are antithetical to the cultural relativism 
that is imbedded in customary law concepts about rights, which promote communality as 
opposed to individuality, and conciliatory justice.78 Secondly, the prioritization of ‘civil and 
political rights’ by universalists contrasts with the prioritization of ‘socio-economic and cultural 
rights’ by relativists.79 To impose Eurocentric universalist views of rights on customary law 
simply overlooks the harmonious communality that underpins African societies and the rules 
that regulate and secure their interests. Thus, ensuring that customary law complies with 
Constitutional rights should never fail to make proper consideration for the value systems that 
underpin customary law.   
 
8.5.3  Socio-economic and political 
The transformative mandate of the South African Constitution represents a significant socio-
political and economic factor that informs the ideological dispositions of and experiences of 
South African judges. Socio-economic factors also impact the participation of non-
governmental organizations and government commissions, the ability to fund the costs of 
litigation, and the quality of legal representation. The transformation agenda implemented in 
Nigeria had a different focus and so it did not impact on how courts ascertain and apply 
customary law in the way and manner that it occurred in South Africa.80 
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In South Africa, the transformation mandate of the Constitution to ensure that 
customary law is developed in the ‘spirit and purport’ of the bill of rights has been particularly 
prominent in the minds of judges of the Constitutional Court when they ascertain and apply 
customary law. Hence, in the Shilubana case81 the court exercised wide discretion to justify 
departure from customary norms that excluded women from the line of succession. The court’s 
primary rationale was to uphold equality for women even in succession cases. The approach 
however is questioned.82Mnisi described it as a ‘contrivance’ and states that it resonates with 
the central ideology of the positivist legal traditions in which the judges were trained. Bekker 
and Van der Merwe observed that the court’s decision was not a development of customary 
law. Rather, it was a preference for an amendment to the customary rule on succession, made 
by the Valoyi Royal family to aid succession by Ms Shilubana.83 Though the preference was 
informed by the need to achieve the Constitution’s standard of gender parity on questions of 
succession, whether the court could initiate such a radical departure that alters the essence of 
the customary rule is debatable. Since Ms Shilubana was no longer in the line of succession and 
if a reversion was proposed, there were earlier cases of women who were skipped before her 
and should have been reverted to.   
In Jeffrey Brand-Ballard’s rightly held view, ‘a court misapplies a legal standard when it 
incorrectly presents the standard as a reason to reach a result or incorrectly treats the standard 
as a reason to reach the result.’84 A judge’s discretion must be exercised within ‘valid legal 
standards’.85 The Constitutional Court’s acceptance of an amendment to customary rule 
without first ascertaining/weighing the prevalence of the amendment rule by the entire 
community over partisan interest therefore arguably overreached the limits of what was legally 
permissible under customary law. 
According to most constitutional law scholars, adjudicating constitutional provisions 
sometimes necessitates the exercise of judicial discretion. Generally, however, there is dissent 
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about the legitimacy of discretion.86 For Pettys,87 judges in constitutional adjudication may 
acceptably exercise discretion where there is a divergence of judicial opinions regarding the 
facts to which a constitutional rule applies.88 This however does not provide justification for the 
minority judgement in the Pilane89 case since the appellants have clear cut constitutional rights 
which the perception of the facts by the dissenting judges infringe upon even if they were true.   
Judicial power (which includes its exercise of discretion) is accepted on the terms of its 
adherence to its process as a basis for its legitimization.90  This legitimacy is also tied to 
transparent engagement with the judging process91 to which procedural factors are vital and 
impact on it. 
 
8.5.4  Procedural factors 
One of the most critical procedural processes has to do with resolving conflicting evidence. 
Courts exercise considerable discretion when resolving conflicting evidence, and usually on a 
balance of probabilities, (a standard of proof under the rules of evidence). They may rely on the 
testimonies of witnesses who are custodians of customs, or may resort to a combination of 
anthropological or historical or other relevant texts, evidence and precedence. There were also 
instances of wrong application of these evidential rules by judges. These all influence how the 
court exercises discretion in the ascertainment and application of customary law. However, 
undue reliance on procedural rules does sometimes impede the exercise of discretion in 
ascertaining and applying living customary law. An example is where the court employs a 
technical rule that has nothing to do with the content of the applicable customary rule. 
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When an appellate court presides over a customary law dispute, it is confronted by two 
limitations that could influence how it exercises discretion to confirm or overrule a lower 
court’s finding on a question of ascertainment and application. First, unlike trial courts, 
appellate courts do not have the opportunity of testing the veracity of a testimony by observing 
the witness’ demeanour. Secondly, the rules of procedure constrain appellate courts from 
tampering with the findings of the trial court except for the achievement of justice. Exercising 
discretion within these limitations may mean that appellate courts may not always have the 
opportunity of ascertaining living customary law.  
Another procedural factor has to do with the choice of court process for commencing a 
lawsuit. Where the party comes by way of a motion that excludes pleadings and testimonies, 
what is put before the court as evidence of the applicable customary norm would be limited. In 
such instances, the court might be led to exercise discretion in a way that falls short of 
ascertaining living customary law, simply because there is insufficient evidence before the 
court.  
Flawed interpretations by court interpreters may also exclude testimonies that are 
crucial to ascertaining the relevant norm. The role of registrars in identifying and confirming 
amici, and the status of witnesses invited as either principal members of their communities or 
chiefs as expert witnesses enables the court to be possessed of evidence suitable for the 
exercise of its duty as it exercises its discretion. A salient point is the provision of order 20 rule 1 
of the Court of Appeal Rules  that records of proceedings from the customary court of appeal 
should also be submitted in the language in which the case was heard as well as in English 
language.; this may aid ascertainment. This is because the vernacular content of customary 
norms given in evidence will be available for assessment.  
The collegial sitting at the Constitutional Court where judges contribute actively to 
debates drawing on their wealth of experience, research and direct involvement with people 
also impacts on the exercise of discretion. So far, there were only a few indications that the 
gender of the judge impacts on how judges exercise discretion. Research findings show that the 
crucial factor is the judge’s ideology and experience which in a few instances is buttressed by 
the judge’s gender. 
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Having summarized the key findings of the factors that influence the ascertainment and 
application of customary law by formal courts in Nigeria and South Africa, the thesis presents 
below a model process of ascertainment and application of customary law by the court.  
 
8.6  A model process of ascertainment and application of customary law by the 
court 
 
The case of Lewis v Bankole attached here as ‘Appendix F’92is a locus classicus in Africa on the 
fact that it is living customary law that courts ought to ascertain. It also has a lot to offer on 
how courts should ascertain and apply customary law. Here, the court was faced with the 
question of whether according to the applicable native law and custom in Lagos, the estate of 
older children who had been assigned properties by their deceased father prior to his death 
could, several years after his death, claim rights to another property left by the deceased to the 
other children who had continued to live there and exercised ownership after the father’s 
demise. The Supreme Court on appeal ordered that further evidence be obtained on the 
content of the applicable customary law upon which the Full Court could give its judgment or 
revert the matter back to the Supreme Court for final decision. At the Full Court, five Lagos 
chiefs were invited by the judge to give evidence on the contents of the applicable customary 
law as to how they would decide the issues if the case had been before them.93 They were put 
on oath and the court presented a scenario with facts similar to the issues before the court and 
questions were posed to the chiefs at the same time. They were allowed to withdraw and 
confer amongst themselves before they responded one after the other to each of the questions 
asked by the court on how he would decide the matter. Their respective answers to a large 
extent were similar but differed in few instances.94 The court accepted the evidence and 
                                                          
92
Supra. Available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/LawReporting/1909/D.W.%20Lewis%20&%20Ors%20v%20%20Bankole%20&%20Ors.pdf (accessed on 
03/08/2017). 
93
 This is crucial because ssometimes, the issue is not with respect to gaps in customary but that there might be 
gaps in the knowledge of and how the adjudicator understands what is presented as evidence of its content. 
94
This case is attached as Appendix E to this thesis for details. 
263 
 
 
reasoning of the current chiefs in Lagos with their modifications which were based on current 
socio-economic considerations and rejected the old customary practice from outside Lagos. 
It is vital to note that the court did not ask the chiefs for the content of customary law 
but created a scenario depicting the facts of the case and asked how they would resolve specific 
issues in the context and circumstances of the case. Hence, they did not give ideal rules or mere 
customary rules but approached the issues contextually and with the flexibility it deserved. The 
court’s decision was based on the broad principles established from the responses of the chiefs 
collectively. The court still exercised a great deal of discretion in the nitty gritty of the facts with 
respect to the rights of the parties to the properties to achieve justice and fairness.  Osbourn C J 
in his judgment delivered in the case in 1909 stated that: 
[o]ne of the most striking features of West African native custom, to my 
mind, is its flexibility; it appears to have been always subject to motives of 
expediency, and it shows unquestionable adaptability to altered 
circumstances without entirely losing its individual characteristics. The 
great danger in applying it in this Court is that of crystallising it in such a 
way that it cannot be departed from in cases where expediency demands, 
and where natives themselves would depart from it; and I therefore preface 
my findings with the remark that they are intended as findings of the 
general principles which govern native custom in Lagos at the present day, 
and not as hard and fast findings of immutable native law.95 
With respect to judicial notice, therefore, it is recommended that, based on the 
quotation above, judges should depart from contents of customary law to be judicially noticed 
on grounds of expediency and where it is established that natives themselves would depart 
from it. With respect to proof as facts, contextual applications would accommodate nuances, 
evolvements and flexibility rather than strict adherence to mere rules. These will gear towards 
the ascertainment and application of living customary law, however, subject to the intrinsic and 
extrinsic factors identified in this thesis that impact on the ascertainment and application 
process.  
8.7  Concluding remarks 
The courts have made gradual progression on how they ascertain and apply customary law over 
the years but a lot is still desired. The similarities and distinctions noted in both jurisdictions 
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studied are not dissociated from the ideology, legal culture, history and other influences96 
which this range of factors explains. The identification of these factors should provide a 
platform upon which a process that enhances the ascertainment and application of living 
customary law will be nurtured.  
The crux in the exercise of discretion under the institutional, substantive, procedural and 
socio-economic and political factors is that it must lead to the ascertainment of living 
customary law. Where it fails to do so, it defeats the purpose of the Constitutional provision 
that recognises customary law (which has been interpreted to mean living customary law) as an 
independent source of law at par with other sources of law in South Africa. This interpretation 
is also acknowledged by a replete of judicial authorities in Nigeria as what ought to be 
ascertained and applied in court. 
Some of the cases analysed reveal that some judges did apply discretion outside the rules 
of evidence and principles applicable in the context of the cases. Richard Spindle explains that: 
[A] trial court must (1) apply the general rules of law, both of 
substance and of procedure, to (2) his observation of the parties in 
question and (3) his determination of the issues joined and (4) his 
general knowledge of local conditions, plus (5) a searching inquiry 
into the honesty of statements made of positions taken, and (6) 
without unconscionable advantage to either party to the controversy 
b(7) bring about a determination of the issue joined, on the true 
merits of the controversy.97 
 
Any other external consideration or influence would amount to an abuse of 
discretion.98This thesis asserts that while the list above should be the determining factors, there 
are other factors outside these that impact on the judge’s discretion in ascertaining and 
applying customary. These factors should be addressed in the quest for solutions to enhance 
the judges’ exercise of discretion in the ascertainment and application of customary law.  
While the legal framework provides a basis for the process of ascertainment and 
application, the loopholes noted should be addressed. The thesis reveals threats to an 
otherwise viable, unsullied system of adjudication at the chiefs and headmen’s courts which 
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must be addressed. The thesis also reveals that the path to a more viable process extends 
beyond the adroitness and expertise of the judge to include other areas incidental to the 
process that must be addressed, ranging from the content of legal education, ongoing 
knowledge and skills acquisition, the operations of the courts and the engagement of requisite 
staff, requirements for the recruitments of judges bestowed with this responsibility and 
economic interventions. These must be addressed including measures that enhance the 
integrity of the process. The solutions cannot ignore the socio-economic and political 
environment which one way or the other contribute to this process. To adequately address 
these would entail policies and deliberate interventions that would respect the distinctiveness 
of the customary law systems even in a positivistic dominated system of law. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Map of Nigeria showing Abuja FCT
100
 
 
Map of South Africa showing the different provinces including Gauteng, Free State and North 
West Province were the courts researched are situated.
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Available at http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/ (accessed on 10/03/2017). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Federal Capital Territory Abuja, Nigeria showing the three local government councils 
where the customary courts researched are located.102 
 
 
North West Province, South Africa showing where the magistrate courts and chiefs’ 
courts researched are located.103 
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Available at 
https://www.google.co.za/search?q=map+of+north+west+province+south+africa&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
Interview questions for judges 
1. Can you tell me a little about yourself, your qualifications, and experiences in customary 
law outside legal practice? 
2. Can you describe your experience of customary law in your practice as a legal 
practitioner? 
3. How has your experience been in your adjudication of customary law cases as a judge? 
4. Can you describe your experience with respect to the ascertainment of customary law 
as a judge? 
5. Based on your experiences, what would you say are the challenges you have 
encountered with respect to ascertaining customary law in court? 
6. What is your opinion of the need to consider ‘certainty’ as a value in the customary law 
applied by a judge to the dispute before him?  
7. Can you please explain how you exercise judicial discretion in ascertaining the 
customary law you applied to disputes before you? 
8. Can you tell me what recommendations you have for a strengthened and standardised 
process of ascertainment of customary law in Nigeria/South Africa? 
9. What should I have asked you that I didn’t think to ask? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
103
Available at http://www.potatoes.co.za/regional-services/regional-map/north-west.aspx: (accessed on 
10/03/2017). 
 
297 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D 
 
Interview questions for registrars 
1. Can you tell me a little about yourself, your qualifications, and experiences in customary 
law outside legal practice? 
2. What has been your experience with respect to the adjudication of customary law by 
courts, as a court registrar? 
3. Can you explain the challenges you think the court has with respect to ascertaining 
customary law? 
4. How are assessors appointed? 
5. Can you describe the problems you face with regards to catering for participants like 
assessors and expert witnesses for the ascertainment of customary law in the court? 
6. What suggestions do you have on how the ascertainment of customary law in court can 
be improved? 
7. What should I have asked you that I didn’t think to ask? 
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APPENDIX E 
 
List of Cases for which Records of Proceedings were Analysed 
South Africa 
 
Constitutional Court cases 
Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others (CCT19/03) [2003] ZACC 18 
Bapedi Marota Mamone v Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims and 
Others (CCT 67/14) [2014] ZACC 36  
Bhe & Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate & others [2004] ZACC 17para 154. 
Gumede (born Shange) v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others (CCT 50/08) [2008] 
ZACC 23. 
Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Anor (CCT 57/12) [2013] ZACC 14 (30 May 2013). 
Pilane v Pilane (CCT 46/12) [2013] ZACC 3. 
Shilubana and Ors v Nwamitwa (CCT 03/07/2008) ZACC 
 
Supreme Court of Appeal cases 
Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2003 (6) SA 104 (SCA) 
Amantungwa & Ors v Mabuyakhulu SCA Case no 513/09. 
Bapedi Marota Mamone v Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims and 
Others (260/13) [2014] ZASCA 30 
Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Anor  SCA NBO: A541/11. 
Mthembu v Letsela SCA 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA). 
Pilane v Pilane[2012] 4 All SA 626 (SCA) 
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Shilubana and Ors v Nwamitwa [2007] (2) SA 432. (SCA) 
Southon v Moropane (755/2012) [2014] ZASCA 76. 
 
 
North West High Court cases 
Bakgatla Ba Sesfikile Community v Bakgatla Ba Kafela Tribal Authority Unreported North West 
High Court Case no. 320/11 (2011). 
Maloko & Anor v Mosimane & Anor NWHC Case No. 1843/11 
Pilane & Anor v Pilane & Anor. North West High Court (263/2010) [2011] ZANWHC 80 
Segwagwa Mamogale v Premier North West Province & Ors Case no 227/2005. 
Segwagwa Mamogale v Premier North West Province Case no 1156/2007. 
 
Others 
Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others Case No 488/2001. 
Amantungwa & Ors v Mabuyakhulu. NPD Case No. 4023/08 
Bapedi Marota Mamone v Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims and 
Others GNP [2012] 4 All SA 544 (GNP) 
Bhe & Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate & others WC Case No. 9489/02 
Gumede (born Shange) v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others Case No. 
4225/2006. 
Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Anor GNP Case No. 29241/09. 
Mthembu v Letsela Case No 488/2001 
Shilubana and Ors v Nwamitwa TPD Case No. 25411/2002. 
Southon v Moropane (14295/10) [2012] ZAGPJHC 146. 
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Magistrate court cases 
 
Botlholo Motswamasimo v Moholo Gadifele Magistrate Court Lehurutshe Unreported Case No 
03/2011 
Charles Obakeng Morule v Kenole Aleta Matlhaku Magistrate Court Lehurutshe (Could not sight 
the case number but judgment was delivered on 15/12/2005). 
Ditile Pitso v Mogami Modiri Dinokana Magistrate Court Lehurutshe (Could not sight the case 
number but judgment was delivered on 19/01/2005). 
Kharu Matlhoko v Bothonoka Pheto Magistrate Court Lehurutshe Unreported Case No. 04/11 
Lesego Diutlwileng v Tshotlego Lebelwane Magistrate Court Lehurutshe Unreported Case No 
08/2003  
Maribana Mokgaotsi v Shimane Maduenyane & Kenaope Maduenyane Magistrate Court 
Lehurutshe (Could not sight the case number but judgment was delivered on 11/04/2006). 
Maphuye Onkemetse Sophy v Balebetse Maphunye Bahurutshe Magistrate Court Lehurutshe t 
Unreported Case No. 06/2013 
Molokwane Modise v Molokwane Semakaleng Sophie Magistrate Court Lehurutshe Unreported 
Appeal No. 1/2011  
Mongae Tiro v Sebogodi Israel Magistrate Court Lehurutshe (Could not sight the case number 
but judgment was delivered on 12/12/03). 
Patricia Nazo v Mogami Moeng Mmabatho Magistrate Court Unreported Appeal No 2971/13. 
 
Tlogelang Mosagale v Nkaki Mooketsi Magistrate Court Lehurutshe Unreported Case No. 
18/03. 
 
Courts of Chiefs & Headsmen Cases 
Botlholo Motswamasimo v Moholo Gadifele Chief’s Court Dinokana Unreported Case No. 
16/2010. 
Charles Obakeng Morule v Kenole Aleta Matlhaku Bahurutshe Ba Ga Gopane Tribal Court 
Unreported Case No. 04/2004 
Ditile Pitso v Mogami Modiri Unreported Dinokana Chiefs Court Case No. 08/2003. 
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Frans Lesomo Mokobota v Ontibile Lillian Mokobota Bahurutshe Ba Ga Gopane Tribal Court 
Unreported Case No. 01/2012 
Gaboile Seaketso v Richard Mogwera Molele Bahurutshe Ba Ga Gopane Tribal Court 
Unreported Case No. 02/2001. 
Maduenyane Mokgaotsi v Maribana Mokgaotsi Tribal Court Bahurutshe Ba Lenloe Witlegat 
(Could not sight the case number but judgment was given on 11/04/2006) 
Magakala M. v Magakgala Magogwe Unreported Bahurutshe Ba Ga Gopane Unreported Tribal 
Court Case No. 02/2012 
Maphuye Onkemetse Sophy v Balebetse Maphunye Bahurutshe Ba Ga Gopane Tribal Court 
Unreported Case No. 2012/09/10 
Mmaisaka Andronica Molokwane v Boenyana Mafoko Bahurutshe Ba Ga Gopane Tribal Court 
Unreported Case No. 10/2002 
Molokwane Modise V Molokwane Semakaleng Tribal Court Of Bahurutshe Ba Ga Gopane 
Unreported Case No. 6/2010.  
Mongae Tiro V Sebogodi Israel Bahurutshe Ba Ga Gopane Unreported Tribal Court Case No. 
15/2003  
Moruakgomo David Molefe v Sello Solomon Mokgatlhe Bahurutshe Ba Ga Gopane Tribal Court 
Unreported Case No. 03/2002 
Phefo Bothonoka v Matlhoko Kaaru Bahurutshe Dinokana Unreported Case No.04/2011 
Semakaleng Sophie Molokwane v Modise Molokwane Bahurutshe Ba Ga Gopane Tribal Court 
Unreported Case No. 6/2010 
Tlogelang Mosagale v Nkaki Mooketsi Unreported Case No. 2003/10/07. 
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